Problems of Communism

Book Reviews

Nicholas Vaslef
Francis P. Hoeber &
Robert Dannenberg
Robert W. Campbell
Gordon B. Smith
Samuel P. Huntington
Oles Smolansky

MAY-JUNE 1983

CHOICE AND CHANGE IN SOVIET POLITICS
William E. Odom

Europe in Soviet Eyes
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Poland's Military Burden
Michael Checinski

Insurgency in Southeast Asia
Shee Poon Kim

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Cover: General Secretary Yuriy Andropov and Soviet Defense Minister Dmitriy Ustinov at the May Day 1983 parade in Moscow's Red Square: Photo by Time.

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Articles

Choice and Change in Soviet Politics
William E. Odom

Yuriy Andropov is thoroughly familiar with the domestic side of Soviet politics and society. As long-time head of the KGB and member of the powerful Defense Council, Andropov was exposed to the critical economic and social problems of the country. Despite the many problems facing the USSR, Andropov will most likely attempt to continue Brezhnev's strategy of muddling through at home and seeking more targets of opportunity abroad.

Europe in Soviet Eyes
Adam Ulam

The Marshall Plan brought unprecedented economic prosperity to Western Europe. But the Plan failed to achieve one of its basic aims—the political integration of the West. Current Soviet policy toward Europe is designed to exploit this weakness, nurturing the fragmentation of the European community on the one hand and encouraging and deepening the fissures within the Atlantic Alliance on the other. The Soviet leadership fluctuates over how to accomplish this: by patience and prudence, or by aggressiveness and risk-taking.

Poland's Military Burden
Michael Checinski

Ever since 1949, a Soviet-imposed military-industrial buildup has substantially slowed Poland's economic growth. Major costs include steady diversion of resources from civilian investment, a long-term arms trade deficit, and heavy expenditure on unproductive infrastructure. The privileged military sector has also impeded economic reform, indirectly contributing to Poland's continuing political unrest.

Insurgency in Southeast Asia
Shee Poon Kim

Communist insurgencies in the countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations have not prospered in the period following establishment of Communist rule in Kampuchea, Laos, and South Vietnam. This reflects internal weaknesses in the insurgencies, the resistance of local cultures and polities to Communist activities, and the absence or decline of external assistance.

* * *

Essay-reviews

Soviet Strategic Style
Nicholas Vaslef

Analysis of Soviet military literature offers valuable insights into Moscow's strategic perceptions—including temptations for a lightning strike in Europe. But Soviet concerns about troop passivity, inadequate command technology, and Eastern Europe's ultimate military unreliability might inhibit such aggressive moves.

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Moscow and the Military Use of Space
Francis P.Hoeber and Robert M. Dannenberg

Soviet leaders took an early interest in the military applications of space technology. The Soviet military first developed the ICBM program and then sought to perfect the USSR's antisatellite and antiballistic missile systems. They are now experimenting with high-energy laser and particle-beam weapons. The USSR's continued progress in developing these systems has in part been responsible for rekindling US interest in space technologies.

Economic Issues in the USSR
Robert W. Campbell

A major compendium of scholarly articles just released by the Joint Economic Committee of the US Congress pictures the Soviet economy as faltering. Among the factors that will keep annual increases of Soviet GNP at or below 2 percent in the coming decade are a sharp slowdown in the growth of the labor force and stagnation or even decline in productivity. At the same time, there is no sign of easing in the competition for resources among investment, consumption, and military spending.

Technology Transfer and Soviet Innovation
Gordon B. Smith

Recent studies on the effect of technology transfer to the Soviet Union reveal that while Western technology has come to play a central role in some production sectors (e.g., synthetic fibers and fertilizers), Moscow still has not overcome the systemic and institutional barriers to self-sustaining innovation. Even in defense-related industries, change tends to be "evolutionary" and imitative rather than genuinely innovative.

Weighing Power and Principle
Samuel P. Huntington

Zbigniew Brzezinski's memoirs of his years as President Carter's national security adviser show the challenges and frustrations inherent in the foreign policy process. The book describes the need to balance foreign and domestic policy imperatives, diplomacy and force, and above all the competitive and cooperative aspects of Soviet-American relations.

Gulf Security and Outside Powers
Oles Smolansky

Instability remains a major issue in the Persian/Arabian Gulf region, largely because of internal political and socioeconomic dislocations. Outside powers can only marginally contribute to or capitalize upon this regional turmoil—as demonstrated by Soviet difficulties in exploiting either the Iranian revolution or the Iran-Iraq war.

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Choice and Change in Soviet Politics

by William E. Odom

Anticipated for several years, the post-Brezhnev era is at last here. In the West it has been awaited as a turning point, a time when new policy initiatives and new political forces would come into play. Many viewed it optimistically as a chance for positive change in both Soviet foreign and domestic policies. A new generation of younger leaders, it was hoped, might bring a surge of imagination and energy leading to significant reform internally and a new détente with the West—with genuine concessions on arms control and "rules of the game" for regional competition permitting the USSR to draw back from its rather extended commitments, especially in the Third World—in order to give more attention to solving accumulated domestic problems. Others anticipated a rapid turnover of elites, internal reform, but no retreat from an assertive foreign policy.

When Yuriy Andropov speedily succeeded Leonid Brezhnev as party general secretary, it came as a surprise to many, particularly those who expected positive change. How could this happen? How could Andropov, long the head of the secret police (KGB), achieve what his predecessor Lavrentiy Beria apparently tried and failed to achieve after Stalin's death? Surely his accession must be merely the first round in the succession struggle. Surely the younger set among the leadership will not let things settle down until the geriatric Politburo has been repopulated with a youthful membership. To be sure, old age is forcing turnover in elites at an increasing rate; nevertheless, the anticipated breakup of consensus in the Politburo and of the policymaking system has yet to occur and seems unlikely in the near future. The real surprise is that students of Soviet affairs generally did not anticipate what has happened thus far; namely, they did not take the Andropov candidacy seriously and expected a much more erratic transfer of power.

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Why Andropov?

Why, indeed, did Andropov win the first round? The answer to this question lies primarily in the organizational and structural features of the Soviet party-state system at its apex. All of Lenin's successors—Stalin, Malenkov, Khrushchev, Brezhnev, and Andropov—held positions in two key institutions: the Politburo and the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. As Merle Fainsod, Leonard Schapiro, and others have pointed out, real power in the party-state system depends above all on controlling party cadre assignments, that is, personnel.[1] The institution offering that control is the Secretariat. Lenin depended on Yakov Sverdlov to manage cadres in the early years of the Soviet regime.[2] After Sverdlov's death, Stalin gradually took over this task, using the Organization Bureau and the Secretariat to set up a comprehensive personnel system. Challenges to his grip on cadres failed, and Stalin slowly accumulated enough power to have himself named general secretary in 1922.

[1]See, e.g., Merle Fainsod, *How Russia is Ruled*, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1963, pp. 180–84; and Leonard Schapiro, *The Communist Party of the Soviet Union*, New York, NY, Random House, 1960, pp. 548, 550–53.

[2]Schapiro, op. cit., pp. 243–50, and William E. Odom, "Sverdlov: Bolshevik Party Organizer," *Slavonic and East European Review* (London), July 1966, pp. 421–43.

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

Key Soviet leaders at a wreath-laying during the December 1982 observances of the 60th anniversary of the USSR, in the first row, from left to right: Defense Minister Dmitriy Ustinov, Politburo member and Central Committee Secretary Konstantin Chernenko, General Secretary Yuriy Andropov, Premier Nikolay Tikhonov, and Foreign Minister Andrey Gromyko.

—Gamma-Liaison.

The key to cadre control is the *nomenklatura* system, institutionalized early in the Soviet regime. It is a list of positions which can only be filled by persons who have the approval of the higher party apparatus.[3] One of the Secretariat's major roles is looking after the hundreds of thousands of *nomenklatura* posts. They include not just positions in the party apparatus but also thousands of posts judged essential for controlling state and economic institutions. The *nomenklatura* system ensures for the Secretariat a network of reliable agents in all institutions of consequence who are beholden to the Secretariat for the rank, stature, and privileges that accompany these strategic posts. There is no sign that this system has atrophied or weakened significantly since its inception. The Secretariat, therefore, remains key for any aspirant to the top political post in the party. Without it, he could not hope to make the Central Committee and lower party officialdom sing his tune in choosing a new general secretary. It goes without saying, then, that any serious candidate in the post-Brezhnev succession had to be a party secretary. It goes equally without saying that an aspirant for the highest post had also to be a member of the Politburo, the top policy- and decision-making body of the party. There is no precedent in Soviet history of anyone who was not a Politburo member becoming general secretary of the CPSU.

Had Brezhnev died several years ago, Andropov might well have failed to claim the General Secretary's

[3]See Fainsod, op cit., pp. 224, 515, 518.

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mantle. There were other Politburo members also holding party secretary posts who could have been serious challengers. Mikhail Suslov's position was undoubtedly quite powerful in light of his long tenure in both top party organs. Dmitriy Ustinov held both posts for a time. Andrey Kirilenko was long judged a likely successor precisely because he held both positions. And Konstantin Chernenko's ascendancy as a potential successor derived from the same dual base.

However, in January 1982 Suslov died. Ustinov, who became minister of defense in 1976, had yielded his secretary post in the same year. Kirilenko has been reported to have been in less than robust health during the past few years, a factor that may account for his failure to win the first post-Brezhnev round. Chernenko certainly held the requisite posts, and had to be taken seriously as a competitor, notwithstanding his somewhat mousy character and clerk-like subservience to Brezhnev.

Thus, the key question for a serious Kremlinologist became "who would replace Suslov in the Secretariat?" This would be the critical clue to the nature of the expected succession struggle. There were two dramatically different possibilities. One was unlikely but had to be considered because, had it occurred, the succession dynamics would have been altered fundamentally. This would have been to turn to the Leningrad or Ukrainian party organization, both of which have always played key roles in party factional struggles. Grigoriy Romanov, reportedly a very tough and hard-line younger Politburo member, might well have been brought to Moscow from Leningrad to work as secretary. But Volodymyr Shcherbytskyi, first secretary of the Ukrainian party, was a more likely candidate. Because he is relatively young, he could have brought new energy to the top party apparatus.

Had either of these Politburo members captured Suslov's post as secretary, we would be facing a quite different situation in the post-Brezhnev era. They would have worked rapidly during the last months of Brezhnev's life to shuffle as many party posts as possible in preparation for the succession struggle. They would have brought their own coterie of party *apparatchiki* into the competition. The Moscow center would have been under assault by cadres from a regional center. In that circumstance, a quick and easy transfer of power to a new general secretary would have been virtually impossible. A period of uncertainty would have been inevitable while the regional group fought it out with Andropov, Chernenko, and others who held the important ground in Moscow.

A second possibility is the one that did occur. A new secretary was found in the small circle of those who were already well-entrenched in Moscow. Had the choice been someone who was not also a Politburo member, that would have augured well for Chernenko. Even Viktor Grishin, a Politburo member and head of the Moscow city party organization, might not have posed a serious challenge to Chernenko, since he lacked two trump cards that Andropov brought to the game.

Andropov's first card was obvious: his many years as head of the KGB. This provided him with the power that comes from KGB counterintelligence work within all state, party, and military organizations. The *internal* counterintelligence role gave Andropov a far stronger position than is generally recognized by Western analysts. It made him very knowledgeable of *nomenklatura* and cadre assignments because clearance for such assignments involves a KGB security check. It also gave Andropov familiarity with the daily institutional activities of all the organizations that his agents watch, that is, virtually the entire state apparatus. In this respect, Andropov had a much closer acquaintance with the operation of the Soviet economy than one might ordinarily suppose. The view occasionally expressed in the West that he has no experience with the economy is factually inaccurate: Andropov has vast experience with the way the economic bureaucrats and factory managers cheat the system, falsify reports, and fulfill their plans in appearance if not in reality. Another little-understood role that Andropov played in the economy as head of the KGB concerns acquisition of Western technology, legally and illegally. The Ministry of Foreign Trade enjoys only a subordinate role in this regard, since the KGB and the Ministry of Defense dominate foreign trade decisions.[4]

Andropov's second card was less obvious. He seems to have been a key figure in the Defense Council. His position on this body may well have been the most significant factor in Andropov's quick gaining of power. To understand the basis for this judgment requires some background on the Defense Council's role and composition. It is the lineal descendant of the Council of Labor and Defense (STO) from the early days of the regime. During World War II, the State Defense Committee (GKO) had a similar role. After the war, the GKO disappeared, at least from public view. The STO and GKO both consisted of a small subset of Politburo members who coordinated manpower, industry, and agriculture on the one hand, with military

[4]Michael Sadykiewicz, "Soviet Military Politics," *Survey* (London), No. 26, Winter 1982, p. 193, shows the Foreign Trade Ministry's intelligence role and its linkage to the Defense Council.

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requirements on the other. Both were extremely powerful bodies whose decisions were not challenged by the Politburo as a whole. They could dictate to the economic and industrial planning apparatus. And they were the highest court of appeal on the allocation of resources for the military.[5]

By the early 1970's, and perhaps even earlier, this old organizational device became operative again. The Military Industrial Commission, headed by the deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers, gave the military industries a corporate executive at the highest level. The Military Collegium in the Ministry of Defense provided a parallel corporate executive for the military leadership. The two institutions undoubtedly work in considerable harmony, but issues are bound to arise that transcend that harmony or require a higher policy decision. Such decisions are made in the Defense Council.[6]

When Andrey Gromyko, Andrey Grechko, and Andropov were elected to the Politburo in 1973, it was not difficult to infer that this old organizational system was reemerging. These men made up the foreign-policy/military/police clique which had formed the STO and GKO in the past.[7] It made sense for Brezhnev to bring them into the Politburo where they could help him carry the vote on his foreign and military policies. In 1974, the Defense Council was mentioned in the Soviet press and its existence has been public knowledge since that time.[8]

We cannot be entirely sure about the make-up of the Defense Council, but it seems logical that Andropov, Gromyko, and—after Grechko's death—Ustinov must have joined Brezhnev to form this body. Possibly Suslov and Aleksey Kosygin were members. In any event, this group includes those who are knowledgeable about military and foreign policy, as well as economic issues, by virtue of their state duties. Every Politburo member does not have time to immerse himself in these areas. The Defense Council subset of the Politburo, therefore, probably has a free hand in foreign policy and military issues since other Politburo members are not in a position to gain adequate information and staff support to challenge the arguments on such matters by the Council members.

Had an outsider like Shcherbytskyi come to the Secretariat, he would have had to abolish the Defense Council or quickly make it subordinate to his wishes. Otherwise, his chances of gaining the top post in the party would have been small. If Chernenko was not a member of the Defense Council, this would have contributed to his political weakness; however, it is probable that Brezhnev had included him.

Speculation has been widespread that Ustinov and the military establishment threw their lot in with Andropov, making his ascendancy possible. Whatever the case, one can assume that Andropov and Ustinov had worked together in considerable harmony for several years. Moreover, if Ustinov did play a key role in Andropov's selection as general secretary, his personal support sufficed; "military" support in the broader sense was not necessary. And unless Ustinov truly detested Andropov, he was unlikely to have backed a regional party chief like Shcherbytskyi or Romanov given the uncertainty and turmoil that the ascendancy of such a leader would bring to the central party apparatus. In fact, one may wonder why Ustinov himself did not bid for the top post, since institutionally he was in a strong position to do so, having served not long ago as a party secretary.

In any event, the uncertainty of the situation was greatly reduced in the spring of 1982 when Andropov became a party secretary. From that point, there was no real possibility of another challenger making a serious bid. Andropov offered a smooth institutional transition, the least turmoil in the succession process. Furthermore, it is improbable that Andropov, Ustinov, and other key figures had not been working out a succession sequence months if not years before Brezhnev died. The succession struggle—to the degree there is one—did not begin with Brezhnev's death; it had been in progress for some time.

However, Andropov himself is not a young man, and the next succession cannot be far off. Will it proceed as smoothly? This depends on who is brought into the Secretariat and the Politburo. If new people can be co-opted in an orderly fashion, the next succession, too, ought to be smooth. Certainly, the organizational structure is such that it can be. A series of

[5]Ibid., pp. 179–212; Victor Suvorov, *Inside the Soviet Army*, New York, NY, Macmillan, 1983; Sergei Freidzon, "Estimating the Current and Long-run Limitations of the Soviet Defense Burden," prepared for the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Net Assessment, Washington, DC, 1981, pp. 37–57; M. V. Zakharov, et al., *50 let Vooruzhënnykh sil SSSR* (50 Years of the Armed Forces of the USSR), Moscow, Voyenizdat, 1968; Edward L. Warner, III, *The Military in Contemporary Soviet Politics*, New York, NY, Praeger Special Studies, 1977, pp. 272–74. There has been a certain amount of confusion in Western literature on lineal descendancy of the Defense Council. Sometimes, as in Warner's case, the STO is seen as the antecedent of the present-day Military Industrial Commission, sometimes of the Military Collegium. Neither is accurate. The Military Industrial Commission traces back through the state economic apparatus, while the Military Collegium is within the Ministry of Defense and traces back to the Revolutionary Military Council. The top-level military/economic/scientific infrastructure is more complex than I have portrayed here. Freidzon gives a good description, especially of the state side including Gosplan, the supply system, and the Council of Ministers. Sadykiewicz gives a particularly interesting analysis of the Defense Council's relationship to the rest of the state and party hierarchy.

[6]Sadykiewicz, loc. cit.

[7]See William E. Odom, "Who Controls Whom in Moscow?" *Foreign Policy* (Washington, DC), Summer 1975, esp., pp. 119–23.

[8]V. G. Kulikov, "The Brain of the Army," *Pravda* (Moscow), Nov. 13, 1974.

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West German Chancellor Willy Brandt meets with Soviet party chief Leonid Brezhnev in the Crimea in September 1971.

—BLACK STAR.

deaths among the Politburo members, of course, could force the pace of change, making the co-optation process difficult to manage. But even in that event, the institutional arrangements will remain to define the playing field on which the struggle for the general secretary's position is carried out. The need to organize the society for military-command affairs, for an aggressive foreign policy, and for the continued modernization of Soviet military forces provides strong institutional imperatives that challengers cannot easily dismiss or throw into disarray without consequences they would not desire. The breakup of the central policymaking system, therefore, may not be as likely as some have anticipated.[9]

Brezhnevism: A Legacy

In order to judge prospects for the post-Brezhnev period, it is necessary to define the basic nature of the Brezhnev era. In brief, it combined foreign policy *mobilism* with domestic policy *immobilism*.

In the international arena, Brezhnev scored remarkable gains for the USSR. They were not all of his making, but he certainly took advantage of key opportunities that arose. With the coming to power of the Social Democratic Party (SPD) in West Germany, he reversed Soviet policy toward Bonn and offered small rewards for the SPD's new Ostpolitik. At the same time, he utilized the American opening on strategic arms control to relax tensions between the superpowers. In turn, he got a slowing of US strategic programs, acknowledgment that the USSR was a superpower, and a surge of East-West economic interaction financed by the West. At the same time, he brought the West to recognize more formally (at Helsinki) the post-World War II frontiers in Europe, something Khrushchev tried and failed to achieve.[10]

In the Third World, the projection of Soviet power grew unabated. As the United States turned its military attention away from NATO and toward Vietnam, Brezhnev was undoubtedly delighted, not only because it weakened NATO but also because it affected US public attitudes toward an assertive US foreign

[9]See Seweryn Bialer, "The Harsh Decade: Soviet Policies in the 1980s," *Foreign Affairs* (New York, NY), Summer 1981, pp. 1012–15.

[10]See Adam Ulam, *The Rivals: America and Russia Since World War II*, New York, NY, The Viking Press, 1971, pp. 299–340, for an account of Khrushchev's scheme to force Western recognition of East Germany.

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policy. While appearing to cooperate with the United States on a settlement in Vietnam, Brezhnev kept an abundant supply of military materiel flowing to his North Vietnamese allies.

The major setback for Brezhnev came in 1972 in the Middle East when Anwar al-Sadat ordered Soviet advisers out of Egypt. Having invested a great deal there as a strategic anchor for Soviet policy in the Middle East, the USSR found itself abruptly expelled from a key position in the region. By the end of the decade, however, with the help of Cuban forces, Brezhnev had reasserted Soviet influence in the region, gaining important positions in Ethiopia and South Yemen while holding on to significant influence in Syria and Iraq. And, of course, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan created new pressure on the north side of the Persian Gulf region. The Soviet-Cuban venture in Angola made the USSR a larger factor than had been the case previously in southern Africa. After General Anastasio Somoza's fall in Nicaragua in 1979, Brezhnev was able to launch the Soviet-Cuban partnership on a new offensive in the Caribbean region. The US withdrawal from Vietnam gave the USSR, through its client regime in Hanoi, hegemony in Vietnam, Laos, and Kampuchea.

Other than Egypt, the only major negative development from the Soviet viewpoint was the normalization of relations between the United States and China. Brezhnev, of course, inherited the Sino-Soviet split. Apparently accepting it as irreversible in the short run, he set about containing China, establishing a strong position in Southern Asia—in India and Afghanistan—and reducing tensions in Europe while expanding the size of Soviet military forces on the Sino-Soviet border more than threefold.[11]

The backdrop for this foreign policy offensive was the steady Soviet military buildup. In almost all cate-

[11]See Thomas W. Robinson, "The Sino-Soviet Border Conflict," in Stephen Kaplan, Ed., *Diplomacy of Power*, Washington, DC, The Brookings Institution, 1981, p. 287.



Soviet BTR-70 armored personnel carriers come ashore from a hovercraft during 1981 Warsaw Pact maneuvers on the Baltic Coast of Poland.

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gories of military power, the USSR equaled the United States and exceeded it in some.[12] In a real sense, the Soviet military buildup in the 1970's marks a qualitative change in the postwar East-West military balance, no mean achievement for Brezhnev.

The Brezhnev era indeed was a time of great Soviet foreign policy mobilism. Moscow showed astuteness in reading the political climate in the West and in encouraging "realistic" circles there to curb any serious Western attempt to match or check Soviet assertiveness. In the Third World, Moscow not only replaced US influence almost entirely in southeast Asia but also created a major geopolitical challenge to vital Western interests in the Persian Gulf region. Although he lived only long enough to see it begin, Brezhnev threw the USSR into a new offensive for influence in Central America.

On the domestic front Brezhnev left quite another record. The economy certainly enjoyed an infusion of Western technology, but on the whole, economic entropy seems to have been the dominant trend. The "second economy" and massive corruption have grown to proportions that appear to exceed the regime's capacity (or will) to repress them with punitive and "administrative" methods. Two attempts at reform came to nothing. In the 1960's, a number of reforms, associated with the name of economist Yevsey Liberman, were introduced with little apparent result. In the early 1970's, great press fanfare accompanied the concept of production associations and the freeing of inefficient labor from economic enterprises. Many officials in the central economic apparatus were to move closer to production, away from Moscow. In any event, little of note happened in response to these organizational measures for economic improvement.[13]

Symptomatic of the decay in the economy was the discussion of the need to shift from an "extensive" to an "intensive" approach to economic growth. Abram Bergson's estimates of the trends in Soviet factor productivity cut to the root of the problem.[14] The decline in factor productivity meant that larger and larger amounts of capital would be required to sustain growth, and—at best—the rate of growth would continue to decline unless some significant changes were introduced in the Soviet growth model. By 1975, matters reached a point where the leadership, faced with the necessity to cut back in at least one major sector—investment, consumption, or defense—decided to reduce investment in favor of consumption without touching defense.[15]

This decision tells us a lot about Brezhnevism. The General Secretary realized that the economy was in serious difficulty. Yet he would not touch defense allocations. Rather, he reduced investment to save consumption. This was a sign not of aggressive economic leadership but of resignation—perhaps temporary—in the face of stagnation, lethargy, and inefficiency. It is also possible that the economic planners had concluded that the return on larger investment had become too small to make the pain of sacrifice elsewhere worth it. Defense expenditures, of course, were paying off abroad, earning money from arms sales and bringing increased prestige to the USSR as a military superpower.

Added to Brezhnev's economic woes were a number of bad harvest years and bottlenecks in oil and gas production. Both problems required foreign currency: to buy grain and to import energy production equipment. The overall energy problem brought sharp shifts in resource allocations in 1981–82 aimed at relieving bottlenecks, but the result is meager thus far.[16] The great agricultural program for the non-black earth region, an attempt to ameliorate the agricultural problem, and other schemes have accomplished little, compelling the USSR to rely on imports.[17]

Perhaps the most dramatic sign of domestic policy immobilism is to be found in the growth of corruption and the so-called second economy. Konstantin Simis offers an inside account of corruption, its dimensions and the regime's unwillingness to move against it. The party elite seems to be the most corrupt and the least punished when caught. Even the Georgian affair—in which Vasiliy Mzhavanadze, a candidate member of the CPSU Politburo, was implicated—did not bring indictment or loss of party membership to the most heavily involved.[18] Ironically, at about the same time—in 1972—Brezhnev initiated a party "documents exchange" which he described as not simply a "technical" affair but as a "politically principled inspection of the party's ranks."[19] Traditionally such ex-

[12] See *Soviet Military Power*, 2nd ed., Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1983.

[13] See Gertrude Schroeder, "The Soviet Economy on a Treadmill of 'Reforms,'" US Congress, Joint Economic Committee, *Soviet Economy in a Time of Change*, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1979, Vol. 1, pp. 329–40.

[14] See Bergson, "Toward a New Growth Model," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), March-April 1973, pp. 1–9.

[15] Myron Rush, "Guns over Growth in Soviet Policy," *International Security* (Cambridge, MA), Winter 1982–83, pp. 167–79.

[16] Karl-Eugene Wädekin, "Soviet Agriculture: Dependence on the West," *Foreign Affairs*, No. 60, Spring, 1982, pp. 882–903, provides an analysis of Soviet agrarian problems and performances.

[17] Ibid.

[18] Simis, *USSR: The Corrupt Society*, New York, NY, Simon and Shuster, 1982, pp. 53–60.

[19] See the lead editorials in *Pravda*, June 24, 1972 and *Krasnaya zvezda* (Moscow), June 29, 1972.

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Soviet and Czechoslovak party delegations discuss the political crisis in Czechoslovakia at the July 29-August 1, 1968, meeting in Cierna nad Tissou just west of the border with the USSR. Among those accompanying Soviet party leader Leonid Brezhnev (second from left) are, to his right, Nikolay Podgornyy, and to his left, Alexsey Kosygin, Mikhail Suslov, Petro Shelest, Konstantin Katushev, Boris Ponomarëv, and Konstantin Rusakov; leading the Czechoslovak delegation was Alexander Dubček (fourth from the foreground at the right)

—EUPRA.

changes were implemented as purges, designed to reinvigorate the party apparatus, to bring it back to Leninist norms of self-sacrifice and revolutionary dedication. The Brezhnev documents exchange dragged on for two years and was still receiving press attention in 1975.[20] Notwithstanding this "principled inspection" of the party's ranks, few if any party members were expelled, and corruption continued unabated. The contrast with the Krushchev and Stalin shake-ups of the party could hardly have been greater.

The Soviet dissident movement offers ambiguous evidence about the Brezhnev regime's inability to prevent internal decay.[21] Judgments vary on the extent and importance of this movement, but it did test Soviet repressive capabilities. In the last few years, its vitality has been sapped by the KGB. In fact, the regime has displayed considerable ingenuity in breaking it up and, in this regard, the dissidents appear to have found and exceeded the regime's limits of toleration. Nevertheless, the mere emergence of the movement indicates a degree of internal decay.

The Brezhnev period also witnessed serious challenges to Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe. Although Brezhnev proved willing to use force to break resistance in Prague, he had to take the entire Politburo with him to negotiate with Alexander Dubček on the Czech-Soviet border in the spring of 1968: clearly he did not have unrestrained power to act on his own, and he also may have wanted to spread the responsibility among his colleagues. Problems in Poland, beginning in the winter of 1970–71, reemerged in far more threatening dimensions in 1980. Political and police "salami tactics" exercised through Polish authorities have whittled down organized opposition and brought matters in Poland under temporary control, but the mere fact that such developments could occur indicates the degree of immobilism in bloc policy that beset Brezhnev's leadership.

Today the Soviet leadership is confronted with both the successes and failures of Brezhnevism. The successes derived from a highly flexible and assertive foreign policy accompanied by the largest and most comprehensive military buildup ever witnessed. The failures can be attributed to the retention of the Leninist and Stalinist party/police/state structure resting on a centrally planned economy without retention of the system's mechanisms for revitalization, that is, purges of the party elite and rigid enforcement of labor discipline. This is not to suggest that the system would have been more successful with the retention of full-blown Stalinism, but it is to identify the basic change that permitted domestic policy immobilism and decay to reach their present dimensions.

Factors of Change and Continuity

The prospects for the Andropov regime and its successors are constrained to a large degree by the objective factors of change that have accompanied Brezhnevism. Western analysis of these factors has not proven very perspicacious. In the 1960's, it became popular among Western specialists on the Soviet Union to take the "group approach" to the political analysis of change in the USSR. De-Stalinization, many agreed, had introduced conditions for signif-

[20] See *Pravda*, and *Krasnaya zvezda*, Feb. 7, 1975.

[21] See Andrei Amalrik, *Notes of a Revolutionary*, trans. by Guy Daniels, New York, NY, Knopf, 1982.

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icant change in the Soviet system. The task of analysis was to discover what these conditions were and anticipate the political development of the system. A review of such endeavors based on the group theory of politics led me to the conclusion that the approach anticipated the results before the evidence was thoroughly examined.[22] Despite the failure of pluralism to develop in the USSR, many analysts still cling to the interest-group approach in analyzing Soviet politics. Some analysts dismiss critiques of the group approach as being an assertion that the system remains "monolithic," an assertion undercut by signs of the diffusion of power.

The important question, however, is not *whether* power is diffused but *how* it is diffusing. Pluralism is only one way for power to be diffused, and it depends on very particular circumstances in a polity whether the pluralist variant of diffusion takes place. Bureaucratic decay is another way for power to be diffused in a monolithic system. Regionalism is yet another way, and when regionalism is reinforced by nationalism, that represents yet another diffusion mechanism not very compatible with the pluralistic model. A review of key institutional, economic, and social factors in the USSR demonstrates that while much has changed and power has diffused within the system, continuity also remains strong and the diffusion of power has hardly followed pluralist patterns.

In assessing the extent to which institutional change has occurred, one must look, above all, at the *centrally planned economy*. While hundreds of small policy changes have been introduced to cope with undesired organizational consequences and behavior, the essential institutional structure remains unaltered. There has been no significant expansion of market pricing, not even in the marginal manner observed in some East European states, most notably Hungary. The USSR State Planning Commission (Gosplan) retains its dominant role in setting prices and allocating resources. Although "economic success indicators" have been modified in many ways in an unending search for more efficiency, the essential character of the system has been carefully preserved.[23] This lack of institutional change, of course, is a reflection of the leadership's strong preference for the kind of political control the system affords for directing the economy, for making its structural development and its output conform to "planners' preferences" as opposed to "consumers' preferences."

The most dramatic change is found in what the unchanged planning institutions are capable of doing. In the 1950's, American graduate students studying the Soviet economy were taught that central planning in the USSR permitted directing a higher investment rate at those sectors that the planners desired to expand.[24] Problem areas such as agriculture and efficiency of capital investment were not ignored, but professors left their students with the impression that the Soviet system could mobilize resources and direct them more or less as the leaders chose, notwithstanding consumer and other demands. That was probably a fairly accurate assessment of the Soviet economic system in its first three or four decades. Today, it no longer adequately describes the system.

The dialectics of growth have brought a major change in the economic system. As the aggregate capital stock has grown, it has required ever larger amounts of new investment to make a proportional change in the structure of the capital stock. In other words, the central planners' ability to shift investment significantly from one sector to another is not as great as it was earlier. The discretion they retain in altering the capital-stock structure declines each year. The extraordinary restructuring of the economy in the 1930's and in the postwar reconstruction period can not be easily repeated, and is perhaps impossible, today.

This diminution of planners' discretion is not only the result of the size of the economy. It is perhaps equally the result of what economist Fyodor Kushnirsky calls the absence of managerial responsibility.[25] It seems to be beyond the power of Soviet planners to close down inefficient economic activities. They may expand activities and create new ones, but they seldom cause a firm to go bankrupt. The forces against bankruptcy action include not only diffusion of responsibility within the managerial system but also regional party influence and the fear of creating unemployment. Official acknowledgment of the decline of planners' discretion is implicit in the slogan that growth now depends on "intensive" methods rather than traditional "extensive" methods of economic development. The call for greater labor productivity is inspired by keen awareness of the decline in discretionary factor inputs at the disposal of planners.

[22] See William E. Odom, "A Dissenting View on the Group Approach to Soviet Politics," *World Politics* (Princeton, NJ), July 1976, pp. 542–67.

[23] See Fyodor I. Kushnirsky, *Soviet Economic Planning, 1965–1980*, Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1982, for an insider's account of the search for efficiency while avoiding fundamental reform.

[24] See, e.g., Maurice Dobbs, *Soviet Economic Development since 1917*, New York, NY, International Publishers, 1948; Harry Schwartz, *Russia's Soviet Economy*, Englewood Cliffs, NJ, Prentice-Hill, 1950, p. 54; and Abram Bergson, Ed., *Soviet Economic Growth*, Evanston, Il, Row, Peterson, 1953.

[25] Kushnirsky, op. cit., pp. 136 ff.

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A formation of BTR-70 armored personnel carriers and BMP-A mechanized infantry combat vehicles (at the rear) moves through Red Square during the November 7, 1980, Revolution Day parade. The gigantic poster to the rear calls for "A Worthy Welcome to the 26th CPSU Congress! The people and the party united! Realize the plans of the party! Glory to the CPSU! A resounding finish to the 10th Five-Year Plan."

—Novosti from Soviets.

Yet another change is the expansion of the "second economy" alluded to earlier. Irregular economic activity seems to have taken root at every level in Soviet society.[26] Naturally, this means that resources are diverted from the purposes intended by the central planners. We do not know the size of the second economy; therefore, it is impossible to judge precisely how great a factor it has become in shifting resources away from investment and plan fulfillment. But the impressionistic writings on this subject encourage us to believe that it is not trivial.[27]

The *military economy* is an objective factor of both continuity and change. Probably the greatest failing of Western study of the Soviet Union lies in lack of attention to the military-industrial sector. True, very little information about it is in the public domain, but a great deal of information has long been available about its product: Soviet military forces. They have grown steadily in size, and they are receiving technology in many cases not yet fielded in Western armies.[28] Considerable information is also available about institutional arrangements within the military-industrial sector and its relationship to the rest of the economy.[29]

The striking thing about this growing sector is its structural continuity. The essential structure was developed during World War I and the Civil War. During the ensuing New Economic Policy period, the "military industries" were not demobilized but kept under a single trust. During the First Five-Year Plan, military industry was accorded bureaucratic primacy and priority access to investment allocations. "Military representatives" *(voyenpredy)* formed a vast apparatus that

[26]See Dimitri Simes, "The Soviet Parallel Market," *Survey*, Summer 1975, pp. 42–52.

[27]See, e.g., Gregory Grossman, "The 'Second Economy' of the USSR," *Problems of Communism*, September-October 1977, pp. 25–40; and idem, "Notes on the Illegal Private Economy and Corruption," in US Congress, Joint Economic Committee, op. cit., Vol. 1, pp. 834–55.

[28]See *Soviet Military Power*, op. cit.

[29]See David Holloway, "Innovation in the Defense Sector," in R. Amann and J. Cooper, Eds., *Industrial Innovation in the Soviet Union*, New Haven, CT, Yale University Press, 1982, pp. 303–21; and Sergei Freidzon, op. cit. Also Suvorov, op. cit.; and Karl F. Spielmann, "Defense Industrialists in the USSR," *Problems of Communism*, September-October 1976, pp. 52–69.

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penetrated all industrial activities contributing to the military. They gave the military enormous control over quality, design, and pricing of military goods. They created a supply system of inputs to military industries that ensured priority of allocation. Thus, a siphon system came into being that could pump out of the civilian sector whatever resources the Politburo desired that the military receive.

This system remains essentially unchanged. Without it, the recent Soviet military buildup would have been impossible. And without taking this system into account, no complete understanding of the performance of the Soviet economy is possible. At its apex, three institutions give it unchallengeable power. First, the Military Industrial Commission, chaired by the deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers, provides central focus and management for military requirements within the state economic bureaucracy. Second, the General Staff of the Armed Forces generates the military doctrine that dictates military requirements. Through the Ministry of Defense, these requirements are levied on the Military Industrial Commission. Finally, the Defense Council provides guidance over the entire process. The Defense Industries Section of the Secretariat, of course, provides the Politburo and Defense Council with party control over the defense hierarchy. Today, this structural arrangement looks more like the one operative in the late 1920's than the one existing in the 1950's.[30] Continuity, therefore, has reasserted itself.

What has changed is the size and complexity of the military-industrial complex. The military grip on the research and development sector, including the USSR Academy of Sciences, has tightened as modern military technology has increased in diversity and importance. The size of the military-industrial production base, naturally, has grown enormously. This has not been independent of the remainder of the economy. In fact, most Soviet civilian industries have military production lines, active in some cases, on standby in others.[31] The leadership's concern for war mobilization has constrained the profile of Soviet industry perhaps more than any other factor. Military production and mobilization requirements come first. Other production considerations are secondary.

The primacy enjoyed by Soviet military industry goes far in explaining some dysfunctions in other parts of the economy. The leadership, including senior military figures, is not indifferent to the health of the economy as a whole. This should be borne in mind in interpreting recent statements of Soviet military leaders about the economy. Marshal Nikolay Ogarkov, the Chief of the General Staff, was quite candid in expressing concern about the Soviet economy.[32] Was he, as some observers have suggested, defending the Soviet military budget? Was he anticipating demands by reformers to shift resources away from military production? Or was he, in fact, articulating a general worry within senior military circles that without reforms and increased labor discipline in the overall economy, the military sector would also suffer? The last interpretation seems the most compelling as one looks more closely into the structure of the system. Marshal Ogarkov and the Minister of Defense, Marshal Ustinov, must be as concerned as other senior leaders about problems in the economy as a whole. Unless institutional reforms are proposed that include the breakup of the Military Industrial Commission and the Ministry of Defense's apparatus of "military representatives" throughout the industrial and the research-and-development sectors, the defense budget is not likely to suffer in ways that military leaders would oppose. Discussions of economic reform to date have not suggested any such radical change; rather, they have been directed toward getting the present system to produce more efficiently. Ustinov and Ogarkov surely would desire that kind of change, and they might even support Politburo decisions that trade off present military production for greater future production. There are precedents for such support by the top military in the 1920's, the late 1940's, and possibly in the late 1950's.[33]

The *new intelligentsia* has been seen by many Western observers as a source of change. Most often this anticipation takes the form of discussions about "generational change," that is, how younger age cohorts, as their members move into positions of power,

[30]See N. Suleiman, *Tyl i snabzheniye deyistvuyushchey armii* (Rear Services and Supply for a Combat Army), Moscow, Voyenizdat, 1927, Charts 31, 34; A. Vol'pe, "The Bases for Mobilizing Industry in the USSR," *Voyna i revolutsii* (Moscow), No. 7, November-December 1925, p. 75; M. V. Zakharov, "The Communist Party and the Technical Re-equipment of the Army and Navy during the Prewar Five-Year Plans," *Voyenno-istoricheskiy zhurnal* (Moscow), No. 2, 1971, pp. 3–12. Compare these with Holloway, loc. cit., Freidzon, loc. cit., and Sadykiewicz, loc. cit.

[31]See Holloway, loc. cit., p. 304.

[32]N. Ogarkov, "Defending Peaceful Endeavor," *Kommunist* (Moscow), No. 10, July 1981, pp. 80–91.

[33]I. B. Berkhin, *Voyennaya reforma v SSSR, 1924-26* (Military Reform in the USSR, 1924-26), Moscow, Voyenizdat, 1958, pp. 46–47, details the rationale of the dramatic demobilization of the Red Army in 1921–23: to redirect resources toward technical modernization for a future larger force. Matthew A. Evangelista, "Stalin's Postwar Army Reappraised," *International Security*, Winter 1982–83, pp. 110–138, discusses the extent of Soviet demobilization in 1947–48. Oleg Penkovskiy, *The Penkovskiy Papers*, Garden City, NJ, Doubleday, 1965, pp. 234–43, gives some insight into Khrushchev's manpower reductions in the late 1950's, which, it can be inferred, were aimed at cost reductions and higher technical competence in the officer corps.

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will alter Soviet policy.[34] Analysts who place emphasis on this source of change tend to expect it to have a liberalizing effect on both domestic policy and Soviet relations with the West. Jerry Hough, for example, expects that generational change will have a moderating effect on Soviet foreign policy—although it will certainly not usher in "a period of bliss in Russian-American relations"—and will be conducive to significant economic reform on the domestic front. The better-educated younger intelligentsia, particularly in the foreign policy establishment, is not, in Hough's view, as ideological and tough-minded regarding East-West competition as the older generation.[35]

Quite a different interpretation can be placed on the apparent growing sophistication of the younger generation in foreign affairs. John Lenczowski, for example, finds the younger Soviet analysts of Western affairs much abler in understanding and exploiting Western political groups and governments. He finds not so much a decline in the role of Marxism-Leninism as a greater sophistication in the use of its categories for analysis of the "international class struggle."[36] While Hough is encouraged by the pro-détente attitudes he finds among younger Soviet analysts, Lenczowski assesses détente as a major Soviet gain in the East-West competition achieved in part thanks to the more sophisticated insights brought to Soviet policymaking by these younger analysts.

The attempt to anticipate Soviet policy as a function of a generational change is likely to fail. Generations do not make policy. A few individuals in the Soviet system make policy, and even their staffs, although quite large in number, may not be a representative sample of their own generation. Moreover, because of the authoritarian character of the Soviet regime and the lack of competitive interest-articulation by social groups, generational change is less likely to have a direct effect on Soviet policymaking than it has in Western liberal democracies. "Generation" is a useful category for sociological analysis, but for political analysis its utility is distinctly limited.

How are we to deal analytically with the new Soviet intelligentsia? No one disputes that it is different from the older generation of educated elites. Better education, greater exposure to Western influences, less sharp memories of the Stalinist period, a larger proportion growing up in an urban environment, less idealism about the official ideology—these and other factors undoubtedly are causing significant differences between "fathers" and "sons" in the Soviet intelligentsia. Hough suggests that reform on the domestic front—and specifically of the economy—"would tend to benefit the most skilled and the best educated.... Since they have every incentive to think of reasons why reform would serve the interests of others and of the economy as a whole, it is difficult to believe that they will not do so. The combination of a demographic problem and an energy crisis will provide them with a golden opportunity to make the case for greater efficiency."[37] This line of reasoning may well occur to many of the new Soviet intelligentsia. Yet, for reasons we shall offer below, such reform is unlikely to occur, notwithstanding the "golden opportunity."

How will the intelligentsia react to frustration and disappointment? This is the critical factor that the leadership must face, and it is the crux of the kind of change that the new generation will bring to the system. While no one knows how they will react, we are not without historical parallels to stimulate our thinking about the possibilities. Throughout the 19th century, the autocracy frustrated the intelligentsia by rejecting reform or by failing to carry through when reform was introduced. In the last several decades of the empire, the intelligentsia had more institutional bases for pursuing reform than is now the case in the USSR or is likely to be the case in the foreseeable future. Nonetheless, it did not unite behind enlightened reform. Rather, the intelligentsia tended to polarize into radical wings. The left wing turned to revolutionary activity. The right wing became more reactionary in defense of autocracy. Nothing as dramatic as the Great Reforms of the 1860's is really to be expected in the 1980's, and even that kind of progress left the 19th-century intelligentsia in despair. Are not the conditions for polarization even greater in the 1980's?

More than a little evidence is available to suggest exactly such a social development in the USSR. The dissident movement reflects the anti-regime wing of the new Soviet intelligentsia,[38] while Lenczowski's analysis of the younger generation of Marxist-Leninist foreign policy analysts identifies the pro-regime wing. Its members have been described by many émigrés. The younger KGB personnel show remarkable sophistication in dealing with dissidents. Soviet diplomatic officials abroad today are a much more sophisticated and no less uncompromising generation of operatives

[34] See, e.g., Bialer, loc. cit.

[35] Jerry Hough, *Soviet Leadership in Transition*, Washington, DC. The Brookings Institution, 1980, pp. 127–30, 144 ff.

[36] John Lenczowski, *Soviet Perceptions of U.S. Foreign Policy*, Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press, 1982.

[37] Hough, *op. cit.*, p. 138.

[38] See also Rudolf L. Tőkes, Ed., *Dissent in the USSR*, Baltimore, MD, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975, p. 11, for an ideological spectrum of Soviet dissident views.

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for the regime than were their Stalinist predecessors. One can also detect a new confidence and assertive arrogance in the younger officials, as well as a deep cynicism that is perhaps more vicious than that of imperial officials and secret police.

There is little middle ground for the younger intelligentsia. Either they choose the highly principled path of the dissident movement and sacrifice all hope of the comforts of modern society or they submit to the morally debasing standards of success and upward mobility within the Soviet system. Alexander Solzhenitsyn traces the psychological trauma of *Novyy mir* editor Aleksandr Tvardovskiy as he sought to find a middle ground. In the end, Tvardovskiy failed.[39] Where this polarization will eventually lead is difficult to anticipate, but it certainly does not augur well for reform. Instead, at least for a decade or so, it would seem to encourage a heightened struggle between the regime and its loyalists on the one hand and periodically emerging dissident groups on the other. In any event, the appearance of a better-educated intelligentsia is an important factor of change within the system, one which the regime is already devising new means of managing.

It is important to remember that the military intelligentsia is not immune to the general social and political dilemmas that confront the Soviet intelligentsia as a whole. The imperatives of modern military technology have led to a dramatic growth in the system of officer education, not just in size but also in sophistication.[40] Officers probably feel sufficiently secure personally to explore unorthodox ideas more readily than many of their civilian contemporaries. The Riga naval officers' group of dissidents and Major General Petro Grigorenko provide examples, albeit small in number.[41] While most officers are likely to tilt to the pro-regime wing of the intelligentsia, some of them are likely to join the anti-regime wing. It seems most unlikely, however, that this polarization will affect the policy orientation of the senior military leadership. Rather, the anti-regime elements will be expelled from the military as they are discovered, and will lend their support—those who have the courage—to dissident groups in the civilian sector, provided such groups continue to exist either openly or furtively.

Much attention has been given to *demographic change* in the USSR. The expanding Central Asian ethnic groups stand in contrast to the slower-growing

Aleksandr Tvardovskiy, former editor of Novyy mir.

—Sovfoto.

Slavic ethnic groups. Employment opportunities are greater in the Slavic area, leading some analysts to anticipate migrations from Central Asia into the European part of the USSR. Such a migration, however, has not occurred at a dramatic level; it is also possible to infer that hidden unemployment exists in the large industrial centers.[42] It does not seem, therefore, that labor migration would necessarily help the Soviet economy. Demography may eventually have a significant impact on Soviet politics, but we are not likely to see this in the 1980's. It is not likely to have much of an impact on Soviet military manpower policy.[43] In fact, the trained reserve manpower pool is sufficiently large for the baby booms and busts to be absorbed without a noticeable effect on force levels or change in

[39] *The Oak and the Calf*, New York, NY, Harper & Row, 1975.

[40] See William E. Odom, "The 'Militarization' of Soviet Society," *Problems of Communism*, September-October 1976, pp. 34–51.

[41] Peter Reddaway, ED., *Uncensored Russia*, London, Jonathan Cape, 1972, pp. 127 ff, 171 ff.

[42] Murray Feshbach, "Soviet Dynamics in the USSR," paper presented at the conference, "The Soviet Union in the 1980's," January 14, 1983, Washington, DC, sponsored by the US Information Agency, with the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University, and the Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies, Woodrow Wilson Center for Advanced International Studies.

[43] See Ellen Jones, "Manning the Soviet Military," *International Security*, No. 7, Summer 1982, pp. 105–31.

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military-service policy. Demography may have some effect on policies toward minority nationalities and on regional party politics, but it does not promise to be a large factor in Soviet political development in the Andropov period, and perhaps not even during the rule of his successor.

Alcoholism and a high male death rate have been cited by Vladimir Treml as significant factors in Soviet demography.[44] They definitely indicate social and moral fatigue resulting from low Soviet living standards and impose a resource constraint on the Politburo, but are not likely to cause a policy crisis.

Nationalism ought not to be discounted as a factor for change. Although anti-Russification sentiment is strong in many of the national minority regions, the centrifugal political forces it generates are not likely to create a major crisis of legitimacy for the USSR. (Such a crisis could, however, occur if a war or some similar shock revealed Moscow's instruments of control to be weak.) A more significant effect of nationalism is in instances where it underpins and reinforces deviant behavior, such as corruption and bribery. Konstantin Simis's account of Mzhavanadze's Georgian circle of corruption is a case in point.[45] Ethnic and clan ties provided the social structure for cooperative efforts in corruption and proved surprisingly resilient against party, police, and KGB instruments of control; they were even able to gain a grip on Mzhavanadze, a Politburo candidate member. This form of active ethnic and national sentiment is probably more difficult for the regime to suppress than the separatist sentiments and overt hostility to Russification found in the Baltic republics.

There is a tendency to overlook *religion* as a factor for change and resistance to Soviet authority. Sectarian activities can, of course, be lumped together under the general category of the dissident movement, but they appeal to quite different and broader social strata. The dissident "democratic movement" was composed almost wholly of the intelligentsia. Baptist sects recruit from much less sophisticated social circles. The Orthodox Church also plays a highly complex role, dissident in some regards, more ambiguous in others, especially in its implicit support of Soviet foreign policy through its external relations bureau. It attracts a large number of people from the ranks of the intelligentsia, and not just from those tending toward anti-regime sentiments. A strain of neo-Slavophilism, supportive of the Russian church as well as the regime, has been alleged to exist and to find sympathy among the military and the KGB.[46] To be sure, some of the intelligentsia find in Orthodoxy an alternative to the official ideology, a source of cultural and historical roots, and a haven for "internal immigration." While religion poses no serious threat to the regime's control, it does create a nuisance politically and ideologically. The impressionistic view one gains in the Soviet Union is that religion has grown both in its social and spiritual attraction as well as in institutional size. We may well misjudge both the degree and nature of religious influence. If it is true that Moscow inspired the attempt on the Pope's life, that act reflects the deep concern the leadership feels about the political strength of the Polish Catholic Church and probably about Catholics in the Soviet Union. And, of course, Muslim groups have a model in Iran that does not comfort Moscow, even if an Iranian-style upheaval is most unlikely in Central Asia or the Caucasus.

Finally, *ideology* is thought by many to be changing, that is, declining in influence. Measuring such change is difficult, and most judgments about its decline are based on impressionistic observations. Whatever the case, the language of the Soviet press shows no lack of adherence to the traditional ideological norms. Nor has the time devoted to ideological training in Soviet institutions decreased.

Two realities should be kept in mind before pronouncing Marxism-Leninism dead. First, a multinational empire like the Soviet Union requires a legitimacy principle for maintaining its rule over non-Russian peoples in an age when nationalism is the most prevalent legitimacy principle in the world. Marxist-Leninist "internationalism" provides such a theory. Also critically important for Moscow's power is the Marxist-Leninist view of property. State control of property is the cornerstone of the entire edifice of economic and police instrumentalities. It is difficult to imagine even a marginal retreat from the basic tenets of the official ideology in light of these considerations of its positive role for Soviet power.

Second, Marxism-Leninism offers a sophisticated set of categories and assumptions for political analysis. The same Soviet citizen who confides in private that he is not really a Marxist-Leninist will proceed to discuss international affairs and domestic politics of other countries in Marxist-Leninist categories, apparently having internalized them so fully that he does not recognize them for what they are. Many Soviet officials clearly believe that Marxist-Leninist categories

[44] See his *Alcohol in the USSR: A Statistical Study*, Durham, NC, Duke Press Policy Studies, 1982.

[45] Simis, op. cit.

[46] Hedrick Smith, *The Russians*, New York, NY, Quadrangle, 1976, pp. 429–30; Robert G. Kaiser, *Russia*, New York, NY, Atheneum, 1976, pp. 166–63.

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

Patriarch Pimen of Moscow and All-Russia celebrates Easter on April 6, 1980 at Moscow's Bogoyavlenskiy Cathedral.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

are superior tools of analysis, which provide them with a clear advantage in strategic thinking. Thus, it is too soon to accept the view that the ideology is dead. On the contrary, it may not be dying but rather becoming more fully internalized in Soviet society.

Andropov's Options

Given the heritage of Brezhnevism and the objective factors of change and continuity, what can Andropov do? What must he do? These questions have received no little speculation in the West in recent years, even before Andropov assumed power. The natural tendency has been to focus on the backlog of problems, primarily economic but also social, and to anticipate significant change. Hough has taken a view shared by many that the post-Brezhnev period presents an opportunity for marked improvements, not exactly for a "Prague Spring" but at least for a pragmatic assessment and exploitation of opportunities by a new leader.[47] Trimming back foreign adventures and devising solutions to discrete domestic problems, including cutbacks in the military sector in favor of the civilian sector, seem to be what Hough anticipates. Bialer gives even more emphasis to the enormity of the problems facing the Politburo in the 1980's.[48] While he does not fully share Hough's optimism, he sees the regime at a crossroads. To solve many of the domestic problems, he believes, some factions will press for a reduction in the military sector and for continued access to Western economies for credits, technology, and trade. Yet he does not rule out a continued military buildup and an assertive foreign policy. Bialer's strong implication is that significant change in Soviet politics is bound to occur, although he does not venture to predict its direction.

Andropov's ascendancy, however, has not encouraged us to expect the leadership to make a clear

[47] Hough, op. cit.
[48] Bialer, loc. cit.

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choice between the horns of the many dilemmas. It has not weakened the Defense Council and military-industrial complex as a contending regional party leader might have done in the succession struggle. Nor has it necessarily signaled a larger military role, as is occasionally suggested. Rather, it means that the Brezhnev policymaking system is still intact.

But are the growing problems and forces of change so great that they will soon break up this system? In other words, are the dilemmas so urgent that fundamental choices cannot be avoided? Or can Brezhnevism be sustained for another decade?

The dissident intelligentsia, demographic factors, nationalism, and religion create centrifugal pressures on the regime, but neither singly nor in the aggregate will these pressures prove unmanageable in the coming decade. A major shock to the regime, such as a war, might give these forces such vent that they could become critical for political stability; but short of such a crisis, they have almost no chance of causing major changes.

They cannot, however, be ignored by the regime. They present serious problems and challenges. Co-optation of some of these forces has long been a regime practice, but only if the price was not too high.[49] Coupled with this tactic is repression. As these forces pose more serious problems for the regime, is Andropov likely to abandon the traditional two-tactic policy? Will he merely shift the mix toward more repression as co-optation proves less effective? Does he have an alternative? Genuine concessions to these forces could endanger the system. Is he willing to risk that? Could he bring off an evolutionary systemic change? These forces, if given full expression, are more likely to fragment the system than to take the gradualist road of liberal change. We are compelled, therefore, to expect that Andropov, as well as Andropov's successor, will continue the traditional policy, merely devising new variations on it.

Next, consider ideology. As a source of idealistic fervor, it offers little to the regime. But in a number of other ways its retention remains imperative. There is every reason for Andropov to cling to it. The ideological factor, therefore, works for continuity and against change. It tends to blur the sharp dilemmas Bialer describes, or at least it gives them a unique perspective in Politburo eyes.

Finally, let us consider the economy, including the military sector. Are the economic problems so critical that they demand dramatic changes in policy? Or can the symptoms be treated for another decade while the disease is allowed to persist? In fact, the Soviet economy continues to grow, although at a declining rate. If a real decline—negative growth—occurred, would that bring the regime to dramatic, perhaps systemic, change? It certainly would create enormous domestic political pressures, but what would be the alternative to persevering with the present system? Most Western economic analysts agree that a significant relaxation of central control over resource allocations and prices would carry enormous political risks for the regime. Could the Politburo return to some form of Lenin's New Economic Policy, letting the agricultural sector de-collectivize and allowing small private enterprises to develop in the consumer goods sector? Conceivably that would not topple the regime in the short run, but what dilemmas of power would follow a few years later? Another "scissors crisis," as in 1922–23, when the peasants refused to supply products to the urban areas?[50] Would not the frightened party elite look for another Stalin to reassert central control? Would the West provide a manifold Marshall Plan to rescue the Politburo from its crisis of decentralization? Could the party's legitimacy survive such a dramatic turn of events?

These possibilities would not appeal to Andropov. Nor is it easy to imagine a post-Andropov leadership willing to confront them. A major step in the direction of treating the fundamental ills of the economy would be a step down a very slippery slope. The next step would be difficult to avoid, yet returning up the slope could cause complete loss of footing. Any Politburo will struggle to avoid that course even if it means a lengthy period of economic stagnation and a return to more repressive measures against poor labor discipline, bribery, corruption, and other disorders in the system. Andropov's early moves against corruption, of course, are precisely what should have been expected. The next gambit may be the appearance of "reform," that is, organizational change in the economic apparatus based on new ideas about how to make the old system work. Some shifts in economic policy and organization may provide a moderate arrest of certain economic disorders. Recent investment emphasis on energy and transportation may reduce bottlenecks sufficiently to sustain overall growth, even if only at a declining rate. Measures of this sort may continue for several years before their ultimate failure is demonstrated beyond dispute. In a word, crisis is not as imminent as has sometimes been anticipated.

Agriculture may be an exception. Failure to meet industrial growth plans would not have the immediate

[49]See Amalrik, op. cit., for an account of the KGB effort to co-opt him that lasted until his final days in the USSR.

[50]Dobbs, op. cit., pp. 149–76.

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Soviet humor magazine Krokodil *highlights problems of crime and corruption in the USSR. The two scenes bear the captions "Loaded" and "Unloaded."*

—*Krokodil* (Moscow), Sept. 3, 1982.

social consequences that a crop failure would. The seriousness of the agricultural failures is indicated by Soviet willingness to continue to import large quantities of grain even though Soviet hard-currency reserves are declining. Among reform efforts, we should expect the greatest emphasis in agriculture.

The Soviet military-industrial complex cannot remain unaffected by the overall economic situation. But can it, as is frequently suggested, provide a source of relief for other ailing sectors? The answer is some but not much. Unfortunately, economists have not explored extensively the relationship between defense spending and overall economic performance, not just in the USSR but elsewhere as well. The absence of such scholarly work leaves not only pundits but also many Western specialists on the Soviet Union leaning toward assumptions that what goes to defense is a loss to the rest of the economy; that defense spending is an unambiguous "burden"; and that changing the mix of "guns and butter" is a simple and easy policy choice. Yet, while examples can be found of polities where large defense spending correlates with slower economic growth, examples of the contrary correlation can also be found. Most of the history of the Soviet economy presents a case of rapid economic growth coupled with large military spending. In the last two decades, military spending has increased while growth has slowed, but it is not at all clear that the military sector is the major cause of the decline. It is a contributing cause, however, if one assumes that the centrally planned economic system is essential for the military sector. Such an assumption is compelling. The military product is clearly the preferred choice of the planners. And it is doubtful that military growth could have been sustained at its historical rate had the preferences of Soviet consumers determined resource allocations.

Here we have a bit of a puzzle. Why should we argue that Soviet defense spending has been a "burden" if planners prefer it? Is not the Soviet military buildup a real measure of Soviet economic success? Could one not argue with equal cogency that social costs (environmental, health, etc.) of some sectors of American industry are a "burden"? Of course, but would it follow that the output of those sectors should be considered a "burden" to the gross national product? Certainly not. To understand how the Politburo looks at the Soviet defense "burden," we must keep this analogy in mind. As long as consumers in the United States desire the products of the socially costly industries, these industries are likely to survive. To be sure, interest groups could bring political pressure to bear to reduce those social costs. They would try to make the industries pay for "clean up" or reduction of the social costs. Does not the same thing hold for the Soviet guns and butter relationship?

In part it does, but only in part. First, the Soviet Union does not have—as does the West—institutions for interest articulation that could make the military pay for social costs. Planners can assert their preferences until things become quite bad for the remainder of the economy. Among the elite, those most likely to press the planners for a corrective action are the Defense Council members and military leaders in a position to recognize the danger to future military power arising from too much present neglect of the social costs. Even then, it is not easy in the short run to shift sufficient resources from the military sector to solve problems in another sector. To be sure, there are exceptions. Some military industries could shift production

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A poster in Naberezhnyye Chelny (renamed Brezhnevsk) states: "... the years will pass, but all Soviet people will remember the labor exploits on the Kama." The city is the site of the Kama Truck Plant, a major project constructed with large infusions of Western technology and capable of producing civilian and military vehicles.

—Serge Schmeman/*The New York Times*.

to civilian goods. Tank factories could begin producing more tractors on fairly short notice. When the size and character of Soviet economic problems are considered, however, it is clear that such redirection of production capacity would ameliorate only a few of the problems. For example, radar factories might produce more TV sets, but that would do very little for critical problems of labor discipline and factor productivity in the civilian sector.

Second, military factories are apparently more modern and efficient than other factories. Does it make sense to shift large amounts of capital from the efficient to the inefficient sectors? That would be a bit like selling stocks that are rising in price, to buy ailing stocks in order to force up their price. The analogy is not perfect, but it may reveal something about the dilemmas faced by Soviet planners in making capital allocations.

We can probably expect some shifts of the production mix in the military sector, but such shifts promise only modest relief for the overall economy. A large shift of industrial infrastructure could not take place overnight. It would require years. And, it would not necessarily solve many of the structural problems of the economy. We can also expect that senior military leaders will accept minor shifts, perhaps even large cuts in equipment production. They will do so willingly if they see it as the necessary price for the long-term health of the system that has given them the forces they now have.

On balance, these factors seem less likely to beget major policy changes than to elicit a series of efforts to hold the line in defense of the basic system. In other words, the incentives are strong for Andropov to try to muddle through. Whether he sticks to a "muddle-through" policy, or tries significant initiatives to mitigate or reverse some of the adverse trends within the system, one problem cannot be easily avoided: the

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declining vitality and responsiveness of the party apparatus.

There are signs that Andropov understands this and intends to deal aggressively with entrenched bureaucrats—party and non-party. Anticorruption campaigns clearly have the aim of restoring greater administrative efficacy in the state and party apparatus. If they are to achieve notable results, they will have to be sweeping and sustained, and they will create resistance in many party circles. Should they prove ineffective and half-hearted, then "Brezhnevism" will persist under Andropov. Yet, to allow it to persist indefinitely is to risk eventually greater dangers for the system—dangers of a kind that developed for the Polish party.

In Poland, when the party proved no longer able to defeat dissident activity or keep it from large-scale organizational expression, the military had to supply the civilian sector with cadres, that is, with personnel responsive to central party direction. In other words, the Polish leadership turned to its last remaining source of reliable party workers: the officer corps and the police. It remains to be seen if this policy can rebuild a more effective Polish party apparatus.

The Soviet Union does not yet appear to be near the point where such a dramatic move is required. Still, the comparison is instructive in that it tends to sharpen our appreciation of what Andropov is up against. Stalin relied on blood purges to deal with problems of "localism," "careerism," and "drift" in party work. Khrushchev promised the party ranks no more blood purges, but he tried to develop a surrogate through reorganizations and formal requirements for frequent turnover of party and state cadres. Brezhnev was willing to spare the party apparatus even such bloodless purges. Thus, the lower and middle ranks of the party have achieved considerable success in limiting "true Leninist norms" of "democratic centralism"—the principle that made the Bolsheviks a powerful instrument of control and dictatorial policy execution.

Western analysts, by taking the "group approach" to Soviet politics in order to explain the post-Stalin diffusion of power, have tended to miss its key dynamic feature. Conflict is less severe between institutions and incipient groups than it is between higher and lower strata in the hierarchical Soviet system. In the early years of the regime, the narrow top stratum held the initiative. In the Brezhnev years, the middle and lower strata gained significant ground against the party center.[51] The greatest change in Soviet politics has come from this loss of control by the party's Secretariat. It can appoint whom it chooses to *nomenklatura* posts, but soon small face-to-face cliques or "family circles," as the Soviet press calls them, develop to get around the impossible output goals demanded by party direction. These cliques do not aggregate into "groups" in the Western political sense; rather, they thrive within the hierarchical bureaucratic system, reinforcing it.

If Andropov (or his successor) fails to restore party discipline, will he eventually be forced—as were the Poles—to turn to the military and the KGB? We cannot rule out this possibility, although it does not look imminent. If this did occur, it would not be a military takeover in the sense usually meant by a coup. Instead it would be, as in Poland, a shift of party cadres within the system. If this did not lead to an effective purge and rebuilding of the party in a short time, the effects on the military would be severe. The officer corps has a momentous task in simply managing a large and modern military establishment. It does not have cadres to spare. And how long would it be before the officers were trapped in the same "family circles" that they had been sent to eradicate from the party apparatus? This dilemma is so sharp and unpleasant for any Soviet leader that it is difficult to believe he would not use neo-Stalinist methods on the party apparatus before such a crisis arose.

In any event, the central focus for Soviet domestic policy has to be the party cadre problem, that is, the lack of cadre responsiveness to the party center. In the short run, a crisis can be avoided. Andropov can try and fail to reassert effective discipline for a number of years. So can his successor. Yet, unless dealt with, the problem will remain a threat to the very stability of the system.

If that is the outlook for Soviet domestic policy, what must Andropov do in foreign policy? The brief answer is "more of the same," that is, continue Brezhnev's foreign policy "mobilism." Can Andropov do this? Does not domestic stagnation place a drag on Soviet foreign policy? Will not concern with sorting out domestic problems cause the Andropov regime to look for ways to cut back on foreign policy commitments, to reduce costly and dangerous ventures abroad in order to make resources available for dealing with domestic bottlenecks? It is not clear that cutting foreign commitments would create resources that would alleviate some of the domestic resource problems. The sale of Soviet arms, for example, generates hard-currency earnings that would be lost if some commitments were reduced. The fungibility of other foreign policy resources may also not be great. Could hun-

[51] William E. Odom, *The Soviet Volunteers*, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1973, pp. 264–328.

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A May Day 1980 display in Moscow's Red Square proclaims: "We are with you, the revolutionary people of Afghanistan."

—TASS from Soviets.

dreds and thousands of military advisers and KGB operatives be easily shifted to industrial problem-solving on the domestic front? The key point here is that there is no way to establish a predictable causal relationship between Moscow's situation at home and its degree of assertiveness abroad.[52] To the extent one were to establish a correlation between the two from Russian and Soviet history, the data are likely to favor the proposition that internal weakness correlates with external assertiveness.

Andropov's views on foreign policy are probably driven less by domestic concerns than by the changing dynamics of Soviet détente policy. That policy should be put in the larger context of the long-standing Soviet concept of "peaceful coexistence," which had its origins in the early 1920's. Finding himself clearly without the power to precipitate a revolution in Western Europe—where he had expected it—Lenin designed a new strategy. In dealing with the advanced industrial states, he would seek correct state-to-state relations, trade and aid, and construction of a Soviet industrial base. Stalin, of course, gave this policy the label of "socialism in one country." But peaceful coexistence had another component that is sometimes forgotten: continued revolutionary struggle in what is now called the Third World and what Lenin called the "weak link" in "imperialism, the highest stage of capitalism." That policy was pursued in various forms until the start of World War II.

By the mid-1950's, Moscow returned to the original thrust of the "peaceful coexistence" policy, although initially this policy excluded West Germany. Only after the Czech crisis of 1968 and the coming to power of

[52] In a larger sense we can establish connections between historically rooted domestic structural dynamics in the USSR and the likelihood of the USSR becoming a nonassertive status quo power. I have outlined the dynamics elsewhere and conclude that without fundamental structural change, the USSR cannot become a status quo power. See "Whither the Soviet Union?" *Washington Quarterly*, No. 4, Spring 1981. It is another question to determine at specific times whether domestic difficulties will temporarily reduce assertiveness in Soviet foreign policy behavior.

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the SPD in Bonn was Moscow able to reestablish the former broad-based approach to "peaceful coexistence" in Europe. Furthermore, the United States was drawn in as well. For a decade this alternative form of the "international class struggle" (the official definition of "peaceful coexistence") yielded considerable benefits to the USSR. The disenchantment in the United States, however, and the debt problems in East Europe have raised serious questions as to whether the policy can continue to bring Moscow the profits necessary to make it worthwhile.

To date there is no significant evidence of a fundamental Soviet review of the current form of "peaceful coexistence." Andropov is pursuing, although somewhat more aggressively, the Brezhnev policy of trying to split Europe from the United States. The German elections of 1983, bringing a Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union coalition to power, were a setback; but the deployment of Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) in Europe has not yet been accomplished and, to all appearances, Andropov will do what he can to prevent or delay it. If the missiles are deployed, then the Politburo might well begin a basic review. The inclination to do so will be all the greater if economic interaction with the West is stymied or declining, due either to Western trade policies or Soviet lack of credits. The outcome of a basic review of strategy would not be apparent for several months, or even a year or two.

What could it yield? Continuation of détente is not to be discounted. Although détente's "high-yield" years may be past, severe tensions in central Europe would not offer greater yields and modest economic gains at the present level of trade are not to be lightly thrown away. In the Third World, there are no good reasons for Moscow to draw back, except here and there for tactical purposes. The re-arming of Syria and the greater Soviet military involvement there indicate a willingness to run quite high risks of an East-West confrontation. The Iraq-Iran war grinds on, supplied largely by the USSR and its surrogates, creating what Moscow may see as long-term "progressive developments" in Iraq and especially in Iran—the real strategic prize.

In Central America, the Soviets and Cubans seem committed to exploiting the large opening created by the Sandinist victory in Nicaragua. The danger in these two regions—the Middle East and Central America—is that Soviet success might create a backlash in the United States and a policy consensus that Soviet power projection is indeed endangering the Western international order. Thus far, however, Moscow has been able to prevent that, in part by working hard to keep the nuclear weapon and arms control issues at the center of public attention.

On the whole, the Brezhnev variant of "peaceful coexistence" still has much to offer, and its tactical and strategic "mobilism" probably will retain its appeal for Andropov. It has been an offensive strategy, and its gambits are still far from played out. The odds, therefore, seem to be on the side of a continuation of this policy, with many tactical shifts and changes as different situations require. The major worry Andropov must have is the possibility of a reemergence (in the United States in particular, but also in Europe) of a broad-based public and media reaction against Soviet policy. If the attentive public and the media became convinced that assertive projection of Soviet power, rather than the nuclear issue, is the most pressing danger to peace and stability, then NATO might well be able to offset some of the Soviet conventional military advantage, and the United States would probably allocate much larger resources to competition with the Soviet Union in the Third World. That indeed would prompt a fundamental review of foreign policy in the Kremlin.

In sum, the prospects for the post-Brezhnev era seem to be sound and fury about domestic reform accompanied by little actual change. In external policy, we can expect threats to end détente while Moscow hangs on to its economic access to the industrial West and competes more aggressively in the Third World.

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Europe in Soviet Eyes

by Adam Ulam

A Soviet analyst might well view the recent history of Western Europe as something of a paradox. Although the Marshall Plan led to a generation of unprecedented economic prosperity, that very prosperity made the individual European states lose sight of one of the main premises of the Plan: the need for political integration of the West. Indeed, the momentum for European political integration seems to have spent itself by the mid-1960's. Those nations that not so long ago dominated the world stage apparently abandoned any ambition to play—either collectively or singly—a role analogous to that of the United States or the Soviet Union. As a result, for all of the enormous agglomeration of industrial and potential military strength that Europe represents, few would doubt that the security of the continent depends more on decisions made in Moscow and Washington than on those made in Paris or Bonn.

Reasons why this paradoxical situation has been allowed to develop are not merely of historical interest. The West's past attitudes and policies concerning the defense of Europe have left their imprint on the Soviets' mind, and they will continue to influence the Kremlin's own strategy and tactics in dealing with Western Europe. This essay examines these Soviet perceptions—in particular, as they reflect the interaction of different attitudes that make up the mindset of Soviet leaders—and offers a brief overview of some of the key factors that may affect future Soviet policymaking vis-à-vis Western Europe.

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Soviet Leaders' Split Personality

The Kremlin's view of the West has in the main been formed by its fairly realistic reading of the history and politics of the United States and Western Europe since World War II. Insofar as the influence of this interpretation on actual Soviet policies is concerned, Western observers must eschew attempts to divide Soviet policymakers into hawks or doves or to divine who represents the "hard" or "soft" factions among them. It is natural to assume—and on some past occasions there has been considerable, if circumstantial, evidence to substantiate such a view—that there are within the Politburo and its affiliate decision-making bodies real differences of opinion when it comes to foreign policy. Such differences, however, are usually expressed not through permanent groupings or factions, but in the fluctuation between two main attitudes present in the mind of the leadership as a whole.

One such attitude might be compared to that of the rentier—a view that the Soviet Union ought to be patient and prudent in its foreign policies and continue to collect the dividends of its past successes and current strength, on the one hand, and of the West's past mistakes and current afflictions on the other. In the 38 years since World War II, the West has proved unable to stop the steady accretion of Soviet power; it is unlikely to do so in the future. Thus there is no reason for the USSR to pursue policies that may involve serious risks of a direct confrontation with the other superpower.

The other side of the Soviet leaders' split personality might be characterized as that of the speculator. The

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speculator rejects the rentier's notion that the imperialist danger is a thing of the past and that the West, through the mere passage of time, is bound to grow weaker both in absolute terms and vis-à-vis the USSR. According to this argument, it has been the steady growth in Soviet military power, and Soviet leaders' occasional if usually feigned readiness to risk nuclear confrontation with the United States, that have kept the West off balance and prevented it from pursuing more forceful attempts to undermine the Soviet bloc. The USSR must therefore continue to stress active and aggressive exploitation of the weak and vulnerable spots within the world capitalist system, even at the risk of provoking a major clash with the United States. The speculator motif thus favors reliance on dramatic coups and military power, rather than on "the inherent logic of economic and social development," as the means of enhancing Soviet security and power.

At present, neither attitude seems to be dominant in the Kremlin's councils, but this is perhaps natural given the recent shift in leadership. The speculator impulse among Soviet leaders inclines them to try especially hard to create the impression that they stand firm and unyielding on their main positions; the rentier impulse tends to create an awareness that they may have overdone the act of appearing ready to chance a nuclear exchange. It is the *interplay* of these two attitudes that is likely to continue to govern Soviet policies toward the democratic world, with the Kremlin alternating between its current "war is hell and we know it" line and its former feigned confidence that it could sustain and win a nuclear shoot-out.

Détente and the Defense of Europe

A major sin of omission in the West's overall strategy vis-à-vis the Soviets has been the almost invariably bad timing of its policies. When NATO was being formed in 1949 it appeared imperative (in fact it was not so) that the United States maintain sizable land and air forces in Europe. It was widely believed that the USSR might at any moment unleash its army against the West and that Soviet troops could be at the English Channel before the US Strategic Air Command could be effectively deployed. NATO's European members, which were then still recovering from the effects of World War II, could not possibly be expected to match the Soviets man-for-man and tank-for-tank. The US military presence in Europe, so the argument ran, would serve as a trip wire, activating, in case of a Soviet attack, America's strategic force. Thus, the



American servicemen catching a quick meal as they man their tanks in a confrontation with Soviet tanks at Checkpoint Charlie, an East-West crossing point in Berlin. —FPG.

USSR could not hope to make a bid for the conquest of Europe without realizing that such action would bring nuclear retaliation against its own territory.

Whatever the soundness of the original premise—and it is most doubtful that the Soviet Union, itself recovering from the ravages of war, would have attacked Europe had there been no NATO in 1949—by the 1960's it had lost its validity. By then the European members of NATO (which had been strengthened in the meantime by the accession of West Germany and Italy) should have been in a position, both militarily and economically, to match the Warsaw Pact's conventional forces. Thus there was no reason to persist in the assumption that NATO could not on its own discourage a Soviet invasion, and that the security of Europe against such an attack must still be found ultimately in America's nuclear arsenal. Yet no adjustment of the Atlantic Alliance's strategy took place. The United States was preoccupied by the Vietnam conflict, and the Europeans had grown used to the idea that it was the US nuclear umbrella rather than mere troops and tanks that must in the final analysis guarantee their security.

It was thus a rude awakening for Europeans when

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they realized that the USSR was catching up with the United States in the nuclear arms race. Instead of working collectively to strengthen their common defense, however, the Europeans responded to the new situation by adopting a variety of separate approaches, including efforts by individual states to reach their own accommodation with the Soviet Union. As de Gaulle heralded a "Europe from the Channel to the Urals," France proceeded to build its own nuclear strike force. Bonn embarked on its Ostpolitik policy—thereby formally accepting both the division of Germany and Poland's western borders as set at Potsdam—and renounced nuclear pretensions by adhering to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. What Stalin had not been able to obtain through the Berlin blockade and Khrushchev through his madcap ultimata and threats between 1958 and 1962 was now achieved at no expense and risk through the Soviets' patient diplomacy of the late 1960's and early 1970's.

So it is in Western Europe that the USSR has drawn the greatest benefits from détente. In the first place, the SALT I agreement seriously undermined the Europeans' faith in the viability of the US nuclear deterrent insofar as their own security was concerned. (And SALT II, though not ratified, has in fact had the same effect.) To an expert, the quantitative provisions of SALT I did not appear too significant, since the United States had the edge over the USSR in nuclear weapons technology. But the average German could be excused for worrying: now that the United States had many fewer ICBM's than the USSR, should Soviet tanks roll into Hamburg, would America really stand by its obligations and use nuclear weapons against the Soviet Union knowing full well what fearful retaliation it might expect?

The average European (and to some extent his government) greeted détente with relief since it signified not only that the Russians were serious about peaceful coexistence and about conducting extensive trade and cultural intercourse with the West, but also that they might perhaps even loosen their reins on Eastern Europe (an especially important point for the West Germans in view of their hopes concerning the German Democratic Republic—GDR). A German or Dutchman was also bound to feel somewhat anxious: should the Soviets be somehow provoked or otherwise change their attitude, Europe would be in a much more exposed and dangerous position, now that the



L'Indomptable (Indomitable), part of France's strategic nuclear force, is launched at Cherbourg on September 17, 1974. Equipped with sixteen M-20 thermonuclear missiles, the submarine began active service in January 1977.

—Pictorial Parade.

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Soviets had become much stronger and the Americans weaker. Indeed, the United States's readiness to come to Europe's aid, if it meant risking a Soviet nuclear strike against its own territory, had become at least problematic.

This kind of psychological impact of détente on the Europeans was far from unwelcome from the Soviet point of view. And indeed, observing the Kremlin's policies over the last decade, one gets a strong impression that the Soviets have been attuned to the perpetuation and strengthening of that dichotomous image of the USSR insofar as Western Europe is concerned: peaceable and desirous of expanding all forms of cooperation, yet extremely dangerous should Western Europe allow itself to be pushed into policies that seriously threaten the Soviets' interests. The Soviet Union has already declared that one such policy could be the installation of those intermediate-range nuclear weapons and cruise missiles proposed by the NATO Council in December 1979. In the future, the list of such policies considered as hostile to the USSR and hence pregnant with dangerous consequences for West Europeans could be greatly enlarged, perhaps even extending to issues outside the continent, including proposals for massive economic assistance to China or furnishing the People's Republic with modern weapons and technology.

The USSR does not need to make its threats explicit. In fact, when objecting to European policies, Soviet leaders actually prefer, and quite astutely, to present Western Europe as an *unwilling* accomplice of the United States. The Soviets for the most part have relied on the silent persuasiveness of the superior numbers of their ICBM's and tanks, which according to one analyst are substantial: "By 1980 NATO had 7000 battle tanks on the Central Front [in Europe] compared to the Warsaw Pact's 20,500, 13,500 of which were Soviet. . . . Soviet plans for rapid rates of advance, if successful, would overwhelm NATO's forces more quickly than they could be reinforced."[1] Soviet deployment of SS-20's has also served the same purpose. It is a gross oversimplification, however, to see those Soviet maneuvers and arms buildup as a clear indication that Soviet leaders do in fact contemplate offensive action against NATO, just as it is naive to wonder why the Warsaw Pact's forces are being expanded and equipped far beyond any point that might be justified by the defensive needs of the Soviet bloc. All those arms and troop concentrations, the Soviets hope, will continue to provide them with solid political dividends.

And economic ones as well. Quite apart from the actual benefits that may accompany expanded trade with the USSR, the Europeans, whether consciously or not, see such trade as a psychological reassurance against the possibility of Soviet aggression. Surely the Soviet Union would not be negotiating and concluding various long-term joint economic ventures with Western Europe if the Kremlin were either preparing to pounce upon it in the foreseeable future or even proposing to revert to the old ways of threats and harassments, such as another blockade of West Berlin. Furthermore, by being helpful to the Soviet Union in general and by assisting its faltering economy (as well as the economies of the other countries in the Soviet bloc) with technology transfers and credits at a low rate of interest, many in European political and business circles feel that they are, so to speak, domesticating the Soviets, reinforcing the position of those within the Kremlin leadership who urge that it is more profitable to cooperate with the capitalists than it is to pursue goals of conquest and expansion at the capitalists' expense.

Thus, in this view, it would be unwise to yield to US pressure to punish the Soviet Union each time it misbehaves—for example, by imposing drastic economic sanctions. Nor, and this is felt especially strongly in West Germany, should Europe follow Washington's hints and encourage fissiparous tendencies within the Soviet bloc. On the contrary, note critics of US policies, the democracies' real interests, even though many in the United States obstinately refuse to recognize this, lie in the Soviet bloc preserving a degree of stability. Dramatic challenges to Soviet domination of Eastern Europe, such as the one inherent in the Polish crisis, may drive them into a corner and thus make them really dangerous. A key to European security, therefore, lies in the gradual evolution toward liberalization within individual Communist states and toward greater autonomy in these nations' relations with the Soviet Union, an evolution that can best be advanced by Western Europe maintaining commercial and cultural links with them rather than by treating them as mere satrapies of Moscow.

It would be unfair to describe such attitudes as being dominant in the thinking of either the governments or the people at large within the European community. Yet it is this kind of attitude that the Kremlin is likely to try to foster as part of its unremitting efforts both to loosen the ties between the United States and its European allies, and to keep the European community from achieving a degree of meaningful political unity.

[1] Rebecca V. Strode, "External Factors Affecting Soviet Policy for the 1980s: The Military Dimension," a paper prepared for the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University, Washington, DC, 1982, p. 19.

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Soviet Priorities

In her study on Western Europe as seen from the Soviet perspective, Angela Stent identifies five major areas of interest for the USSR insofar as Europe is concerned: (1) the determination that Germany must never again become a military threat and the resolve to maintain the current division of that country; (2) the encouragement and deepening of fissures within the Atlantic Alliance, especially those between West Germany and the United States; (3) a commitment to keep Western Europe fragmented, since once united it could resist Soviet pressures much more effectively and could exert unhealthy influence on the Soviets' satellites in Eastern Europe; (4) the nurturing of the Soviets' links with West European communism; and (5) the continuation of Moscow's growing economic relations with Western Europe, in order to prop up its faltering economy and earn hard currency in payment for Soviet exports of raw materials.[2]

For the balance of the decade at least one might safely scratch number four from that list of Soviet priorities; the West European Communist parties are no longer the obedient tools of Soviet foreign policy that they were before 1953 and for quite a while thereafter. Indeed, these parties have more recently become something of an embarrassment to the USSR or, as in the case of the current leadership of the Italian and Spanish Communists, a source of irritation and an ideological burden. Their still generally anti-US orientation does not compensate for the harm done by, say, the Italian party's criticisms not only of Soviet policies in Poland or Afghanistan, but also of the Kremlin's domestic practices. Such criticisms damage more than just the Soviet Union's anti-imperialist and pro-national liberation image in the Third World; they also find occasional reverberations within the Soviet bloc and provide further evidence of the growing incompatibility between Soviet national interest (as currently interpreted by the Kremlin) and the interests of the international Communist movement to which the USSR gave birth.

Nonetheless, the fragrance of Moscow still clings to even the most independently minded Communist party, and that by itself complicates Soviet exploitation of French, German, or Italian nationalism against US influence in those countries. In the last French presidential elections the Soviets obviously preferred Giscard d'Estaing to the candidate of the socialist-

[2]See Angela Stent, "The USSR and Western Europe in the 1980s," a paper prepared for the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University, Washington, DC, 1982, pp. 1–6.



Enrico Berlinguer, Secretary-General of the Italian Communist Party, a vocal critic of the Soviet Communist Party.

—Gianfranco Gorgoni/Contact.

Communist coalition, and their relations with the Mitterrand regime have been notably cooler than with its predecessor, even though there are Communists in the new French leader's cabinet.

Still, while low on the list of its priorities, the Kremlin has not entirely given up on West European communism. The Berlinguers and Carillos may eventually give way to people more in sympathy with "proletarian internationalism" and more tolerant of the Soviet Union's foreign and domestic peccadilloes. Western communism remains a potentially valuable resource for the USSR, and as such it is not going to be left to its own devices, nor will it disappear entirely from Moscow's calculations.

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Disrupting US-European relations and fragmenting Western Europe's unity, when taken together, present something of a dilemma to Soviet policymakers. Would they really want the fissures in the Atlantic Alliance to become so serious as to lead the United States to withdraw or greatly reduce its land forces under NATO? The shock of America's partial (of course it could never be complete) disengagement from the defense of Europe might just prove to be a strong enough incentive to revive the impetus for European unity or to make West Germany reconsider its renunciation of nuclear weapons. A fissure of such magnitude could also have other less-than-pleasing consequences from Moscow's point of view.

Conversely, the present not very harmonious state of relations between the United States and Western Europe offers certain benefits to the USSR. America's European allies, especially West Germany, tend to act as a moderating influence on Washington's attitudes and initiatives toward the Soviet Union. For example, recent European pressures seem to have played an important role in the Reagan administration's willingness to reopen nuclear arms limitation talks with the USSR. Europe's reluctance, or to put it more bluntly, Germany's and France's refusal, to limit its trade with the Eastern bloc makes it more difficult for the United States to withhold American high technology, not to speak of grain, from the USSR and its clients. Insofar as the Soviet Union is concerned, the most desirable pattern of relations between the United States and Europe for the immediate future would be that of a less-than-happy marriage, with both partners continuously squabbling, rather than deciding on a trial separation. Such a separation might well make each strive to be more independent and self-sufficient vis-à-vis a third party, and yet end up by bringing the estranged partners together in a much firmer alliance than before.

The US-West European squabbles have greatly helped the USSR to enhance its military superiority in Europe, with all the consequent political and even economic advantages that have already been mentioned. In view of the Soviets' incredible tenacity in holding on to a position of advantage once it has been secured, one can be sure that the Kremlin would fight tooth and nail to retain that superiority and to block the deployment of 108 Pershing II's and 464 ground-launched cruise missiles proposed by NATO in 1979. Even in their deepest apprehensions, the Soviets could not possibly envisage NATO as likely to provoke a war. But anything that tends to make Western Europe feel more secure, especially if it removes the specter of nuclear war being fought on its territory, deprives the USSR of its most potent means of psychological pressure on the West. And so, in a remarkable tour de force, Soviet propaganda has argued, and apparently has convinced many, not only in Europe but also in the United States, that the present imbalance in tactical nuclear weapons between the superpowers is conducive to peace and that any attempts to right this imbalance threatens war. Accordingly, at the 26th party congress in February 1981, Leonid Brezhnev "officially" opened the campaign for a nuclear freeze on a somber note: "A 'limited war', say in Europe, would mean in its very beginning the absolute end of European civilization." He then followed with the Soviets' proposal for avoiding such a catastrophe: "We propose an immediate moratorium on the deployment by NATO and the USSR of new missiles of intermediate range; that is, a freeze both quantitative and qualitative on such weapons."[3]

To be sure, the mills of Soviet propaganda will grind relentlessly in the years to come, so as to hobble any effort to place Western Europe in a position of military preparedness that would free its statesmen's minds of the consciousness of the fragility of its defenses and hence make them less anxious to propitiate the Soviets. There are so many disparate elements upon which the "peace movement," and the related phenomena of the nuclear freeze initiative, can feed: the Green Party and the left wing of the Social Democratic Party in Germany; the unilateral disarmament sentiments within the British Labour Party; and the fairly widespread skepticism of countries such as the Netherlands and Norway about whether the whole military blocs game makes much sense for small states like themselves. As of now, one could not place more than even odds on the NATO 1979 decision being fully put into effect. And even a partial US success on that score is very likely to make the Soviets more obdurate in any strategic arms negotiations, since they will be able to deal from a position of relative strength, given Western Europe's continued feelings of insecurity and inferiority when dealing with Moscow and of irritation over its relations with the United States.

Soviet Strategy, European Response

In many ways Western Europe remains *the* decisive area of world politics. In 1980 the European Commu-

[3]See the stenographic report of the 26th Congress of the CPSU, *XXVI s"yezd Kommunisticheskoy Partii Sovetskogo Soyuza, stenograficheskiy otchët*, Moscow, Politizdat, 1981, pp. 38–39.

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Karl Kormes (left), Ambassador in East Germany's Foreign Ministry, and Günther Pagel, a department head in West Germany's Ministry of the Interior, sign a protocol reaffirming the inviolability of the frontier between the two countries on November 29, 1978, in Bonn.

—Eastfoto.

nity's share of the world gross national product stood at 22.6 percent (against 22.1 for the United States and 11.5 for the Soviet Union), and the combined population of its member states equaled that of the USSR and surpassed that of the United States.[4] Yet with all that strength *not* being translated into adequate political and military power, Europe's security against Soviet aggression, whether carried out with conventional or other weapons, depends ultimately on America's readiness to defend its allies and on the Kremlin's conviction that this readiness in fact exists. Indeed, unless Europe were to become a superpower in its own right, it could not by itself either resist Soviet pressures—not to mention an actual invasion—or even protect its interests and values in other parts of the world.

The current situation on the continent provides perhaps the strongest case for the rentier type of argument within the Politburo. What possible Soviet gain elsewhere in the world, the rentier would argue, could compensate for the potential damage done to Soviet interests if Western Europe became stronger and/or more united? Why should the USSR pursue policies that might encourage or foster a higher degree of solidarity among the nations of Western Europe, especially since there are a number of issues on which Europeans remain indifferent or divided? They are unlikely, for example, to become unduly perturbed by the spread of Castro-like regimes in Latin America. And Europeans remain by and large critical—or more precisely, fearful—of what they regard as America's excessive support of Israeli policies, an emphasis that many in Europe fear makes US policymakers somewhat oblivious to the danger inherent in the Soviet ties to the hard-line Arab states. But a threat to Europe's oil supplies, or too overt a Soviet intrusion in any future struggle in South Africa, would be a signal for West Europeans to close their ranks and become more responsive to Washington's urgings.

Has Afghanistan, continues the rentier argument, been worth the damage done to détente? And would not another Afghanistan or a military intervention in Poland play directly into the hands of the Washington "hawks" by causing Western Europe to lose its delu-

[4]US Central Intelligence Agency, National Foreign Assessment Center, *Handbook of Economic Statistics, 1981*, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1982, p. 1.

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sions about détente, and pushing it to translate its economic strength into political and military power?

The speculator would counter such arguments by pointing out that Europe's present disarray and somewhat ambivalent position in the current phase of the Soviet-American duel is based not so much on European appreciation of the Soviet Union's peaceful intentions, but on the shrewd suspicion that the USSR may not be so peacefully inclined after all. It is desirable, therefore, to do everything possible to make the Europeans more friendly toward Moscow, provided they do not lose entirely that salutary fear of Soviet power. It is an intricate but necessary game the USSR has to play in Europe, the speculator would argue, balancing friendly assurances with intimidation. Take the Polish crisis. Was not the initial reaction in West Germany colored by fear that the USSR in its wrath over Poland might do something unpleasant to the West, perhaps make trouble over Berlin? But suppose that the USSR had let the scandalous state of affairs in Poland continue, that martial law had not been proclaimed? Would not West Germany have started entertaining some dangerous notions of what might happen in the GDR, thereby becoming more tough-minded in its dealings with East Germany, and even with the Russians? And so it would be a mistake to tip the balance of the Soviets' European policy too much in favor of conciliation. The best policy, the speculator would argue, is to keep the Europeans apprehensive, but not to the point where they panic. And the USSR must continue to emphasize that the *real* danger to Europe comes not from the Soviet Union, but from the United States: if America continues to provoke Moscow and keeps trying to regain nuclear superiority, then the consequences of such American malevolence might have, alas, to be suffered by Europe as well.

The original Western concept of détente was premised, among other arguments, on the carrot-and-stick equation. But as things have developed, especially insofar as Europe is concerned, one sees the Soviets munching vigorously the carrot, with the Western stick nowhere in sight. The West Europeans' somewhat shamefaced arguments justifying this state of affairs have reverted to such well-known refrains as "economic sanctions never work" and "trade has helped to liberalize East European regimes." And, with perhaps much greater justification, Bonn or Paris could ask why they should be called upon to make economic sacrifices when the United States, for all the tough rhetoric of the Reagan administration, has hastened to lift the grain embargo.

And so West-East trade has flourished, neither stopping nor slackening in the wake of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan or the proclamation of martial law in Poland. By 1981, West German trade with the USSR had increased eightfold over its 1969 level.[5] More-

[5]Stent, loc. cit., p. 10.

East-West energy trade: at left, large-diameter pipe of West German manufacture is loaded onto the Soviet freighter Aleksandr Ushakov in Hamburg for shipment to the USSR; at right, work in October 1982 on the Soviet link of a pipeline slated to deliver natural gas to Western Europe in the mid-1980's.

—Photos by Sven Simon/Katherine Young and APN/Gamma-Liaison.

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over, the Mitterrand regime, despite indulging in some strong anti-Soviet rhetoric, joined the consortium for the construction of the West Siberian natural gas pipeline; and in February 1981, barely a month and a half after the Polish coup, it extended US$140 million in credits to the USSR. The pipeline project indeed opens up the prospect of the USSR not only obtaining the carrots, but to some extent being able to wield its own stick over Europe. Once the pipeline is completed, Germany and France will depend on the Soviet Union for one-third of their natural gas consumption,[6] with eight other European nations also importing substantial amounts of Soviet natural gas: This will appreciably increase the Soviet Union's hard-currency earnings as well.

It is often argued that much as the Soviets' trade with the West has increased, it still does not loom very large given its rather small size relative to the Soviet GNP. Thus one should neither exaggerate the benefits Moscow has derived from such trade, nor presume Western imports to be crucial to the Soviet economy. Yet in view of the parlous state of the Soviet economy, the even worse plight of several other countries of the Eastern bloc, and the crucial technological importance of many items acquired by the USSR and its client states, one must conclude that the West has relieved the Soviet Union of some of the burdens it would otherwise have had to incur because of its imperialist policies. Total indebtedness of the Soviet bloc to the West had by the end of 1980 passed US$70 billion.[7] The case of Poland, to be sure, illustrates the danger inherent in a Communist regime becoming addicted to capitalist largesse, something that perhaps Stalin was mindful of when he spurned the Marshall Plan and told the Czechs and the Poles to beware of capitalists bearing grants and low-interest loans.[8] Despite the lesson of Poland's and Romania's virtual bankruptcies, however, the eagerness to lend to the Communists has far from spent itself in the West. The Soviet Union's credit rating is still very good, and Western bankers have been quite willing to keep "rolling over" Poland's debts. Some people in government and business circles in Western Europe have in fact greeted the imposition of martial law by the Warsaw regime with a degree of relief. For all the sympathy so widely felt for the Polish people in their tragic predicament, most European politicians, it is fair to say, would be secretly pleased to see General Jaruzelski and his fellow satraps succeed in restoring the Communist version of law and order in Poland. The Russian bear must not become incensed, for the consequences of its wrath might extend far beyond Poland's borders.

Much of the ambivalence of West European attitudes can be traced to West Germany and its crucial role both within the European community and the Atlantic Alliance. More sensitive to the Soviet threat than any other European state (both Helmut Schmidt's and Helmut Kohl's governments have supported the NATO decision to deploy intermediate missiles), the Federal Republic has been at the same time the one most reluctant to antagonize the USSR, whether concerning trade, East European politics, or other issues. Psychologically, this ambivalence is quite understandable: for Bonn, détente has meant closer intra-German contacts, as well as a hope of eventual German reunification, a prospect that the West German government has been reluctant to admit has increasingly turned into a mirage. (West Berlin, for all the Soviets' pledges and guarantees in 1972, remains a hostage within the Communist camp.) Thus, aside from whatever positive actions other European nations may take, it would take a dramatic development in West German's attitudes and political climate to end the *immobilisme* and ambivalence of Western Europe's current posture in world politics: allied with the United States, yet unwilling to synchronize its policies with those of that country, except on issues directly affecting Europe's military security; conscious of the damage fragmentation has done to Europe's interests, yet unable to move toward effective political unity.

The Soviet Union's immediate objectives in the area must be aimed at preserving that *immobilisme*. Beyond that, the Kremlin would, of course, be pleased to see Western Europe move toward what has been dubbed "Finlandization." But Soviet leaders realize that their foreign policy in Europe must be more finely tuned than in any other part of the world. In areas such as Subsaharan Africa or even the Muslim world, the USSR could suffer reverses and decide to cut its losses without doing too much damage to its overall position in world politics. China represents a clear, but not yet present, danger. However, any Soviet move that might unwittingly become the catalyst for Europe's unity could transform the entire international scene overnight. Nor could the USSR look with equanimity on any American initiatives that would restore the momentum toward the unity of the Atlantic community as a whole. Thus, preventing European unity must remain the cardinal objective of Kremlin politics.

[6] Ibid.

[7] See Marshall Goldman, *USSR in Crisis*, New York, NY, W. W. Norton, 1983, pp. 157 and 166.

[8] Adam Ulam, *Expansion and Coexistence: Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917–1973*, 2nd ed., New York, NY, Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1974, p. 435.

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Poland's Military Burden

by Michael Checinski

For the past three years, Poland's political and economic problems have been continuously in the news. Yet an important underlying cause of this protracted "Polish crisis" has been consistently overlooked: the tremendous economic distortions caused by an entrenched Polish military-industrial program responsive primarily to Soviet needs. In addition to the direct economic costs of military spending, the indirect costs in terms of skewed priorities and obstacles to economic reform have been very great. The long-term trend has been for military expenditures to increase at a faster rate than economic output as a whole; only for a few years in the early 1970's did the growth rate of Polish national income, bolstered by a vast infusion of Western credits, outpace the steady growth of Polish spending on defense.

Indeed, one recent Polish source argues that most of Poland's postwar economic difficulties and cyclical crises were a direct result of the phases of military modernization of the Soviet-sponsored Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO).[1] While this is probably an exaggeration, there is no doubt that *one* major factor behind the current Polish economic crisis is the WTO (i.e., Soviet) policy of extensive Polish military spending, coupled with the uneconomic buildup of a large Polish military industry operating with obsolete technology.

For Poland, on the edge of an economic abyss, this heavy military burden continues to sabotage the overall performance of the economy—and hence, to some extent at least, of the political system as well. Moreover, Poland's predicament is but one example—albeit an especially severe one—of the military burden afflicting the economies of all the USSR's East European allies. This essay will examine the military-industrial relationship between Poland and the Soviet Union, from the establishment of the Soviet-led Council on Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) in January 1949.[2]

Postwar Soviet Planning

In 1949, Stalin forced Poland (and also Czechoslovakia) to violate their national economic interests by organizing, in the short span of three years, a relatively large military-industrial complex, thereby substantially "militarizing" the economic and social life of these countries. In Poland, the intensive military buildup brought about a complete revision of the newly-prepared Six-Year Plan (for the years

[1] Jadwiga Staniszkis, "Economic Cycles and Politcs in Poland," *Osteuropa* (Aachen, West Germany), No. 3, 1982, p. 195. Dr. Staniszkis, a lecturer at Warsaw University, prepared this analysis for Solidarity in 1981 on the basis of a student's doctoral dissertation.

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[2] For the early history of the CMEA, see Josef M. van Brabant, "Another Look at the Origins of East European Economic Cooperation," *Osteuropa Wirtschaft* (Munich), No. 4, 1979, pp. 243–66; and idem, *Socialist Economic Integration,* Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1980, pp. 16–54. Van Brabant does not discuss the military aspect of the CMEA at all. Yet Polish experts state that in 1949, and even in the mid-1960's, there were no purely economic reasons for the integration of the economies of the CMEA members, and that the first formal statute of this organization was prepared only in December 1959. Henryk Cholaj, "The Integration Group of CMEA Members and Trends in its Development," *Ekonomista* (Warsaw), No. 2, 1979, p. 299; and Pawel Bozyk, "Thirty Years of CMEA: States and Forms of Cooperation," ibid., p. 335. See also Connie M. Friesen, *The Political Economy of East-West Trade,* New York, Praeger, 1976, pp. 70–71.

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Prominent Warsaw Pact leaders pictured during the "Friendship 1982" joint Pact maneuvers in northwest Poland in March 1982, from left to right: Marshal of the Soviet Union Viktor Kulikov, commander-in-chief of Warsaw Pact forces; East German defense minister, General Heinz Hoffman; and General Wojciech Jaruzelski, Polish defense minister, party chief, and head of Poland's martial law regime.

—Daniel Simon/Gamma-Liaison.

1950–55). The plan itself was not formally changed, but a special annex was added, outlining obligatory tasks of military-industrial construction. As a result, all non-military aspects of the plan were soon victimized, turning the plan for civilian-oriented investment into a mere scrap of paper.[3] A Polish military industry was built and organized over a three-year period by simply taking over a large portion of existing and much-needed civilian factories and by allocating production factors from the nonmilitary sectors—in other words, by violating the directives of a well-prepared, long-term plan in a decidedly uneconomic manner.

Given the obvious economic and potential political costs of such a policy, Soviet motives deserve close examination. These motives seem particularly puzzling when one considers that the USSR, in the aftermath of World War II, already had one of the biggest armament industries in the world, and could easily have supplied East European armies with all the weapons they needed. Why then did Moscow want to have a relatively strong military industry in Poland and certain other East European countries?

The whirlwind pace of building large armament factories in Poland (and reconstructing them in Czechoslovakia) could not be explained by the "fear" of an imminent new conventional war in Europe voiced in official propaganda.[4] Nor can the unexpected outbreak of the Korean War in 1950—more than a year *after* the East European military-industrial buildup had already begun—fully explain this drastic and long-term Soviet policy. Indeed, the Soviet Union did not even seem to be seeking the most efficient production of weapons throughout the Warsaw Pact

[3]Michael Checinski, *The Interaction of the Soviet and Polish War-Economies in the Framework of CMEA*, Ebenhausen, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, November 1981, pp. 15–16.

[4]Claims to this effect are made in Waclaw Stankiewicz, *Ekonomika wojenna* (The War-Economy), Warsaw, Wydawnictwo Ministerstwa Obrony Narodowej (Ministry of Defense Publishing House—hereafter WMON), 1981, pp. 423–66; Oskar Lange, *Pisma ekonomiczne i spoleczne, 1930–1960* (Economic and Social Writings, 1930–1960), Warsaw, Panstwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1961, p. 54.

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region. For, if this were the goal, why then did Moscow insist on the development of very similar capacities in both Poland and Czechoslovakia? Such redundancy only impeded CMEA cooperation in achieving economies of scale in military production. Moreover, it was not just in direct weapons production that the East European economies were organized in such a way as to compete with one another. This course was also introduced into the newly-developed machine-building and metal-working industries, both essential components of the armament industry. As a result, until the early 1960's, a large part of the machine-building industry in CMEA countries was not fully exploited, and large investments and material reserves were rendered useless.[5]

In view of the above analysis, one must search elsewhere for an explanation of the apparently irrational Soviet military-industrial policy for postwar Eastern Europe. One motive for this policy, upon closer examination, appears to have been a desire to facilitate modernization of the Soviet Union's own military-industrial complex. In the early postwar years, most East European countries were able to cooperate mainly with the USSR, which was the primary supplier of the very specialized machines necessary for armament production and subsequently for the heavy machine-building industries. This created a permanent market for the powerful Soviet armament industry, and for its special equipment and technologies, all left over from the last stages of World War II. The fear on the part of Soviet industrial managers and planners that these tremendous reserves of machines were quickly becoming obsolete helps explain why Poland and Czechoslovakia were forced to develop very similar armament factories—in competition with each other, on short notice, and in conflict with their own national interests. East European factories, in other words, were used as an industrial reserve capacity, producing parts for and using the facilities of the outgoing generation of Soviet military production. Of course, many of those factories quickly became obsolete.[6] Nevertheless, by the 1960's and 1970's, several CMEA countries were able to pass on Western technology and components useful in the modernization of Soviet military research and development (R&D) and armament production.[7]

In addition to these technological objectives, the weapons produced in Eastern Europe served other Soviet military and economic needs. The Soviet Union feared that most of its industrial centers might be vulnerable to nuclear attack. By contrast, it was calculated, industrial (and military) production dispersed among other CMEA countries would not be a target of American attacks, because of a different attitude toward the Polish and Czechoslovak populations. This factor became particularly important in the mid-1950's, when—according to both Polish and Soviet accounts—the Soviet military command started preparing for nuclear war.[8]

Still another use for East European armament production lay in export to favored Soviet clients abroad. In the short run, Eastern Europe served as a supplementary source of weapons for North Korea and China. In the longer run, this role expanded to include arms supply for various wars against "capitalist imperialism." By building up their own military industries, Poland and Czechoslovakia could share the cost of the Korean war and later of other military engagements in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Indeed, the pattern of East European arms trading, as will be demonstrated below, reflects a generation of international conflicts: the Korean war, the Vietnam war, the 1967 and 1973 Arab-Israeli wars, the invasion of Czechoslovakia, Soviet military involvement in Angola and Ethiopia, and even the invasion of Afghanistan. By the early 1970's, Poland, in particular, had become one of the top ten arms traders in the world—though it continued to be a net importer of (mostly Soviet) military equipment until the end of the decade.[9]

Altogether, with the hindsight of more than 30 years, one can assume that Soviet leaders have envisioned Eastern Europe's military industry as an integral part of Soviet relations with the rest of the world. It was not by chance that one of the first duties of the CMEA was to oversee construction of relatively large military industries in countries under Soviet control. Poland, with its strategic location and substantial material and human resources, was destined to become

[5]Urszula Plowiec, "The Stages of Economic Growth and the Phases of Development of Polish International Trade," in Józef Soldaczuk, Ed., *Handel zagraniczny a wzrost krajow RWPG* (Foreign Trade and Growth of the CMEA Countries), Warsaw, Panstwowe Wydawnictwo Economiczne, 1969, pp. 66–73; Lech Kurowski, "Foreign Trade and Growth in Hungary," in ibid., p. 239; and Staniszkis, loc. cit., p. 191.

[6]Stanislaw Ciaston, *Ekonomiczne aspekty obronności* (Economic Aspects of Defense), Warsaw, WMON, 1961, pp. 70, 101.

[7]This phenomenon is discussed in Jorg K. Hoensch, "The Warsaw Pact and the Northern Member States," in Robert W. Clawson and Lawrence S. Kaplan, Eds., *The Warsaw Pact: Political Purpose and Military Means*, Wilmington, DE, Scholarly Resources, 1982, pp. 46–47.

[8]Stankiewicz, op. cit., p. 424; V. F. Samoylenko, *Osnova boyevogo soyuza: internatsionalizm kak faktor oboronnoy moshchi sotsialisticheskogo sotrudnichestva* (The Foundation of the Military Alliance: Internationalism as a Factor in the Defense Might of the Socialist Commonwealth), Moscow, Voyenizdat, 1981, pp. 157, 165.

[9]Poland is one of the top ten countries listed in the tables published in US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (hereafter ACDA), *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers* (hereafter *WMEAT*), Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, various recent annual issues.

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the most important Soviet "junior partner" in the military field. Zdzisław Rurarz, the former Polish ambassador to Japan, summarized this situation as follows:

Poland, strategically speaking, is much more important to the USSR than any other Eastern country. Therefore, the Polish economy is much more intertwined with the Soviet economy than any other Eastern bloc country economy especially as it pertains to the development of certain industries.... It is important to understand that Polish industrial production is intricately linked to the Soviet war production.[10]

Polish military industry began to fulfill its function in Soviet strategic planning almost immediately after its launching in 1949.

Origins of Poland's Military Burden

In the immediate postwar period, Polish authorities concentrated on basic industrial development emphasizing factories producing civilian goods. As a result, the first five postwar years of the Polish economy (1945–49) were a success. The worst difficulties of the destroyed country were under control by 1948, and relatively good prospects were outlined by the very ambitious Six-Year Plan (1950–55). Until 1950, even in the face of continuing civil war and the increasing role of the military and security services, the armament industry was kept at a very low level. Old factories were slowly reconstructed and served more as overhaul shops than as mass-producing armament plants. Only small arms, some artillery, and the necessary ammunition were produced. In the Six-Year Plan, military-industrial investment, including housing for anticipated manpower, was not to exceed 2 percent of total planned investment.[11]

Thus, Poland's new rulers appear to have resisted for a time Soviet pressure to create a large Polish military industry, even after the organization of CMEA.[12] Nevertheless, in 1949, the Polish government did order the organization of a large military-industrial Special Construction Design Bureau (in Polish, *Biuro Projektow Specjalnych*) employing 1,500 engineers and technicians. Soviet pressures in this direction intensified immediately after the oubreak of the Korean war in June of the following year. The Soviet Union forced Polish leaders to change the approved course of economic planning and plan implementation. The accelerated pace of construction of the Polish military industry was destructive for the whole Polish economy, particularly for agriculture and consumer goods industries. In the words of one Polish expert,

the Six-Year Plan for the development of the national economy implemented at that time was not fulfilled in many of the indicators typical of the peacetime economy. In that period we had to deal with a partly war-economic mobilization. In the field of industry, this coincided with investments needed to expand the productive capacities of the armaments industry. This required, of course, numerous accompanying investments and the introduction of major changes in the economic management system. For example, the supply of and demand for staple consumer goods were subjected to fairly strict control, including even basic forms of rationing and a ration-card system . . . .[13]

The destructive role of the militarization of the economy (particularly of industry) in the 1950's is confirmed by a number of other Polish experts,[14] but no statistical data are given in any of their publications. It is therefore important to present some background on the early development of Poland's military industry.

In the summer of 1950, a new "improved" Six-Year Plan was introduced on short notice. The "improvements" were prepared under the direct supervision of the Soviet advisers to a newly-created Military Group *(Zespół Wojskowy)* of the State Economic Planning Commission (PKPG). The deputy chief of the PKPG was responsible for all activities of this Military Group. In the early 1950's, this post was occupied by Piotr Jaroszewicz—later Prime Minister of Poland, until his arrest after the fall of party chief Edward Gierek. Jaroszewicz was agreeable to any and all demands expressed by Pyotr Nikitin, the Soviet adviser to the Military Group. It was thus not entirely in jest that Jaroszewicz was nicknamed "little Piotr," and Nikitin, "big Piotr," among officials of the Polish military-industrial complex.

The Polish military buildup directed by these two "Piotrs" was remarkable not just for its absolute magnitude, but also for the unprecedented pace of its implementation. Many operating civilian factories, abso-

[10]US Congress, Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, *Implementation of the Helsinki Accords: Soviet Involvement in the Polish Economy*, Hearing, April 1, 1982, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1982, pp. 8, 4.

[11]Ciaston, op. cit., p. 69; Leszek Grot, "The Polish People's Army in the Years 1949-1960," in *Wojskowy Przegląd Historyczny* (Warsaw), No. 1, 1976, pp. 23–24.

[12]This information is based on the author's interviews with high officials of the Polish military industry.

[13]Stankiewicz, op. cit., p. 446.

[14]Lange, loc. cit.; Plowiec, op. cit., p. 67.

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Polish Premier Piotr Jaroszewicz, second from left, in 1975 views a production process at the steel works in Katowice, a plant connected by a special wide-gauge railroad to the Soviet Union. From 1952, Jaroszewicz served as his country's permanent representative on the Executive Committee of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance.

—EUPRA.

lutely necessary for the still very weak postwar economy, were abruptly converted to military production. In addition, totally new and very large factories were built and equipped with a growing flow of Soviet machines useful only for producing military goods.[15] Orders were that, in just three years, the whole projected Polish armament industry had to be in full operation. The sum of 8 billion zlotys was earmarked for this purpose—and this only for machines, equipment, and construction, excluding tools, transportation, or production costs (see Table 1). The plan, of course, was fulfilled in nearly every detail. By the end of 1952, Polish military industry employed the planned 200,000 people.[16]

This development had a wide range of negative consequences for the Polish economy. For example, arms factories were deliberately designed with sufficient spare capacity to increase production five- to seven-fold during a mobilization period (e.g., from 200 to about 1,000 tanks a year). Yet even in 1952, at the peak of the Korean war, Poland produced only some 500 to 550 T-34 tanks. It also produced some 200 military airplanes, well above the peacetime quota but still below full output potential. Overall, the armament factories operated at only 50–70 percent of capacity; in calmer periods, capacity utilization was even lower. This underutilization greatly raised the unit cost of the weapons produced.[17]

The negative impact of the expanded military industry, however, was more extensive. The 200,000 people employed in the Polish armament industry constituted fully 8–10 percent of total employment in industry during the years 1950–53.[18] Moreover, the best specialists and workers, technical and management personnel alike, were channeled to the arms industry. Their reallocation to new fields caused a drop in per capita labor output, both by stripping established industries of experienced specialists, and by forcing those specialists to redirect their skills.[19]

Despite the fact that the arms industry absorbed nearly 30 percent of total industrial investment, it was not listed separately in statistical tables on the Polish national income or state budget. But, if one compares the sectoral distribution of new fixed capital created in the years before and after 1952, when the newly-created military industry was ready, one can easily see how far-reaching and destructive was the decision to violate the promising Six-Year Plan (see Table 2 on p. 36). The data presented in this table show the damaging effect on agricultural investment of Poland's intensive military-industrial buildup. In 1952, at the apex of militarization, investment in agriculture dropped by 50 percent. Only 4 percent of all factories continued to manufacture goods for agriculture.[20]

Table 1: Investment Outlays in Polish Industry, 1950-52

(millions of zlotys)

	Yearly totals in 1956 prices			1950-52 total in prices of:	
	1950	1951	1952	1950	1956
A. All industry	11,024	13,021	19,790	27,265	43,835
B. Arms industry				8,000	12,861
C. Row B/A (percent)				29.34	

SOURCE: Calculated from *Rocznik Statystyczny, 1961* (Statistical Yearbook, 1961), Warsaw, Główny Urząd Statystyczny, 1961, pp. 68-69; and *Maly Rocznik Statystyczny, 1958* (Concise Statistical Yearbook, 1958), Warsaw, Główny Urząd Statystyczny, 1958, p. 61

[15]Ciaston, op. cit., pp. 68–69; and author's interviews.

[16]Information from author's interviews. Although the main capacities of the Polish military industry were in operation by the end of 1952, the plan outlined in 1950 was not fully completed until 1954. *Nowe Drogi* (Warsaw), No. 3, 1954, p. 31.

[17]This is confirmed, in a general way, by Plowiec, op. cit., p. 71.

[18]Calculated from *Rocznik Statystyczny, 1961* (Statistical Yearbook, 1961) Warsaw, Główny Urząd Statystyczny (hereafter GUS), 1961, p. 44.

[19]Michael Checinski, *A Comparison of the Polish and Soviet Armaments Decisionmaking Systems*, Santa Monica, CA, The Rand Corporation, 1981, pp. 4–5.

[20]Staniszkis, loc. cit., p. 195.

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Table 2: Growth of Gross Fixed Capital in the Polish Economy, 1950-53 and 1954-57

(average annual growth rate, in percent)

	1950-53	1954-57
All sectors	15.5	5.3
Industry	25.6	1.2
Building construction	10.5	18.3
Agriculture	0.3	17.9
Transportation and communications	7.7	-2.2

SOURCE: Urszula Plowiec, "The Stages of Economic Growth and the Phases of Development of Polish International Trade, in Józef Soldaczuk, Ed., *Handel zagraniczny a wzrost krajów RWPG* (Foreign Trade and Growth of the CMEA Countries), Warsaw, Państwowe Wydawnictwo Ekonomiczne, 1969, p. 67.

The negative consequences of Soviet-modeled militarization are even more apparent if one considers the artificial system of cost calculation for input factors and investments in the military sector. To "lower" the unit-costs of armament, steel prices were drastically reduced; and to make steel mills "efficient," they were supplied with energy (coal, oil, gas, electricity) free of charge. Moreover, the prices of many other materials supplied to heavy industry were reduced significantly without regard to real cost; and taxation of heavy industry, including military industry, was in fact abandoned. This policy changed the input-output estimates for these sectors in a way that made them difficult to compare with the value of investments in the civilian sectors (light industry, agriculture, etc.). Published figures were therefore deceptively high for the non-military sectors, and falsely low for the armament-related industrial sectors.[21] In addition, capital expenditures for the construction and equipment of arms factories were often disguised in official statistics. This was the case with figures for several ministries, particularly those in charge of metallurgy, machine-building, chemicals, and construction industries. Consequently, the published statistics understate the real disproportion of investment and production policy.

For similar reasons, it is difficult to estimate with precision the value of the annual production of arms and military equipment. If, however, one estimates that about 40–60 percent of the output of the metallurgy, machine-building, and chemical industries in those early years was earmarked for armament purposes—as our interviewees suggest—one arrives at a figure for military production of about 6–7 billion zlotys for 1953.[22]

From these rapid beginnings, Polish military industry has continued to expand steadily—and to drain resources from the civilian economy—in response to overall Soviet strategic directives. During the next three decades, Polish military industry became one of the staunchest collaborators of the Soviet Union while undergoing significant growth, both qualitative and quantitative. In addition to its role as a "buffer" for a newer generation of Soviet arms, Poland developed a few of its own modern military-industrial products, some in cooperation with Czechoslovakia and East Germany.[23] A recently published Soviet book boasts:

The Soviet Union ... has provided full assistance to the fraternal countries in the creation and development of military production, in its technical equipping and organization, and in training specialists. ... In the interest of defense, each socialist nation currently has enterprises producing various weapons, ammunition, various types of military equipment and supplies for the troops. For example, Poland produces jet aircraft, helicopters, combat ships, tanks, motor vehicles, various engineering and radar equipment, communications equipment, and so forth.[24]

Needless to say, the costs to Poland of this impressive military buildup have rarely been acknowledged.

The Direct Costs

Although the official Polish defense budget does not cover all defense expenditures, it is representative enough to serve as a point of departure for economic analysis (see Table 3). Officially reported expenditures have increased year to year virtually without a pause. Moreover, throughout the 1960's, the defense budget grew much more rapidly than Poland's net material product. In 1970, the defense outlay was 140 percent higher than that of a decade before, while the net material product had risen only 76 percent.

Later, during the first half of the 1970's, overall Polish economic growth briefly outpaced rising expendi-

[21] Ibid. Similarly, an interview informant who had participated in a 1951 planning session with the highest Polish military-industrial officials noted a remark by Hilary Minc—at the time the decisive figure in Polish economic policy: "I am not asking anyone how much the program of building the military industry will cost, but when it will be in full operation. Some time in the future we will also start to think about the cost calculation, but today this is not your concern."

[22] Calculated from *Maly Rocznik Statystyczny 1955* (Concise Statistical Handbook 1955), Warsaw, GUS, 1956, p. 68; and interview information.

[23] Friedrich Wiener, Ed., *Taschenbuch der Landstreitkräfte, Band 2: Die Armeen der Warschauer-Pakt-Staaten*, (Handbook of Ground Forces, Vol. 2: The Armies of the Warsaw Pact States), Munich, Bernard & Graefe Verlag, 1979, pp. 252, 266, 346. See also Hoensch, loc. cit., p. 45; James R. Carlton, "Soviet and Warsaw Pact Major Battlefield Weapons," in Clawson and Kaplan, op. cit., pp. 171–72; and John Erickson, "Military Management and Modernization Within the Warsaw Pact," in ibid., pp. 220–24.

[24] A. I. Pozharov, *Ekonomicheskiye osnovy oboronnogo moguschestva sotsialisticheskogo gosudarstva* (Economic Bases of the Defense Might of a Socialist State), Moscow, Voyenizdat, 1981, p. 162.

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Table 3: Published Data on Growth of Poland's Defense Spending and Net Material Product, 1951-80

	Defense expenditures			Net material product (% increase, 1961 prices)
	Total (bil. zl.)	Annual increase (bil. zl)	Percent increase	
1951	3.8	—	—	—
1952	6.6	2.8	73.7	5.6
1953	10.3	3.7	56.0	10.5
1954	10.9	0.6	5.8	10.0
1955	12.6	1.7	15.6	8.7
1956	12.7	0.1	0.8	7.2
1957	10.1	−2.6	−20.5	10.8
1958	11.2	1.1	10.9	5.5
1959	14.3	3.1	27.7	5.2
1960	14.9	0.6	4.2	4.5
1961	17.0	2.1	14.1	7.6
1962	18.4	1.4	8.2	2.2
1963	20.7	2.3	12.5	7.2
1964	21.6	0.9	4.3	6.7
1965	23.2	1.6	7.4	6.9
1966	25.2	2.0	8.6	7.2
1967	26.4	1.2	4.8	5.6
1968	30.3	3.9	14.8	9.0
1969	33.5	3.2	10.6	2.8
1970	35.7	2.2	6.6	5.2
1971	37.2	1.5	4.2	8.1
1972	39.9	2.7	7.2	10.6
1973	41.1	1.2	3.0	10.8
1974	45.5	4.4	10.7	10.4
1975	47.6	2.1	4.6	9.0
1976	51.7	4.1	8.6	6.8
1977	57.7	6.0	11.6	5.9
1978	59.8	2.1	3.6	3.0
1979	64.3	4.5	7.5	−2.3
1980	64.5	0.1	0.3	−6.0

SOURCE: Calculated from the *Rocznik Statystyczny* (Statistical Yearbook), Warsaw, Główny Urząd Statystyczny, for different years.

tures on defense. But beginning in 1976, military spending again began to grow more rapidly than national income. In 1971–75, official defense expenditures totaled 211.3 billion zlotys, or US$15.2 billion. In 1976–80, these outlays grew to 298 billion zlotys, or US$21.4 billion, the equivalent of the Polish debt to the West at that time.[25] Other sources, however, estimate that Polish military expenditures for the shorter period 1976–79 were as high as US$30.7 billion, with outlays for 1969–79 totalling US$62.8 billion.[26] While it is possible to explain why defense spending rose in years of international tension, it is more difficult to understand the increases in other years. For example, some of the largest absolute increases in Polish defense spending occurred after Polish borders were recognized by the West German government and by the Helsinki Accords, i.e., at the apex of détente. Only behind-the-scenes pressure from the Warsaw Pact Command or the CMEA Military Industrial Commission can fully account for this steady long-term trend.

This trend continued without regard for Poland's deteriorating economic situation. In 1981, defense spending increased about another US$345 million—in a country with a foreign debt of US$25–26 billion, a totally disorganized domestic market, and a high inflation rate.[27] One Polish source argues that approval of 75 million additional zlotys for investment in the very difficult year of 1981 derived solely from the need to continue modernization of the arms industry. This same published account also makes the sensational statement that the bloody Polish disturbances of 1970 were purposely manipulated by the ruling elite to strengthen their contention in Soviet-Polish discussions that further increases in Polish defense outlays were impossible.[28] If correct, this statement offers a striking indication of how strong Soviet pressure on Poland is in the area of defense expenditures, and how limited is the ability of the Polish government to resist such pressure. Indeed, another Polish source notes that one of the most troublesome problems for the Polish government from mid-1980 until the declaration of martial law in December 1981 was the prospect of a decrease in armament production due to strikes at many factories.[29]

In comparison with the rest of Eastern Europe, Poland shows a faster growth in military expenditures for the period 1975–81 than any other country except Bulgaria (see Table 4 on p. 38). Its average annual rate of increase for the period was 14 percent—exactly twice that for Hungary, at the opposite extreme. Only in 1981, when the Polish economy was faced with extraordinary difficulties, did this rapid rate of increase decline. Altogether, Poland's defense budget afflicts the nation's economy with a surprisingly heavy direct burden. This burden has only been compounded by negative international arms trade balances and by a variety of indirect costs.

[25]The dollar amount is calculated on basis of US$1=13.9 zlotys. This is the ratio used in International Institute of Strategic Studies (hereafter IISS), *The Military Balance, 1981–1982*, London, 1981, p. 20.

[26]See Thad P. Alton, Gregor Lazarcik, Elizabeth M. Bass, and Wasyl Znayenko, "East European Defense Expenditures, 1965-1978," in U.S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee, *East European Economic Assessment, Part II: Regional Assessment. A Compendium of Papers*, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1981, pp. 409–33. Differences in estimates reflect differing assumptions regarding exchange rates and varying approaches to estimating total defense spending. All estimates show a trend toward higher and higher sums of military expenditure.

[27]For figures on Poland's 1981 defense spending, see IISS, *The Military Balance, 1982–1983*, London, 1982, p. 124.

[28]Staniszkis, loc. cit., p. 194.

[29]See, e.g., "A Review of Events," *Lad* (Warsaw), Oct. 8, 1981, p. 2.

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

A Polish Navy patrol boat launching a rocket in 1978.

—EUPRA.

Table 4: Defense Expenditures of East European Warsaw Pact Members, 1975, 1980, 1981

	US$ million			US$ per capita		
	1975	1980	1981	1975	1980	1981
Bulgaria	457	1,254	1,346	52	141	150
(1975=100)	*100.0*	*274.4*	*294.5*	*100.0*	*271.2*	*288.5*
(1980=100)	—	*100.0*	*107.3*	—	*100.0*	*106.4*
Czechoslovakia	1,706	3,601	3,796	116	234	246
(1975=100)	*100.0*	*211.1*	*222.5*	*100.0*	*201.7*	*212.1*
(1980=100)	—	*100.0*	*105.4*	—	*100.0*	*105.1*
East Germany	2,550	4,793	6,593	148	286	415
(1975=100)	*100.0*	*188.0*	*258.5*	*100.0*	*193.2*	*280.4*
(1980=100)	—	*100.0*	*137.6*	—	*100.0*	*145.1*
Hungary	506	1,067	1,237	48	99	115
(1975=100)	*100.0*	*210.9*	*244.5*	*100.0*	*206.3*	*239.6*
(1980=100)	—	*100.0*	*115.9*	—	*100.0*	*116.2*
Poland	2,011	5,063	5,408	59	141	151
(1975=100)	*100.0*	*251.8*	*268.9*	*100.0*	*239.0*	*255.9*
(1980=100)	—	*100.0*	*106.8*	—	*100.0*	*107.1*
Romania	707	1,361	1,351	33	61	60
(1975=100)	*100.0*	*192.5*	*191.1*	*100.0*	*184.8*	*181.8*
(1980=100)	—	*100.0*	*99.3*	—	*100.0*	*98.4*

SOURCE: Calculated from The International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 1982-1983*, London, 1982, p. 124.

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The Arms Trade Burden

As Poland's domestic military production expanded, its exports of military items also grew apace. In the period 1975–79, Poland exported weapons and military equipment valued at approximately US$1,400 million (see Table 5). However, until 1978, the value of imported military-industrial equipment and weapons exceeded that of exports in these categories. In the 11 years from 1969 through 1979, Poland's imports and exports of armament and military equipment totaled about US$2,840 million and US$2,450 million, respectively, representing a cumulative negative trade balance of about US$390 million for this branch of the economy (see Table 6 on p. 40).

Two-thirds of Poland's 1975–79 arms exports went to CMEA countries. The biggest customers were the Soviet Union, the GDR, and Romania; Bulgaria and Hungary each purchased only small amounts of Polish weapons. Czechoslovakia remained in competition with Poland, producing similar military hardware and exporting US$210 in military goods to Poland. In the same period, Poland imported armament and military-industrial equipment from the USSR in the amount of about US$1,200 million.

Poland also exports armaments to non-CMEA countries. In 1975–79, it delivered a total of about US$460 million worth of armaments to these markets. A majority (54.4 percent) went to Libya; India received 8.7 percent; and Iraq, 6.5 percent. Exports to those three countries meant Polish hard-currency armament sales of at most US$320 million.

A closer look at East European weapons trading reveals an interesting phenomenon: trends in arms import and export are very similar for most CMEA members.[30] After remaining stable from 1969 through 1971, arms *imports* increased dramatically in 1972–73—probably in line with WTO plans for armament re-export to Egypt and Syria in preparation for the October 1973 Arab-Israeli war. After a two-year decrease, there was another significant increase in 1976, and then again a slow-down until 1978 (except for Hungary, which continued a high rate of arms import).

As for weapons *exports*, the picture is similar. There was a dramatic increase starting in 1972–73, with an even stronger "jump" in 1975–76. This was true for Poland, for Czechoslovakia, and for CMEA as a whole. Thus, 1972 was a turning point in CMEA export policy. One can only guess at the reasons for this shift; most probably, the Military Industrial Commission (i.e., the USSR) decided that armaments produced in Eastern Europe could be exported not only for political but also for commercial reasons. Arms exports to non-CMEA markets became increasingly dependent on decisions at the national level (as is the case for many other industrial products); in fact, competition among CMEA members for Third World arms markets grows from year to year. Nevertheless, in the aggregate, CMEA weapons exports reflect Soviet political priorities, as regards both destination and absolute magnitude.

Compared to its Warsaw Pact allies, Poland appears to have borne a disproportionate share of the cost of this policy. During the years 1969–79, as noted, Poland had a negative arms trade balance totaling nearly US$400 million. It was thus burdened not only with high military expenditures, but also with the obligation to finance its net arms imports with a large portion of its earnings from non-military exports. By contrast, Czechoslovakia exported some US$4,335 million while importing only US$2,370 million in arms over the same period, thereby earning nearly two billion dollars.[31]

Table 5: Selected Data on Arms Transfers, 1975-79

(US$ million, current)

Recipient	Total arms received	Supplier		
		USSR	Czecho-slovakia	Poland
Bulgaria	1,200	1,200	20	10
Czechoslovakia	1,300	1,200	—	—
East Germany	2,000	1,700	230	70
Hungary	1,000	975	50	10
Poland	1,500	1,200	210	—
Romania	875	675	30	70
USSR	2,800	—	1,900	800
Total for Warsaw Pact	*10,700*	*7,000*	*2,400*	*950*
Angola	850	500	10	20
Ethiopia	1,800	1,500	30	10
India	2,200	1,800	50	40
Iraq	6,800	4,900	80	30
Libya	6,900	5,000	270	250
North Korea	575	280	—	10
Syria	4,500	3,600	310	10
Yemen (Sanaa)	625	210	—	100
Yugoslavia	625	525	—	5
WORLD TOTAL	94,400	33,500	3,200	1,400

SOURCE: US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1970-79*, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, March 1982, pp. 127-30. Numbers may not add due to rounding.

[30] For data on East European arms trading over this period, see the appropriate tables in ACDA, *WMEAT, 1969-78*, December 1980; and idem, *WMEAT, 1970-79*, March 1982.

[31] ACDA, *WMEAT, 1969–78*, p. 130; and idem, *WMEAT, 1970-79*, p. 97.

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The A. Warski shipyards in Szczecin, one of several major shipbuilding facilities in Poland capable of building commercial and military vessels.

—EUPRA.

Beginning in 1978, however, Poland began to export more arms than it imported. This trend has been used in Polish propaganda to justify Poland's large military industry and growing arms trade.[32] But this argument is misleading, if only because a substantial portion of Poland's recent arms exports does not produce real earnings. For example, in 1975–79, Poland delivered military goods valued at US$140 million to Angola, Ethiopia, Yemen (Sanaa), and Syria—amounting to roughly 30 percent of total armament exports to non-CMEA countries (see Table 5).[33] There can be little doubt that this was not a profitable business, but rather consisted at least partly of grants and low-interest, long-term credit transactions forced on Poland by the CMEA Military Industrial Commission. The economic difficulties of those Mideast and African arms recipients suggest that this Polish military aid will be repaid only in the distant future, if ever. In fact, this portion of non-CMEA exports may well have consumed most of the profit Poland obtained by selling weapons elsewhere for hard currency. Yet Poland could not afford to oppose such decisions, since they are part of Soviet-organized aid programs.

Indirect Costs

There are still other, indirect costs stemming from Poland's military-industrial "cooperation" with the USSR. Like other CMEA members, Poland depends primarily on the USSR for its supply of armament and military-industrial equipment. The USSR exploits this monopolistic position by raising armament prices, dictating the timetable and selection of delivered materials, and forcing other CMEA members to manufacture those parts and final products that are economically or technologically inconvenient for the Soviet Union to produce. One recently published Polish document argues that it was such economic cooperation with the USSR that brought Poland to the very brink of

[32] "Profits and Losses: Trade with the USSR," in *Polityka* (Warsaw), Oct. 21, 1981, "Export-Import" Supplement, p. 18.

[33] In the summer of 1979, in addition, Poland agreed to supply 200 T-55 tanks to Yemen (Sanaa), while the Soviet Union delivered 300 tanks and many other heavy weapons. IISS, *The Military Balance, 1980–1981*, London, 1981, p. 105.

Table 6: Polish Military Expenditures and Arms Trade, 1969-79

(US$ million, current)

	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	Total for 1969-79
Military expenditures	3,002	3,631	4,135	4,575	4,967	5,490	6,281	6,914	7,442	7,886	8,466	62,789
(Previous year = 100)	—	*121.0*	*113.5*	*110.6*	*108.6*	*110.5*	*114.4*	*110.1*	*107.6*	*106.0*	*107.4*	*282.0*[a]
Arms exports	150	150	170	140	230	190	170	330	290	370	260	2,450
(Previous year = 100)	*101.1*	*100.0*	*113.3*	*82.3*	*164.3*	*82.6*	*89.5*	*194.1*	*87.9*	*127.6*	*70.3*	*173.3*[a]
Arms imports	120	120	120	260	410	360	350	390	370	160	180	2,840
(Previous year = 100)	*100.0*	*100.0*	*100.0*	*216.7*	*157.7*	*87.8*	*97.2*	*111.4*	*94.9*	*43.2*	*112.5*	*150.0*[a]
Balance in arms trade	30	30	50	−120	−180	−170	−180	−60	−80	210	80	−390

[a] Percent increase, 1969-1979.

SOURCES: US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1969-1978 (hereafter, WMEAT)*, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, December 1980, pp. 63, 147 (for 1969); *WMEAT, 1970–1979*, March 1982, pp. 73, 115 (for other years).

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Soviet and East European leaders at the 6th Congress of the Polish United Workers Party, in December 1971: in the front row, from left to right, are Premier Piotr Jaroszewicz and party leader Edward Gierek; in the second row, from left to right, are Czechoslovak party chief Gustav Husák, Belorussian party first secretary Pyotr Masherov, and Soviet party chief Leonid Brezhnev.

—Eastfoto.

disaster.[34] Another Polish source states frankly that the Soviet Union, as the stronger partner, has the power to force its client to accept its view—simply by manipulating the prices of machines.[35]

For goods available from another CMEA country or even from the West, the bargaining power of the USSR is a bit lower. But for weapons, specifically those produced only by the USSR, the law of dictated prices is in force. There are, for example, reported instances in which the Soviets asked Poland to pay prices ten times higher than those of similar Western products.[36] The Soviet Union is also able to dictate how much and what must be bought for the Polish army. Inasmuch as the Soviets bargain from a monopolistic position, they can charge exorbitant prices not only for weapons but also for most of the specialized machines used in CMEA's military industry.

In the framework of CMEA's division of labor, Poland has been forced to produce goods, including

[34] "The Speech of Marian Rajski, A Delegate to the City Party Conference in Gdynia, on May 16, 1981," *Kultura* (Paris), 1981, pp. 146–58.

[35] "Profits and Losses . . . ," loc. cit., p. 18.

[36] Interview information. CMEA prices for raw materials, on the other hand, are based not on the current world market price, but rather on the prices of the previous five years. In future years, therefore, Soviet oil exports to other CMEA countries will probably be priced at the high market rates of the late 1970's, even if world prices continue to drop.

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components for the arms industry, that required raw materials and technology imported for hard currency. The USSR, however, has often repaid Poland in rubles at prices which were not equivalent to the real dollar costs. This aspect of Polish military-industrial subservience to Soviet interests has just received official (albeit indirect) confirmation for the first time. In 1982, the USSR finally agreed to pay the Polish shipbuilding and telephone industries 13.5 million and 1.2 million convertible rubles, respectively, to buy Western components for Soviet ships and telephones. In 1983, Poland's shipbuilding industry is due to receive US$44 million from the USSR. These figures provide some indication of how many dollars the Polish shipbuilding industry must have expended previously to supply the Soviet Union with ships for which Poland was reimbursed in non-convertible rubles.[37]

In addition, since Polish military industry is backward in comparison with that of the Soviet Union, it is less profitable, because its products must be priced lower for both CMEA and other recipients.[38] When competition among CMEA arms exporters is permitted, the more modern and larger-scale Soviet armament industry is in a stronger position. Poland's economy is also more adversely affected by continual changes in military technology. Despite its own industry's backwardness, Warsaw naturally tends to supply the Polish army with domestic production. Armaments delivered from the USSR are usually outmoded as well. As a result, the Polish military has had to be armed and rearmed, at great cost, with outmoded generations of weapons—weapons that are in many cases older than those delivered to Soviet clients in the Middle East.[39]

For example, only in 1977 did Poland start manufacturing An-2 Colt light planes (at a rate of 200 a year); their license dates back to 1960. Similarly, each year since 1979, Poland has produced 200 Mi-2 Hoplite helicopters, with a license dating from 1956. These helicopters are delivered both to the Polish and to the Soviet armies. (The fact that the USSR is not interested in continuing its own production of Mi-2 helicopters is worth noting.) Poland sells the USSR 10 helicopters for each Soviet jet fighter. The jet fighters delivered from the USSR, moreover, are not the latest models.[40] The growing Polish tank and artillery industry has likewise remained supplementary to its large and continuously updated Soviet counterpart. For more than 13 years, Poland continued to produce the World War II–vintage T-34 tank; the slightly modernized T-54/55 was added only in 1956. Poland began to produce the more modern T-72 only at the end of the 1970's, when Soviet industry was about to switch to the T-80 model.[41] Important segments of the Polish armament industry will consequently remain a buffer for obsolete Soviet arms for many years.[42]

As if these problems were not enough, Polish sources support the view that the country's military industry, for all its high priority, is badly managed and inefficiently supplied.[43] Because that industry has priority in obtaining the necessities of production, it is a major cause of disorganized supply in less-preferred industries. The system of priorities and discrimination is especially costly when arms production is rapidly modernized or expanded.

A related difficulty results from a paradox of Soviet policy. If the political situation in one of the CMEA countries becomes critical, the Soviets typically sponsor very costly joint military maneuvers and/or military intervention. As a result, military spending increases, and military industry expands its production—causing more difficulties for the civilian economy throughout CMEA. This vicious circle obliges each CMEA member-state to pay a high price; and this is particularly true for Poland because of its relatively large army and armament industry.

One should also not overlook other outlays on preparations for war paid by the Polish nation. These include billions of zlotys for the construction of special railroads, highways and bridges, shelters and WTO command posts, depots, storage facilities, hospitals,

[37]Boguslaw Lesiewicz, "Friends Are Tested in Need," *Zycie Partii* (Warsaw), No. 21, Dec. 8, 1982, p. 16. The financial relationships among CMEA members are very complicated. Briefly, two kinds of "money" are used in their international trade: "*transferable*" *rubles are used for payments through the CMEA bank to individual* member countries, while "convertible" rubles could be used for payments in hard currency on the world market.

[38]For example, in 1981, Poland delivered 300 T-55 tanks to Iraq, while the Soviet Union sold Iraq 100 of the more modern and expensive T-72's. Because the Polish army managed to clean out part of its stockpile of T-55's, it then became a potential market for newly-produced Soviet T-72's. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (hereafter SIPRI), *World Armament and Disarmament Yearbook, 1982*, London, Taylor and Francis, 1982, pp. 217–18.

[39]The Polish air force, for example, does not have the MiG-23, and none of the non-Soviet WTO members has the MiG-25. By contrast, Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Libya, and Syria have all received one or both of these planes. IISS, *The Military Balance*, various recent annual issues.

[40]SIPRI, op. cit., p. 245; "Profits and Losses," loc. cit., p. 18.

[41]Clawson and Kaplan, op. cit., pp. 171–72. Production of T-72's began in 1979, but only 50 such tanks were produced in 1980, and not until 1981 did annual production of 300 units begin. SIPRI, op. cit., pp. 161, 245.

[42]A note about the role of Poland in maintaining older production lines of tanks can be found in William H. Lewis, "Arms Transfers and the Third World," in ACDA, *WMEAT, 1970–79*. By contrast, Hoensch emphasizes the fact that Poland, Czechoslovakia, and East Germany help produce some modern components for the Soviet arms industry, while neglecting the very important role of those countries in keeping obsolete production in operation. Loc. cit., pp. 46–47.

[43]Mieczyslaw Dziarmakowski, "Material-Technical Supply," in Marian Koch, Ed., *Ekonomika wojskowa* (Military Economy), Warsaw, WMON, 1979, p. 81.

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A Polish military parade displaying the T-54 tank, a dated piece of Soviet-designed armor used and also produced in Poland long after the Soviet Union had developed and produced newer models.

—Eastfoto.

and material reserves. For example, in 1979, a special 1,520-millimeter railroad (a gauge used only in the USSR) was built from Volodymyr Volynskyi in the Soviet Union to Katowice in Poland, of which 400 kilometers were built with Polish money. The railroad was, in addition, specially constructed to transport unusually heavy loads. Officially this very costly investment is justified by the needs of the big Katowice steelworks, which uses Soviet iron ore, but the railroad's economic irrationality is suggested by the fact that the cars usually run empty on the return trip from Poland. Instead, it is quite probable that this railroad was built primarily for military purposes, to help avert potential bottlenecks for Soviet military transport.[44]

Insofar as the Polish government's own economic policy is concerned, the extensive armament industry makes necessary reforms even more difficult than they might otherwise be. How could there be Hungarian-style economic reforms in a country with about 150 large military factories and R&D institutes,[45] which enjoy far-reaching privileges and operate within a manipulated pricing system? The existence of this large military-industrial sector practically precludes cost-accounting and price-setting independent of the central decision-makers.[46]

Finally, and perhaps most important, are the constraints on national autonomy imposed by the dominance of Soviet strategy in Eastern Europe. CMEA defense planning, including arms production and arms trade, is theoretically integrated with national economic planning. Because defense production typically represents a large part of each national economy, it is organized and implemented within the framework of each country's centralized one-year, five-year, and long-range plans. These plans for military production and material supply are complemented by plans for other defense activities (civil defense, reserves, special transportation systems, etc.).[47]

[44]Yakov Gulev and Irzi Fila, "Concerning the Implementation of Measures to Increase Transport Capacities of International Importance," *Ekonomicheskoye sotrudnichestvo stran-chlenov SEV* (Moscow), No. 4, 1982, p. 34; also pp. 13–22. Former Polish ambassador Rurarz is also convinced that the wide-gauge railroad built by Poland has strategic importance. Loc. cit., pp. 17–18.

[45]The number of armament factories and militarily-oriented R&D institutes is based on the published list of factories that were militarized after the introduction of martial law in Poland. *Trybuna Ludu* (Warsaw), Dec. 14, 1981. For a detailed list of these enterprises, see Checinski, *The Interaction . . .*, Appendix.

[46]E.g., the regime of Wladyslaw Gomulka had apparently planned to unify the amortization rates applied to all branches of industry, including armament production, as of January 1, 1971. One of the first decisions of the new Gierek regime, however, was to revoke this decision, because "this was against the development of the coal-mining, heavy, and armament industries." Staniszkis, loc. cit., p. 194.

[47]"Shadows over Comecon," *The Economist* (London), May 29–June 4, 1982, p. 87; Checinski, *The Interaction . . .*, passim.

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In reality, however, most defense planning is approved on the basis of "strategic" rather than financial estimates. To be sure, some plans may be abandoned in order to match expenditures to the financial capabilities of each CMEA member, but military supply plans are outlined by the CMEA Military-Industrial Commission in coordination with the WTO Command. Armament and equipment supply plans cannot be changed without the approval of that Command, meaning, of course, the USSR. Therefore, only Soviet defense spending fully reflects a particular national interest; all other CMEA military expenditures, armament production plans, and arms trade activities are at best a compromise between strongly preferred WTO (Soviet) goals and East European national capabilities.

The dominant Soviet position is justified by the argument that the USSR bears 80 percent of total WTO defense costs.[48] Left unmentioned is the fact that the remaining 20 percent of WTO military expenditures borne by the other CMEA countries does not necessarily serve their own national interests. The oppressive character of all these military expenditures is suggested by the Soviet invasion of Hungary in 1956 and of Czechoslovakia in 1968, and by the course of events in Poland in 1980–81. Only in this context can one fully evaluate the indirect costs of growing defense spending by CMEA members.

* * *

A study recently published by a US expert argues that,

By offering Eastern Europe preferential terms of trade compared to those available to Eastern Europe in Western markets, the Soviet Union has transferred resources equivalent to almost $80 billion in 1980 dollars during the decade 1971–1980.[49]

These subsidies, according to this study, are provided by selling fuel below and buying machines above the prices for these products on the world market. If this argument is correct, one could expect that in the next decade, the Soviet subsidy for CMEA members would have to be even higher, as East Europe's economic problems mount. Facing internal economic difficulties itself, the Soviet Union might be unable to continue covering the ruinous costs of close political, economic, and military relations with its CMEA partners.

This conclusion, however, neglects many important factors that influence East Euopean trade relationships with the USSR, particularly in the area of armament. In this case, Soviet bargaining power is usually decisive. Added to this factor are the costs of Poland's extensive military infrastructure and technologically obsolete "reserve" production capacity. If a full and honest calculation of how much WTO members "overpay" for their defense (which in any case serves Soviet imperial interests) could be performed, it would greatly affect the calculation of "subsidized" trade among CMEA members. Only in the light of such an analysis could correct conclusions about Poland's military burden—and Soviet strategic exploitation—be drawn.

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[48] A Czech expert estimates that the USSR "carries 80 percent of the defense burden within the framework of the Warsaw Pact." See Oldrich Behounek, "CMEA and the Defense Capabilities of Socialism," *Historie a Vojenstvi*, No. 1, 1980, trans. in Radio Free Europe, *Czechoslovak Situation Report (Munich)*, No. 16, June 26, 1980, p. 10. An American scholar estimates the Soviet share at 85 percent. See Boleslaw A. Boczek, "NATO and the Warsaw Pact: The Present and Future," in Clawson and Kaplan, op. cit., p. 96.

Boczek calculated his percentage from IISS, *The Military Balance, 1980-1981*, in which figures are based on official budget statistics of non-Soviet CMEA states. However, I support the view that "East European state budget outlays for national defense do not cover all military expenditures" (Alton et al., op. cit., p. 409).

[49] Daniel L. Bond, "CMEA Growth Projections for 1981-1985 and Implications of Restricted Western Credits," in NATO Economics Directorate, *The CMEA Five Year (1981-1985) Plans in a New Perspective: Planned and Non-Planned Economies*, Colloquium 1982, Brussels, Mar. 31–Apr. 2, 1982.

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Insurgency in Southeast Asia

by Shee Poon Kim

The fall of Saigon in 1975 and the rapid spread of Communist rule to South Vietnam, Laos, and Kampuchea might have seemed the prelude to new successes for the perennial Communist insurgencies in the nearby states of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN).[1] Yet, the ensuing seven years have not brought these movements closer to power; indeed, the Thai insurgency recently experienced a dramatic collapse.

What accounts for this lack of success? In examining this question, one must explore factors internal to the movements themselves as well as developments in the environment—domestic and foreign—in which they operate. This article will focus on three major parties—the Communist Party of Malaya (CPM), the Communist Party of Thailand (CPT), and the Communist Party of the Philippines (Marxist-Leninist) or CPP(M-L). Each continues armed struggle against the government of its country, although the insurgencies differ in scale and scope. I also briefly discuss Singapore, because the CPM still insists that while it does not conduct an insurgency there, the political struggle in the island republic is inseparable from the struggle in Malaysia. Omitted from this discussion are the Indonesian Communist Party, which has never recovered from its decimation in the aftermath of the abortive coup of 1965, and the Communist Party of North Kalimantan, whose estimated 100-200 armed guerrillas pose no serious military or security threat to the Malaysian government.[2]

[1]For a useful study of the history of the Communist parties in Southeast Asia, see Justus M. van der Kroef, *Communism in Southeast Asia*, Berkeley, CA, University of California Press, 1981.

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The Communist Party of Malaya

The CPM has faithfully followed the Maoist dictum of people's war and armed struggle as the only "correct" path to power. A statement in 1977, commemorating the 47th anniversary of the CPM, reiterated the call for the "Malayan" people to continue their armed struggle, particularly in light of the favorable international situation since 1975.[3] New situation or no, the appeal was a logical extension of the party's 1968 program for seven years of armed struggle.[4] This program reflected a resurgence of CPM activism in post-independence Malaysia. Prior to Malaysia's achievement of independence in 1957, the skillful combination of political, strategic, psychological, and propaganda measures adopted by the British authorities in Malaya, such as transfering power to the Malay nationalists, suppression of the CPM, establishment of the "new villages," etc., undermined CPM efforts to become a viable mass nationalist movement.

However, more than a decade after independence, insurgency began to reemerge at the end of the 1960's, especially in the vicinity of Malaysia's border with Thailand. By 1974, this new activism had gone so far as to succeed in killing the inspector general of police, and in 1975 and 1976 a dozen other police

[2]Malaysia's Inspector General of Police, Tan Sri Hanniff Omar, disclosed that there were about 100 Communist guerrillas in Sarawak in 1979. Since then, their number has remained at between 100 and 200. See *Straits Times* (Singapore—hereafter *ST*), Dec. 28, 1979; and also Justus M. van der Kroef's contribution on Malaysia to Richard F. Staar, Ed., *Yearbook on International Communist Affairs, 1981*, Stanford, CA, Hoover Institution Press, 1981, pp. 175–82.

[3]British Broadcasting Corporation, *Summary of World Broadcasts, Far East* (London—hereafter *SWB/FE*), 5504/D1, May 5, 1977.

[4]"Hold High the Great Red Banner of Armed Struggle, and Bravely March Forward!" New China News Agency (Hong Kong), June 19, 1968.

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and security officials were assassinated and the national monument in Kuala Lumpur was bombed. The Malayan National Liberation Army (MNLA—as the CPM's guerrilla forces have been known since 1968) boasted that it had killed 400 "enemies" in 1976.[5] And despite government claims to have brought the CPM's armed violence under control by the end of 1977,[6] the party subsequently claimed to have killed 409 and injured 4,800 enemies in some 60 battles in 1979.[7]

In April 1980, the CPM proclaimed a party constitution in a broadcast of the Voice of Malayan Revolution. This document formally adopted Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought as the theoretical basis of the party ideology and set as the CPM's immediate goal a "new democratic revolution" (the ultimate goal being the realization of socialism and communism). The CPM envisaged building a "national democratic united front" with the workers' alliance as the "vanguard of the revolution," and firmly rejected both parliamentary democracy and armed urban uprisings or urban guerrilla war. It reemphasized the view that the "correct" path to power was to use the countryside to encircle the cities and to seize political power by armed force.[8]

In fact, the CPM's armed strength peaked decades ago, at an estimated 14,000 guerrillas in the mid-1940's.[9] Their number had dropped to about 1,500–2,000 in 1961, when Chin Peng, the party's secretary general, took his men to refuges along the Thai-Malaysian border. Since then, the guerrilla forces have been rent by factionalism. In February 1970, the 8th Regiment of the CPM defied a Central Committee directive to liquidate "spies" (alleged to be infiltrated by the government) who had joined the party since 1962, and an estimated 200–300 members fled to Sadao, in southern Thailand, to form a CPM Revolutionary Faction, challenging Chin Peng's leadership.[10] On August 1, 1974, another group of armed guerrillas—this time from the 12th Regiment—headed by Yat Kong, a member of the State Committee of the CPM, broke away from the "old guards" to form a

Chin Peng (right), leader of the Communist Party of Malaya, pictured in 1955 on the occasion of a meeting with the late Malayan leader Tunku Aboul Rahman at Baling, near the Thai border.

—Photo from Asian news source.

CPM Marxist-Leninist faction. Each of the three groups, the original CPM and the two splinters, has its own armed force, each vying with others for the honor of being viewed as the most revolutionary and violent.[11] However, these groups are militarily weak and obviously lack a unified command. They are in no position to launch a major uprising—whether with their own resources or with external support.[12] In all, they total an estimated 2,000–3,000 insurgents today.[13]

Very little information is available regarding the current top leadership of the CPM. Secretary General Chin Peng was believed to be 59 years old as of 1982.[14] According to one Thai source, he fled to China in 1961, where he may still be.[15] The CPM would

[5] *SWB/FE*, 5406/13/7. Jan. 7, 1977.

[6] *ST*, Aug 5 and 13, 1977; also Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Asia and Pacific* (Washington, DC—hereafter, *FBIS-APA*), Aug. 16, 1977, p. 0/2.

[7] *SWB/FE*, 6313/A3/1, Jan. 8, 1980.

[8] Ibid., 6442//C/1, June 11, 1980.

[9] The CPM was founded in Singapore in 1928. Called the Nanyang (South Sea) Communist Party, it was formed at the initiative of two Indonesians, Alimin and Tan Malaka, both Comintern agents who visited Singapore in 1924 and 1925. They were instrumental in persuading the Communist Party of China to form a Communist group in Singapore. See J. H. Brimmell, *Communism in Southeast Asia*, London, Oxford University Press, 1959; and G. Z. Hanrahan, *The Communist Struggle in Malaya*, Kuala Lumpur, University of Malaya Press, 1971, pp. 28–29.

[10] See *Asia Research Bulletin* (Singapore), Jan. 31, 1982, p. 887.

[11] Hans Indorf, "Insurgency Problems in Malaysia during the Post-Vietnam Era," paper presented at the Southeast Asian Regional Conference of the Association of Asian Studies, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, Jan. 22–24, 1976, p. 12.

[12] Captured CPM members told authorities that the guerrillas had difficulties in getting food and that their morale was very low. *ST*, Apr. 2, 1981.

[13] *Far Eastern Economic Review* (Hong Kong—hereafter *FEER*), Mar. 6, 1981; *Sunday Times* (Singapore), Apr. 12, 1981; and *Asia Week* (Hong Kong), Apr. 24, 1981.

[14] Chin Peng's real name is Ong Boon Hwa. He came from a poor family; his father, Ong Seng Piew, owned a bicycle shop in Penang. Peng became a member of the CPM at age 17. *Asian Wall Street Journal* (Hong Kong), Apr. 24, 1981.

[15] Kriangsak Chamonand disclosed this information. See *ST*, Jan. 8, 1975.

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appear to suffer from a serious leadership and succession crisis. It has not been able to produce an outstanding revolutionary leader of the caliber of a Lenin, a Mao, or a Ho Chi Minh—which appears to be a necessary though not sufficient condition for a successful people's war.

Particularly critical in the Malaysian context is the paucity of outstanding Malay nationalists in the party's leadership.[16] Whatever the CPM's claims to be a revolutionary party, the majority of Malays still perceive it to be a Chinese party, dominated by ethnic Chinese and linked with China. From its very beginnings, the CPM has always been used by Beijing to serve Chinese national interests rather than to promote a genuine indigenous revolutionary movement in Malaysia.[17] Indeed, ethnicity is the most important single factor in explaining the failure of the party to achieve inroads into the Muslim-dominated Malaysian polity.

From its earliest days, the CPM has tried to bridge this ethnic gap, but with little success. In 1965, the CPM formed a front organization, the Islamic Brotherhood Party (Partai Persaudaraan Islam, or Paperi), based in Weng, south Thailand. The mission of Paperi was to convince Malays and Muslims that Islam and communism have the same ideology and hence are compatible. However, Paperi was largely inactive and ineffective. It was only in December 1977—12 years after its founding—that Paperi finally issued a statement calling on the Malays to take up armed struggle.[18] More recently, in May 1981, a new Malay Nationalist Revolutionary Party of Malaya was reportedly formed to supplement Paperi. The aim of this organization was to "unite Communists, socialists, nationalists, and religious groups"—i.e., to seek to make new inroads among the Muslims of Malaysia.[19]

However, as Michael Stenson has argued, "there could be no possibility in Malaya of the successful application of the strategy of mobilizing the peasantry to surround and isolate the towns."[20] For one thing, the bond between the Malays and the Sultanate system has proved an effective obstacle to the growth of communism in Malaysia. Also, the Malay social structure and the *"tidak apa"* (easygoing) mentality of the average Malay are not conducive to the rigid and disciplined life-style of armed Marxist guerrillas.

A shift of CPM energies toward a quest for power in the towns would be equally unpromising. Although a majority of the Chinese population resides in the towns, only a small number of underprivileged, lower-income individuals and disgruntled intellectuals and students among the Chinese (mostly Chinese-educated) of Malaysia have joined the party, not so much because Communist ideology appealed to them as from frustration and disillusionment with the existing system. The CPM has failed to attract the pragmatic and profit-oriented urban Chinese, a majority of whom are realistic enough to understand that the status quo is more advantageous to their economic interests than revolutionary change would be. Moreover, any endorsement by the urban Chinese of the CPM's revolutionary policy would only sharpen the communal conflict between the urban Chinese and the rural Malays, and it would be the Chinese who would be the losers in any repetition of the racial outbursts of May 1969.

Marxist class analysis and class struggle remain inappropriate responses to the two major problems of contemporary Malaysia: the politics of Islam and the politics of accommodation between the Chinese and Malay communities. The revival of Islamic teaching (the Dakwah movement), which began in the late 1960's, has become one of the most significant forces on the Malaysian political scene. This Islamic fundamentalism is partly a response to the identity crisis brought about by the rapid process of modernization and urbanization in the capital city, Kuala Lumpur, and partly a reflection of the influence of widespread Islamic movements in the Middle East. The significance of this trend lies in the possibility it raises that modernization in Malaysia may not necessarily lead to intensification of class conflict, but rather may become "involuted,"[21] or even reversed, by appeals to and manipulation of traditional symbols and culture or religion.[22]

As for communal accommodation, the Malaysian government's fourth five-year plan (for the years 1981-1985) was structured to promote the develop-

[16]The CPM was able to recruit only three Malay leaders to the party Central Committee—Musa bin Ahmad (ex-chairman of the CPM, whose November 1980 surrender to the government was reported in January 1981) and Abdullah C. D. and Rasid Maidian, both members of the 10th Regiment. On Musa bin Ahmad's surrender, see ibid., Jan. 7, 1981. On the other leaders, see *New Straits Times* (Kuala Lumpur), Jan. 8, 1981; also *Star* (Kuala Lumpur), Jan. 8, 1981.

[17]Musa bin Ahmad testified to the intensity of ties between the Chinese Communist Party and the CPM. Ibid.

The CPM's general subservience to the Beijing line is also witnessed by broadcasts of the clandestine Voice of the Malayan Revolution (VOMR), such as one on January 31, 1981, which condemned "Soviet-Vietnamese hegemonists." See *FBIS-APA*, Feb. 4, 1981 (cited in van der Kroef's contribution on Malaysia in Richard F. Staar, Ed., *Yearbook on International Communist Affairs, 1982*, p. 210.

[18]*FBIS-APA*, June 29, 1978, p. O/1.

[19]See VOMR broadcast of June 11, 1981, in *FBIS-APA*, June 19, 1981, and July 18, 1981—both cited in van der Kroef, in Staar (op. cit. fn. 17) p. 208.

[20]"The Ethnic and Urban Bases of Communist Revolt in Malaya," in John W. Lewis, Ed., *Peasant Rebellion and Communist Revolution in Asia*, Stanford, CA, Stanford University Press, 1974, p. 126.

[21]For an explanation of the term "involuted," see Clifford Geertz, *Old Societies and New States*, New York, NY, Free Press, 1963, pp. 105–57.

[22]The Indonesian Communist Party faces a similar possibility. See ibid.

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ment of all communities rather than just Malay communities.[23] The government has also had some success in encouraging the population at the grass-roots level to establish a vigilante corps (*rukun tetangga*) to defend themselves against threats, harassment, and blackmail by the Communists.[24] Moreover, Malaysia is blessed with rich natural resources and a healthy economy, adequate to cope with the needs of its relatively small population (12 million).[25]

As suggested above, CPM insurgency has been inhibited by the vigilance of the government's security apparatus. In 1979, government sources indicated that from May 1969 to December 1978, some 600 armed guerrillas had been shot, and that since 1975, more than 2,800 Communists and pro-Communists had been detained.[26] Furthermore, in 1981, the government announced that 9.2 billion Malay dollars would be allocated to strengthen the nation's security and defense.[27]

Such results were partly due to closer bilateral security cooperation among ASEAN member states. For example, the joint Malaysian-Thai "Big Star 1" and "Big Star 2" operations (in January and March 1977 respectively) apparently broke the communications link between the guerrillas and their local supporters.[28] Moreover, information provided by the Singapore government was instrumental in the Malaysian government's arrest of some 86 Communists and pro-Communists in June 1977.[29] In the words of Malaysia's then minister of home affairs, Ghazali bin Shaffie, such operations served to "search, disperse and make the CPM guerrillas be on the move all the time."[30] These tactics have prevented the party from establishing permanent bases from which to launch further assaults and expand its political bases and influence at the grass roots.

Other foreign factors have also had some negative impact on the fortunes of the CPM. The Sino-Vietnamese tensions and Sino-Soviet rivalries in the region have prompted China to place increasing emphasis on state-to-state rather than party-to-party relations in its dealings with ASEAN countries. This tendency is reinforced by Deng Xiaoping's pragmatic and moderate leadership, which has stressed the modernization of China and assigned reduced priority to support for revolutionary movements abroad.[31]

A unit of the Malaysian Army on counterinsurgency exercises in August 1980.

—Photo from Asian news source.

Vietnam, too, has been promoting state-to-state relations with Malaysia and has openly declared that it would not support the CPM or consider it a national liberation movement.[32] During a visit to the ASEAN capitals in September 1978, Vietnam's Premier Pham Van Dong reiterated that Hanoi would no longer assist the Communist insurgencies in the region.[33]

In sum, both internal and external conditions are not favorable for a successful Communist revolution in Malaysia, at least not in the 1980's. The CPM remains a very small group with little support from outsiders. It knows that it cannot win power through armed struggle in the foreseeable future; at most, it might succeed in weakening the political base of the Malaysian government by identifying and harping on the failings of the present political system.[34]

[23] *Fourth Malaysia Plan 1981-1985*, Kuala Lumpur, National Printing Department, 1981, esp. ch. 1, pp. 1–8.

[24] Interview with Malaysian government authorities, May 19, 1980.

[25] In the last few years, the average rate of growth of GNP has been about 8 percent a year.

[26] *Southeast Asian Record* (Palo Alto, CA—hereafter *SAR*), Nov. 16–22, 1979, p. 5, and Aug. 3–9, 1979.

[27] *ST*, Mar. 28, 1981.

[28] *SAR*, Aug. 3–9, 1979.

[29] *FBIS-APA*, June 30, 1977, p. 0/1.

[30] Ibid., July 31, 1977, p. 0/1.

[31] In a three-day state visit to Kuala Lumpur in August 1981, Chinese Premier Zhao Ziyang sidestepped the issue of relations between the Chinese and Malayan Communist parties. However, perhaps as a signal to the Malaysian government of China's good intentions, the Voice of the Malayan Revolution (believed to emanate from China) stopped broadcasting on July 1, 1981, to be replaced simultaneously by a Voice of Malayan Democracy, with a more "nationalist" tone. See van der Kroef, loc. cit., p. 212.

Harry Harding's article, "Change and Continuity in Chinese Foreign Policy" (*Problems of Communism* [Washington, DC], March-April 1983, pp. 1–19) provides insight into the recent evolution of Chinese policy toward countries of Southeast Asia and elsewhere in the Third World.

[32] *FEER*, Aug. 27, 1976, p. 59.

[33] *FBIS-APA*, Sept. 25, 1978, p. 0/3.

[34] Such issues include, for example, demands for the immediate release of political prisoners, and charges that the general election of 1980 was held "without freedom." See VOMR broadcasts transcribed in *FBIS-APA*, Nov. 30, 1978, p. 0/4, and Dec. 4, 1980, p. 0/2.

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The CPM and Singapore

Communist activities in Singapore have always been regarded as part of the CPM's overall revolutionary struggle in Malaysia. Indeed, the party never endorsed the separation of Singapore from Malaysia in 1965, but rather labeled its independence as "phony." CPM-style communism seemed to have potential appeal in Singapore because the majority of the population there was Chinese. However, the CPM's roots in this urban Chinese setting, dating back to the later 1920's, were disturbed by the emergence of the People's Action Party (PAP) in the early 1950's. This party, led by Lee Kuan Yew, came to power in 1959. Its successes in spurring economic growth and providing public housing have deprived the CPM of major issues on which it might have made political inroads.

The focus of the Communists appeared for a time to have shifted from subversion and infiltration to use of Singapore as a base to provide the party with financial, logistical, and manpower support for its efforts in Malaysia. However, the CPM continues low-key efforts to widen its political base in Singapore, sporadically criticizing the government on various sensitive issues. There were also some indications in the party's statement of June 20, 1978 (on the 30th anniversary of armed struggle) that the CPM was trying to rebuild its united front in Singapore.[35]

To the CPM, promotion of violence and armed struggle in Singapore must seem a fruitless strategy, one that can never appeal to the increasing number of wealthy middle-class Singaporeans. Moreover, the small size of the country and its highly efficient security and police apparatus have made it very difficult for the CPM to arm its guerrillas without being noticed and detained by the government. For example, in October 1977, the Internal Security Department uncovered four units of the Malayan National Liberation Front, a political front organization of the CPM operating in Singapore, and detained 39 Communists.[36] In August 1979, the government detained nine Communists and Communist sympathizers in connection with their activities in the Chinese Society of the University of Singapore.[37] Such actions not only warn the CPM to tread carefully, but also alert the public to the continuance of the CPM threat, despite the republic's economic growth and increasing affluence. In this vein, the authorities decided in 1977 to begin familiarizing senior commanders and staff officers of the Singapore armed forces and officials of the trade unions with Marxist-Leninist dogma.[38]

[35] Ibid., Nov. 29, 1978, p. 0/7.

[36] *SWB/FE*, 5643/A3/8, Oct. 18, 1977.

[37] *FBIS-APA*, June 17, 1979, p. 0/5; *SAR*, Aug. 3–9, 1979, p. 74. Eight of those arrested were subsequently released.

The Communist Party of Thailand

Although the situation of the Communist Party of Thailand bears a strong resemblance to that of the Communist Party of Malaya, there are also certain distinguishing features. Specifically, CPT strategy has not been focused exclusively on rural insurgency, and there has of late been a measure of "indigenization" of the party (i.e., addition of native Thais to what has been a predominantly Chinese organization).[39]

In 1965, the CPT declared a "people's war" in Thailand, and in 1969, the party organized the Thai People's Liberation Army (TPLA) to carry it out. However, this focus on rural insurgency was later blurred. Encouraged by the democratic period ushered in with the fall of the government of strong man Thanom Kittikachorn in October 1973, the CPT appeared to be moving toward a two-pronged strategy. While reemphasizing "people's war" and stepping up violent attacks on government security forces in the countryside, the party tried simultaneously to widen its political base in Bangkok by recruiting more cadres and members from among students and intellectuals. For example, a February 1976 broadcast by the clandestine Voice of the People of Thailand, entitled "Class Struggle and National Unity," highlighted the plight of the "bourgeoisie," the "national capitalists," the "peasants," and the "proletariat."[40]

In the post–Vietnam war period, the ranks of the TPLA apparently expanded measurably, peaking at some 13,000 rural insurgents in 1977, and then decreasing—to 9,000 in 1981 and 7,000 in 1982.[41] Another source has suggested that the CPT had grown to encompass as many as 20,000 "sympathizers" in 1981.[42] All of these estimates are probably out of date in light of the massive defections of insurgents occasioned by a series of amnesties declared by the Thai government beginning in 1980. In January 1983, Thai

[38] See Shee Poon Kim, "Singapore in 1977: Stability and Growth," *Asian Survey* (Berkeley, CA), February 1978, p. 195; idem, "Political Leadership and Succession," in Peter S. J. Chen, Ed., *Singapore Development Politics and Trends*, Singapore, Oxford University Press, 1983, pp. 173–96.

[39] The writer is grateful to Donald Weatherbee for drawing attention to the efforts of indigenization in the CPT and CPM.

[40] *SWB/FE*, 5151/B3, Feb. 19, 1976.

[41] Paul and Yuangrat Wedel, "Declining Fortune," *Focus* (Bangkok), April 1981, p. 27; also *ST*, Sept. 29, 1980; and *Nanyang Siang Pao* (Singapore), May 26, 1982.

[42] Santi Mingmongkol, "Thai Communists into the 1980's," *Southeast Asia Chronicle* (Berkeley, CA—hereafter *SAC*), October 1981, p. 12.

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Army Commander Arthit Kamlang-ek reported that 450 Communist guerrillas had just surrendered, turning over several hundred weapons; this was on top of another 1,300 surrenders in December 1982. According to Arthit, this brought the remaining size of the guerrilla forces to 300 armed men at most; in his view and that of other observers, the Thai insurgency had been virtually eradicated.[43]

The surge of TPLA ranks in the mid-1970's reflected the influx of some 3,000–5,000 urban students, intellectuals, labor leaders, and opposition politicians after 1976. Ironically, this recruitment was helped by the harsh anti-communism of the Thanin Kraivichien regime that seized power in an October 1976 coup in Bangkok.[44]

The influx of better-educated, more sophisticated members, often of Thai origin, posed something of a challenge to the CPT's aging leadership and their traditional strategic outlook. The party leadership has long been dominated by ethnic Chinese or Thais of Chinese origins. Thus, in 1982, it was believed that five of the seven key members on the ruling political bureau of the CPT were pure Chinese, one was half Thai and half Chinese, and one was half Thai and half Vietnamese; their average age was 64.[45]

Not only does the top leadership of the CPT have a heavy Chinese ethnic background, it also hews faithfully to Maoist ideology and outlook.[46] The CPT's leaders continue to view Thai society as oppressed by "imperialism," "feudalism," and "bureaucratic capitalism," and look to "people's war" to bring the CPT to

[43]A January 23, 1983, Reuter dispatch from Bangkok, in *The Washington Post*, Jan. 24, 1983; also *Asiaweek*, Apr. 8, 1983, pp. 16-24.

[44]For a good study of those who joined the CPT since 1976, see David Morell and Chai-anan Samudavanija, "Thailand's Revolutionary Insurgency: Changes in Leadership Potential," *Asian Survey* (Berkeley, CA), April 1979, pp. 315-22.

[45]The author is grateful to Yuangrat Wedel for this information, which is drawn from Thai intelligence sources. See also *Asiaweek*, Aug. 14, 1981; and Suchat Sawatsi, Ed., *The Communist Movement in Thailand*, Bangkok, n.p., 1979.

It might be noted that the CPT's long-time secretary general, Charoen Wan-ngam, passed away in Beijing in 1979. He was reportedly replaced by Udom Srisuwan, who surrendered to Thai government forces in November 1982. In January 1983, Mongkol na Nakhon, another senior member of the CPT, returned from exile in China. See *Bangkok Post*, Mar. 29, 1982, and Dec. 17, 1981; and *The Washington Post*, Jan. 15, 1983.

[46]Udom Srisuwan confirmed that the pro-China wing led by elderly Communists continued to dominate the CPT. *The Washington Post*, Jan. 15, 1983.

Left-wing students open fire on political foes during August 1976 disturbances on the campus of Thammasat University in Bangkok.

—Pictorial Parade.

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Thai Army commander-in-chief, Gen. Arthit Kamlang-ek accepts a rifle from a surrendering Communist insurgent leader, Lau Lau, at a December 27, 1982, ceremony in Umphang.

—William Branigin/*The Washington Post*.

power in a "nationalist" (rather than "socialist") revolution.[47] However, the newcomers consider such Maoist thinking irrelevant to the Thai situation. They argue that capitalism has transformed Bangkok into a political, economic, and cultural center, and that the political struggle should concentrate on this urban target.[48] These ideological differences aside, the new members apparently have also chafed at a lack of intra-party democracy. Such issues were apparently raised, and not very successfully addressed, in a "rolling" 4th party congress held at several locations in March–May 1982.[49] The differences in perspective, plus the regional dispersion of the various insurgent activities—from the northeast to the south—have been serious obstacles to effective centralized control of the Thai insurgency.

In what sort of domestic and international environment has the CPT been operating? It would appear that party efforts to recruit a pool of committed cadres in rural areas have been hindered by the political culture and national character of the Thai people. Thais, particularly Thai peasants, are by and large conservative, individualistic, and politically apathetic. They lack the vigorous discipline and mood of self-sacrifice required of good revolutionaries and instead place a high value on "fun" (*sanuk*).[50] Not surprisingly, some

[47] See the 10-point program of 1976 in Helen R. Chauncey, "The Growth of the United Front," in *SAC*, January-February 1978, p. 5; also Robert F. Zimmerman, "Insurgency in Thailand," *Problems of Communism*, May-June 1976, p. 29.

[48] Tianchai, author of the *Memoir of a Rebel* (Bangkok, n.p., n.d.), was one of the critics of the Maoist model of people's war. See Santi Mingmongkol, loc. cit., pp. 15, 17.

[49] On the 4th CPT Congress, see *Asiaweek*, Apr. 8, 1983, p. 24.

[50] Zimmerman, loc. cit., p. 33; and David A. Wilson, *Politics in Thailand*, Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press, 1962, p. 84.

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defectors openly complain that guerrilla life in the jungle was not fun.[51] Buddhism, the monarchy, and the nation all remain strong institutional obstacles to the spread of communism, providing a basis for cohesion and stability in the face of coups, attempted coups, corruption, bureaucratic inefficiency, and other signs of social and economic malaise. Landlord exploitation of peasants has never been severe in Thailand, and the kingdom was never colonized. Hence, the appeal of Communist rhetoric is limited, particularly when propounded by a party with the stigma of close links to China.[52] This is not to deny the existence of social and economic problems or overlook a certain crisis of legitimacy as new political forces seek to play a role in the development of Thai society. Should the ruling elites fail to tackle these problems, the appeal of communism might increase, particularly if the indigenization of the CPT continues.

Foreign factors have also affected CPT fortunes. In 1975 and 1976, Thai military sources report, the insurgency enjoyed support not only from its principal long-term benefactor—China—but also from the 35th Pathet Lao/95th North Vietnamese Army combined command. The latter supported the TPLA's unsuccessful efforts to "liberate" Thailand's 16 northeastern provinces from Bangkok's control.[53] However, this favorable state of affairs soon deteriorated as a result of (1) the deadly struggle between the Khmer Rouge and the Vietnamese for control of Kampuchea, and (2) the related surge of Sino-Vietnamese animosity. With the senior leadership of the CPT remaining adamantly pro-Beijing and displaying hostility toward Laos, Vietnam, and the Soviet Union, the Laotian government in January 1979 asked the CPT to remove its camp from Laotian territory, and in December 1978, the Vietnamese terminated a training program for the CPT at the former's Hoa Binh base. Moreover, both countries apparently cut off channels through which Chinese assistance to the TPLA might flow.[54] The Laotians also permitted a pro-Vietnam "Pak Mai" (New Party) faction of the CPT to be launched in 1980 at Vientiane's Wattai airport.[55] Tension along the Thai-Kampuchean border has had further adverse effects on the CPT insurgency. The Vietnamese presence appeared as a serious threat to the Thai nation, and it brought a marked increase in the presence of Thai government troops precisely in the areas of greatest insurgent efforts. Moreover, it also increased the already substantial flow of US military assistance, economic aid, and intelligence in support of the Thai government.

The CPT's pro-Chinese stance did not even seem to serve the party well in its relations with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). In an effort to enlist Thailand's support against the Vietnamese, China in 1981 closed down the transmitters of the Voice of the People of Thailand near Kunming, apparently stopped providing weapons to the TPLA, and even urged the CPT and the Thai government to patch up differences in order to form a united front against the Vietnamese. In a February 1981 state visit, Chinese Premier Zhao Ziyang assured the Thai government that Beijing would not allow relations between the CCP and CPT to harm state-to-state relations between China and Thailand.[56]

While the CPT's insurgency currently seems at a very low point, it is perhaps too early to see what impact the return of masses of former Marxist-Leninist insurgents will have on the Thai political scene. One may also wonder whether an aging leadership and commitment to rural insurgency will continue to dominate the CPT in the years ahead.

Philippine Communist Insurgency

Of the Communist parties in the ASEAN states, the Communist Party of the Philippines (Marxist-Leninist) appears to be the most violent. The party is an offshoot of the Philippine Communist Party (PKP), founded in 1930 by Cristante Evangelista. The PKP pursued power through parliamentary means and adopted a pro-Soviet posture. On December 26, 1968, a group of radicals led by Berne Buscayne (known as "Dante") and Jose Ma Sison broke away to form the CPP(M-L), with the New People's Army (NPA) as its military wing.[57] Pro-Beijing in its ideology, the party seeks to "liberate" the Philippine people from "feudalism," "oppression," and "exploitation" (with the US numbered among the alleged "exploi-

[51] This feeling of hardship in the jungle was particularly acute among former students. See Santi Mingmongkol, loc. cit., p. 15; also *Asiaweek*, Apr. 8, 1983, p. 24.

[52] See Yuangrat Wedel, "The Communist Party of Thailand and Radical Thought," *Southeast Asian Affairs*, Singapore, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1981, p. 325.

[53] "Thailand's Insurgency Projection to the year 2000," *Asian Defence Journal* (Kuala Lumpur), January-February 1978.

[54] *SAR*, Mar. 29, 1978, and Apr. 5, 1979; also R. S. Randolph and W. S. Thompson, *Thai Insurgency: Contemporary Development*, Washington, DC, Sage Publications, 1981, pp. 61-68; and *Bangkok Post*, Jan. 27, 1982.

[55] The leaders of Pak Mai are Therdpoom Jaidee (a former labor leader), Thongpak Piengkate (a former Member of Parliament), and Boonyen Wrothong (a former lecturer at Thammasat University). The party has about 200-300 members. See *The Nation* (Bangkok), Feb. 27, 1982.

[56] M. Ladd Thomas's contribution on Thailand in Staar, op. cit., p. 231.

[57] Sison was formerly a lecturer at the University of the Philippines and was known as Amado Guerrero. Berne served as NPA commander-in-chief until he was captured in 1976; Sison was chairman of the CPP(M-L) until his capture in 1978.

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ters") through a dual strategy: stepping up the armed struggle in the countryside, and attempting to widen "united democratic opposition" to the rule of Ferdinand Marcos and to control it through the CPP(M-L)'s National Democratic Front (NDF). There has been some scattered evidence of a faction within the CPP(M-L) favoring a strategy of urban warfare, but the party seems generally opposed to such an approach. Finally, the CPP(M-L) has tried to form a united front with the Moro National Liberation Movement, a focus of Muslim rebellion in Mindanao.[58]

Unlike the insurgencies of Malaysia and Thailand, the Communist insurgency in the Philippines seems to be growing in strength—in the view of some observers, replacing the Muslin separatists as the most extensive guerrilla group in the nation. As of the end of 1980, the CPP(M-L) had an estimated 5,500 members (3,500 of them well-armed), enjoying the support of some 10,000 cadres and 30,000–35,000 sympathizers.[59] In the same period, a Burmese Communist source claimed that the NPA had a total membership of 80,000, with 26 guerrilla fronts (operation zones) in 40 provinces.[60] In September 1981, Lieutenant-General Fidel Ramos, chief of the Philippine Constabulary, estimated that the violence had expanded to 30 guerrilla zones, and that there were CPP(M-L) organizations in all 72 provinces of the Philippines.[61] In early 1983, the Philippine Defence Ministry estimated NPA strength at 3,000–3,500, although foreign estimates were higher—at 5,000–7,000; the NDF boasted that the NPA had four

[58]Larry A. Niksch and Marjorie Niehaus, "The Internal Situation in the Philippines: Current Trends and Future Prospects," Report No. 81-21, Washington, DC, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, Jan. 20, 1981, pp. 78–81.

[59]Ibid., p. 98.

[60]*Voice of the People of Burma broadcast of Jan. 2, 1981, in FBIS-APA*, Jan. 9, 1981, pp. P/9–10.

[61]*ST*, Sept. 3, 1981.

A combat unit of the New People's Army—the guerrilla force of the Communist Party of the Philippines (Marxist-Leninist)—photographed in the Cordilleras mountains in the northern part of Luzon Island in 1981.

—SIPA PRESS from BLACK STAR.

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times the ministry's estimate, obviously an exaggeration.[62]

Although the insurgency has unquestionably grown in scope throughout the whole archipelago, it still does not pose a serious threat to the Philippine government, because insurgent operations have been sporadic.[63] In part, this reflects a leadership crisis, triggered by the capture of the party's founding leaders early on. It is not even clear who currently heads the party. The Philippine government believes the CPP(M-L)'s chairman is Rodolfo Salas, a chemical engineer.[64] The lack of a clearly recognizable leadership impedes efforts to mobilize broad popular support. The weakness of the CPP(M-L) can also be seen from its inability to establish effective communications among and central control over what appear to be nine self-governing regional party organizations.[65]

Rejection of the CPP(M-L)'s calls for insurrection rests on broader grounds than mere distrust of party leaders, however. As Philip Dion argued in these pages, communism is not really in touch with Philippine reality.[66] While there are numerous economic and social problems facing this populous nation and there is considerable anti-Marcos sentiment, the sorts of solutions proposed by the insurgents run counter to Philippine democratic traditions. There is still a strong perceived incompatibility between Marxism and religion, although anti-Marcos sentiment has led some radical Catholic priests to join the NPA insurgency.[67] For its part, the Moro movement has shown little enthusiasm about linking its Islamic-inspired destiny with that of the Marxist CPP(M-L).

The party does have certain advantages as compared to the CPM and CPT. It is unquestionably native Filipino in its membership and leadership. Moreover, the de facto destruction of the country's two-party system in the Marcos era has removed an important source of political stability. This has provided opportunities for the CPP(M-L) to widen its political influence and to sharpen animosities in the urban centers through its united front strategies, even while continuing its violence in the rural areas. However, the Marcos government has built a powerful force of military and police units that have been able to crack down hard on NPA guerrilla activities.

China's then premier, Hua Guofeng, exchanges a toast with Mrs. Imelda Marcos, wife of Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos, in Beijing on July 9, 1979, the day after signing of a long-term trade agreement between China and the Philippines.

—Eastfoto.

Geopolitically, the Communist insurgency in the Philippines is in an unfavorable situation. There is no bordering state in which to seek sanctuary or through which sympathetic fraternal parties might channel assistance. The CPP(M-L) is separated by sea from its principal mentor, China, which makes direct supply difficult if not almost impossible. Moreover, China currently is seeking to foster improved state-to-state relations with the Marcos government, at the expense of support to the CPP(M-L).[68]

Despite these weaknesses, the party might look forward to gains in a post-Marcos era. Judging by experiences elsewhere in the Third World, one might expect considerable political instability in the Philippines

[62] *FEER*, Mar. 10, 1983, pp. 18, 21.

[63] NPA officials interviewed by Western correspondents in June 1980 viewed a Communist victory in the Philippines as decades away. See *The Washington Post*, June 21, 1980, and *FEER*, June 13, 1980, both cited in Niksch and Niehaus, op. cit., p. 81.

[64] *Asiaweek*, Sept. 11, 1981, p. 27.

[65] Philip Dion, "Communism and Philippine Reality," *Problems of Communism*, May-June 1982, pp. 43–48.

[66] Ibid.

[67] For example, in April 1981, four priests issued a joint statement saying that they had joined the NPA and calling on all Filipinos to overthrow the "US-Marcos dictatorship" (cited in Justus M. van der Kroef's contribution on the Philippines in Staar, op. cit., p. 222). See also Niksch and Niehaus, op. cit., pp. 82–85.

William Branigan reported in the Feb. 18, 1983, issue of *The Washington Post* that in the preceding 18 months the Philippine Defense Ministry had arrested 11 foreign and Filipino priests for subversive activities and was seeking others for allegedly taking up arms with the NPA. Branigin reported that the Catholic Bishops' Conference of the Philippines had drafted a pastoral letter that sought to disassociate the bishops from the "militant" clergy supporting the insurgents but criticized the economic and social policies of the Marcos government and condemned the torture and murder of dissidents.

[68] President Marcos's wife, Imelda Marcos, traveled to Beijing on July 6, 1979. See *Renmin Ribao* (Beijing), July 7 and 13, and Aug. 2, 1979.

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once the one-man ruler and his close associates leave the political scene. However, CPP(M-L) prospects are dimmed by the likelihood that it would be the military —which benefited most from the Marcos martial law administration in 1972-81—that would emerge as the most powerful political force in the post-Marcos Philippines (as it did in post-Sukarno Indonesia).

Balance Sheet

As the above case studies suggest, the failure of the major Communist insurgencies in ASEAN member states to capture power reflects a complex multitude of factors. Some of these have deep historical roots. Malaysia's colonial experience might conceivably have fostered a receptivity to Maoist concepts of anti-imperialism, but Great Britain's effective suppression of the CPM's insurgency and equally effective transfer of power to the post-colonial government in Kuala Lumpur clearly limited the party's opportunities. In the case of Thailand, the absence of any experience as a colony undermines the CPT's appeal to "anti-imperialism."

The principal reasons for the failure of the insurgencies seem to relate to internal (not external) factors. With regard to the insurgent parties themselves, these include: aging leaderships, ethnic differences, a generation gap among party members, succession problems, factionalism, and difficulties in coordinating communications and military actions. Of the three parties examined, the CPT has shown the greatest potential for recruiting a more sophisticated, more articulate leadership—the sorts of persons from middle-class backgrounds who have proved to be the spearhead of revolutions in other Third World countries.

Religion (Islam in Malaysia, Buddhism in Thailand, and both Catholicism and Islam in the Philippines) has also been an important obstacle to the spread of communism in ASEAN member states. Moreover, existing political and social structures and traditions are strong among the peasant communities that have been a prime target of the Communist insurgencies discussed.

On balance, revolutionary movements in these states seem to have made little progress since 1975. Indeed, the real threat seems to have been exaggerated—for different reasons—by both insurgents and governments. There is no evidence to suggest that Communist revolutionary movements will pose a serious political threat to the central authorities at any time in the 1980's. Yet these perennial movements will continue to operate as long as the existing social, economic, and political weaknesses of the non-Communist governments are not overcome. A final imponderable would have to be the possibility of renewed (or expanded) external support for the insurgencies, particularly in Malaysia and Thailand.

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Books

Soviet Strategic Style

by Nicholas Vaslef

PETER H. VIGOR. *Soviet Blitzkrieg Theory.* London, Macmillan, and New York, NY, St. Martin's Press, 1983.

NATHAN LEITES. *Soviet Style in War.* New York, NY, Crane Russak, 1982.

JOHN HEMSLEY. *Soviet Troop Control: The Role of Command Technology in the Soviet Military System.* Oxford, Brassey's Publishers, 1982.

A. ROSS JOHNSON, ROBERT W. DEAN, and ALEXANDER ALEXIEV. *East European Military Establishments: The Warsaw Pact Northern Tier.* New York, NY, Crane Russak, 1982.

GRAHAM D. VERNON, Ed. *Soviet Perceptions of War and Peace.* Washington, DC, National Defense University Press, 1981.

THE STUDY of Soviet military doctrine, strategy, and operations expanded significantly in the late 1960's, when Western scholars were inundated with Soviet writings on every aspect of military affairs—particularly on the impact of scientific and technological progress on military development. Formerly the preserve of a small group of dedicated but inbred specialists writing primarily for each other, Soviet military literature has lately attracted a much broader group of researchers. They have discovered both a new field for their scholarly endeavors, and a rich vein of barely tapped Russian-language sources. The growing availability of translated materials—including the landmark translations of Marshal Sokolovskiy's *Soviet Military Strategy*, works by Marshal Grechko and Admiral Gorshkov, innumerable memoirs, and the US Air Force's "Soviet Military Thought" series[1]—has also spurred interest in what Soviet strategists were writing about their field.

As a result, analysis of Soviet perceptions, rather than assumptions about them, is now almost mandatory in Western scholarship. This is a positive trend, for, as Robert Jervis has written, "unless scholars understand the patterns of perceptions involved, they will misinterpret the behavior."[2]

This does not mean, however, that there are no problems with the new approach. One shortcoming lies in the material itself. While examples abound of the words or deeds of Soviet leaders and commanders during the "Great Fatherland War" and before, it is harder to collect information on more recent issues—such as Soviet lessons learned in Czechoslovakia, current operations in Afghanistan, or military policy with respect to Poland. Nevertheless, enough has been written to provide us with patterns that can be applied to the analysis of Warsaw Pact forces, contemporary Soviet doctrine and strategy, and Soviet perceptions of the changes due to a "scientific-technical" revolution in military affairs.

A measure of the new richness of the field is the appearance, in place of general treatments and translated source collections, of competent analyses focused on particular themes in Soviet military literature. Combining the specialized perspectives afforded by several such analyses can yield fresh insights into old strategic conundrums.

ONE ESPECIALLY FRUITFUL area for this kind of research, to judge from the volumes under review, is the issue of a conventional Soviet land offensive in Europe. The first book on our list, Peter Vigor's *Soviet Blitzkrieg Theory*, makes a plausible case that a lightning ground attack against NATO would have a fair chance of success. The next several volumes reviewed here,

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[1]E.g., Vasily D. Sokolovskii, *Soviet Military Strategy*, trans. by Herbert S. Dinerstein, New York, NY, Prentice-Hall, 1963; V.D. Sokolovskiy, *Soviet Military Strategy*, 3rd ed., trans. by Harriet F. Scott, New York, NY, Crane, Russak, 1975; A.A. Grechko, *Vooruzhennyye sily sovetskogo gosudurstva* (Armed Forces of the Soviet State), Moscow, Voyenizdat, 1975; S.G. Gorshkov, *Morskaya Moshch' Gosudarstva* (Sea Power of the State), Moscow, Voyenizdat, 1976; US Air Force, "Soviet Military Thought" series (translations of Soviet articles and monographs), Washington, DC, various years.

[2]Robert Jervis, "Deterrence and Perception," *International Security* (Cambridge, MA), Winter 1982/83, p. 3.

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while not focused on this issue, provide useful qualifications of Vigor's assessment by analyzing—also on the basis of primary Soviet sources—specific weaknesses in the Soviet military position.

Vigor suggests that it might actually be possible for the Soviet Union, through rapid assaults modeled on the early German campaigns of World War II, to win a European war with conventional weapons alone. If so, then full-scale war could once again become an instrument of national policy. The author, director of the Soviet Studies Research Centre of the Royal Military Academy at Sandhurst, builds a strong case for such a lightning war. Vigor constructs his argument methodically, defining "war" and "victory," presenting historical evidence and analyses of the success or failure of blitz strikes, and showing how the Soviets have studied German blitzkrieg strategy and applied some of its precepts to their own.

Vigor's rationale for the Soviet need to defeat NATO quickly is indisputable. Western ability to marshal vast resources over a period of time could not be matched by the Warsaw Pact. (As we shall see below, political and ideological factors, too, dictate the need to bring hostilities to a quick end.) The initial advantages in a blitzkrieg, however, are clearly on the side of the aggressor, who can select the time, place, and type of attack. In the Soviet case, this could mean a frontal attack against one or several NATO sectors, or a combination of frontal attack with air strikes in NATO's rear.

Should the Soviets choose to start a war, Vigor argues, the Warsaw Pact "will attack from a 'standing start'" (p. 192). He admits to certain assumptions: for example, that the attacking forces can quickly deactivate their own minefields, maintain a rate of advance of 30 kilometers per hour, and observe total radio silence. On these assumptions, Vigor's criteria for speed, maneuverability, weight of blow, and control of the air, in addition to surprise, are generally convincing. Indeed, they resemble those used by Lieutenant General M.M. Kir'yan, a senior staff member of the Voroshilov Military Academy of the General Staff in Moscow, whom Vigor quotes extensively.

Vigor's insightful work was published before he had a chance to study a new volume edited by Kir'yan, entitled *Vnezapnost' v operatsiyakh vooruzhennykh sil SShA* (Surprise in the Operations of the US Armed Forces).[3] In this work, a counterpart to Vigor's own, Kir'yan conveys his perceptions of US views on surprise attack in World War II and later conflicts (including Korea and Indochina). Significantly, the views of these two authors are quite similar regarding the prerequisites to achieving and following up on surprise. The Soviet general acknowledges US efforts to achieve surprise on both strategic and tactical levels, but scornfully dismisses such efforts in Korea and Vietnam as having had only marginal and temporary results. On the other hand, surprise attacks against US forces—who, he writes, were highly vulnerable to them—resulted in disorder, disruption of command functions, a drastic decline in morale, and sometimes even panic.

Vigor does not go this far in the scenario he constructs for a European war, although the results that he foresees for NATO are not at all favorable. Projecting a Soviet as-

[3]Moscow, Voyenizdat, 1982.

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sault on Christmas eve—when NATO vigilance, Vigor believes, would be at its lowest—he envisions the Soviet army overrunning NATO's forward positions and ending up deep inside NATO territory before there is any sort of adequate response. In many respects, his projections are not unlike those in General Sir John Hackett's *The Third World War.*[4]

The question is whether anything can be done to prevent a surprise attack, or at least to minimize its effects. Current thinking has it that it would take NATO about 48 hours to be fully deployed. But in addition to the requisite preparedness, vigilance, and effort to outguess the enemy, the West must have some kind of countervailing strategy. Vigor is well aware of the US Air Force and Army concept of "Joint Attack of the Second Echelon," designed to halt a first echelon blitzkrieg assault. In accord with this strategy, NATO surface-to-surface missiles (SSM's) would hit Soviet rear areas: supply points, command centers, communications, and second and third echelon forces. The first echelon, having lost its support, would fail in its offensive.

This type of defense presupposes a rapid response to the blitzkrieg, but, as Vigor points out, "NATO would be neither fully mobilized nor properly deployed; and to catch your enemy in this situation is really the heart of the concept of winning your war in its 'opening phase' " (pp. 201–2). Moreover, Warsaw Pact use of Operational Maneuver Groups instead of second echelons would provide the Soviet-led forces with greater flexibility.[5] This may force NATO to rethink its defensive strategy— including consideration of both Soviet and NATO use of tactical nuclear weapons in a blitzkrieg situation.

SEVERAL POSSIBLE FLAWS in an aggressive Soviet strategy can, however, be gleaned from the other analyses under review, which complement Vigor's sobering evaluation. An example is the Soviet military's tendency toward tight control verging on rigidity, a major theme of Nathan Leites's *Soviet Style in War.* This imposing volume not only extensively illustrates the behavior of Soviet manpower, but also demonstrates how changes in that behavior were effected during combat operations. Leites, a veteran Rand Corporation researcher and prodigious writer on Soviet defense issues, provides literally thousands of documented cases in what must be the most comprehensive compendium of direct citations on the collective mentality of the Soviet military. Examples are drawn mostly from World War II, with some from more recent operations as well. These are not just random selections, but (as Peter Vigor notes in the Foreword) a carefully arranged exposition of Soviet "proclivities" on the battlefield. The author identifies and classifies weaknesses of human nature in Soviet military personnel, and then describes what the Soviets have done to overcome those weaknesses.

The result is a "how to" book from the Soviet perspective: how to ward off slowness, inertia, and passivity; how to enhance one's own cohesion and reduce that of the enemy; how to improve one's own and degrade the enemy's capacity for calculation. The emphasis is on ground forces and theater operations, although Leites concludes with a chapter on nuclear strategy and possible Soviet behavior in a nuclear war. We thus obtain a record of how Moscow's forces fought in the past, and a sense of how they might fight in the future, replete with insights about the training and conditioning of Soviet troops.

Yet after reading all these citations, it is not entirely clear whether the Soviet military "style" can be neatly categorized. Control, a key element in any army, is perhaps the most important aspect of that style. It is displayed in many ways: from subtle (as in the fatherly advice of a seasoned veteran to his subordinates) to direct (as in the Stavka's orders to field commanders, or Stalin's edicts to his generals). Another aspect of the Soviets' style, also by no means unique, is the effort to fight not just against outside enemies on the battlefield, but also against the negative side of human nature in their own soldiers—who seem to prefer inaction to action, as do soldiers anywhere. The Soviets fight this tendency by constantly drumming into their recruits the concept of *"initsiativa."* This is not the American concept of "initiative," but rather one of *controlled* duty, work, and action. The continual struggle against passivity, so thoroughly documented by Leites, demonstrates that the Soviets themselves are cognizant of this and other possible obstacles to overcome before seriously considering a daring blitzkrieg assault.

ANOTHER OBSTACLE to such an assault is the relatively slow pace of Soviet military modernization in the area of command, communications, and control (or C^3, as often

[4] John Hackett et al, *The Third World War*, New York, NY, Macmillan, 1979.

[5] Vigor defines Soviet Operational Maneuver Groups as "large Soviet formations, possessing their own organic air, and of the size of a strong division on each main axis, operating behind NATO's main defensive belt by the end of the first day of the main battle" (p. 130). These formations are also mentioned in US Department of Defense, *Soviet Military Power*, 2nd ed., Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, March 1983, pp. 33–34.

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abbreviated in Western jargon). These are the vital links without which no army can function effectively, especially in a war of rapid maneuver. The scientific-technical revolution has had an immense impact on C^3; and yet many innovations have been incorporated only gradually and grudgingly into the Soviet war machine. John Hemsley's *Soviet Troop Control: The Role of Command Technology in the Soviet Military System* performs a significant service by focusing attention on this essential subject, too often ignored because of its technical complexity.

Hemsley suggests that the Soviets have "reconciled" the conflict in command and control between initiative and unity of command by placing the latter in a clearly dominant position. The independent action often seen among junior officers and NCO's (non-commissioned officers) in Western armies runs contrary to the "pervasive and continuous" Soviet pattern of "traditional and draconian discipline" (p. 198). Yet Hemsley believes, and this reviewer is inclined to agree, that good troop control is not possible without some initiative. Consequently, in case of a breakdown in the chain of command, the Soviet fighting man might not be able to function on his own as effectively as a British or American soldier in a similar position.

From this point of departure, Hemsley proceeds to a broader discussion of *"upravleniye voyskami"* (the management or leadership of troops, i.e., command and control). He defines the relevant Soviet terms, puts them in an organizational context, and introduces Soviet concepts for the norms and operational typologies through which the command system functions. Aside from its technical aspects, Hemsley's work is notable for its portrayal of the psychological effects of adapting military institutions, doctrines, and procedures to new concepts of automation. He concludes that the ponderous Soviet military machine has not always been eager to accept the technological advances in C^3 essential for maximum flexibility in combat operations.

STILL ANOTHER PROBLEM for a Warsaw Pact military thrust against NATO is the uncertain role of Moscow's East European allies. While whole libraries have been written about Soviet forces, the rest of the Warsaw Pact has been curiously neglected. *East European Military Establishments: The Warsaw Pact Northern Tier*, by Ross Johnson, Robert Dean, and Alexander Alexiev, fills an important gap in Western knowledge by focusing on the armed forces of Czechoslovakia, Poland, and East Germany.

In line with Vigor, the authors envisage a blitzkrieg war, an "unreinforced, forces-in-being" attack with minimum warning. Western planners asume that, in this contingency, the Northern Tier countries are supposed to conduct offensive operations into NATO territory under Soviet leadership. All three of these East European countries do, indeed, maintain a high degree of military readiness and modernization. But political and ideological problems might preclude the unqualified support that the USSR expects, or hopes for. This new volume clearly articulates the nightmarish dilemma confronting Soviet planners: Can they count, in the "crunch," on the military capabilities and political allegiance of their allies? And if so, to what degree?

In order to answer these questions, the authors trace the military development of the Northern Tier countries and their relationship to the USSR. Separate sections are devoted to each country, covering national characteristics, operational and doctrinal evolution, party control, and overall strategic assessment. Analysis of the military role of these three countries is based on an evaluation of eight key issues: "availability, capability, reliability, surprise, operational coordination, logistics, circumstances, and Soviet perceptions" (pp. 2–4).

What, then, can the Soviets realistically expect from their allies? Each of the three countries presents a somewhat different picture. In Czechoslovakia, the effects of the 1968 invasion are still felt—perhaps even more in the armed forces than elsewhere. Wholesale purges and a "voluntary mass exodus" of officers have thoroughly weakened and demoralized the military, and the slow process of rebuilding a viable officer corps is still going on. Politically, whatever traditional pro-Russian (if not pro-Soviet) sentiments the Czechs and Slovaks may have harbored were also largely dissipated by the events of 1968. Thus, Czechoslovakia's military establishment would presumably not rate very high on the eight key issues identified above.

Poland, by contrast, has been spared the indignity of invasion by its senior ally. But Poland has experienced the trauma of internal repression, and is so preoccupied with its internal problems that its utility as a Soviet ally is in some doubt—even though it has the largest and most modern armed forces of the three countries under discussion. Nevertheless, Soviet control over Poland's forces, through "integration" of command, makes it likely that they could "contribute effectively and reliably to at least the initial phases of a

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Soviet offensive against Western Europe" (p. 56). In the face of protracted war, however, the value of Poland's contribution might well diminish, and its reliability weaken.

The German Democratic Republic (GDR) appears to be the only truly reliable member of the triad, from the Soviet point of view. Deprived of its own military tradition, since Prussianism was eradicated as much as possible, the GDR looks to the Soviets for a surrogate. The East German military structure has become in every way a clone of the Soviet armed forces. Even so, questions remain about East German participation in Warsaw Pact operations. For example, the degree to which the Poles and Czechs still hate the Germans (East or West) is unknown. Also unknown are the odds that any of the East European armies would fight as aggressively against American, British, or French forces as they might against their traditional enemies.

In all three countries, an internal conflict between party ideological control and professional military authority has recently become more acute (p. 143). The reasons for this include the war machine's increasing complexity and the growing numbers of specialized technicians at all levels, who must learn to operate new combat systems and may incidentally learn to think for themselves. How then can the party instill its ideology and maintain control over a modern combat force, and simultaneously promote initiative, without undermining either its own authority or the army's combat effectiveness? And what are the consequences when this control over national armed forces has to be shared to some degree with the Soviets, in an atmosphere of mutual suspicion? Such uncertainties further degrade the Warsaw Pact's reliability, both political and military.

In addition to these intra-Pact problems and party/professional tensions, one final problem concerns the kind of war under consideration. A war in which East European armies were defending their homelands might well be ferociously fought. On the other hand, should the Warsaw Pact be the aggressor, there could be some reluctance in the Northern Tier (except perhaps for the GDR) to fight on West European soil.

The conclusion that emerges from all this, rather paradoxically, resembles Vigor's thesis—though for very different reasons. It is that a blitzkrieg may well be the best military hope for the Warsaw Pact, since only in such a war could the Soviet Union come close to ensuring the reliability of its Northern Tier allies. Only by forgoing prolonged mobilization, withholding all information from its allies until the last moment, and concentrating combat in as brief a time as possible can the USSR minimize potential intelligence leaks or political vacillation in Eastern Europe and maintain full operational control in its own hands.

SOME MODEST INSIGHT into such questions can be gleaned from Graham Vernon's edited collection on *Soviet Perceptions of War and Peace*, the last and least focused of the volumes under review. This slim paperback provides an overview of Soviet perspectives on a broad spectrum of topics, ranging from the laws of war to the origins of the Cold War. Its eight chapters, each by a different author, are written with varying degrees of skill and sophistication, imparting to the volume the uneven quality that is often a problem with anthologies. Moreover, half the chapters were published in various journals back in 1979–80. The better-developed essays are those by John Dziak on Soviet military doctrine, William Lee on the Soviet military capability and threat, William and Harriet Scott on Soviet perceptions of US military strategy and forces, and Nils Wessel on Soviet rejection of the concepts of multipolarity and the balance of power. The inclusion of these chapters makes this volume a satisfactory overall introduction, for the nonspecialist, to Soviet military thought and its occasionally surprising divergence from Western perceptions.

Altogether, as these five volumes demonstrate, the study of military affairs has regained legitimacy and respectability among Western scholars—a status that it never lost on the Soviet side. The Soviet military establishment is growing in complexity, and is currently engaged in major doctrinal, operational, and organizational restructuring. The West needs to understand these changes: the driving forces behind them, the resistance they encounter, and the processes by which they are debated and ultimately carried out. As former Secretary of Defense Harold Brown once stated, "our strategy has to be aimed at what the Soviets think is important to them, not just what we might think would be important to them."[6] These five volumes make a notable contribution to the growing literature on Soviet perceptions. Ideally they will inspire the additional research without which Western planners will be hard pressed to outthink and, if necessary, outfight the Soviets.

[6]US Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, *Hearings on Nuclear War Strategy*, Sept. 16, 1980, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office. 1981.

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Moscow and the Military Use of Space

by Francis P. Hoeber and Robert M. Dannenberg

WILLIAM H. SCHAUER. *The Politics of Space.* New York, NY, Holmes and Meier, 1976.

JAMES E. OBERG. *Red Star in Orbit.* New York, NY, Random House, 1981.

BHUPENDRA JASANI, Ed. *Outer Space—A New Dimension of the Arms Race.* Cambridge, MA, Oelgeschlager, Gunn and Hain, 1982.

JAMES CANAN. *War in Space.* New York, NY, Harper & Row, 1982.

DANIEL O. GRAHAM. *High Frontier: A New National Strategy.* Washington, DC, The Heritage Foundation, 1981.

G. HARRY STINE. *Confrontation in Space.* Englewood Cliffs, NJ, Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1981.

IN THE DECADE between the lunar landing of Apollo 11 in the summer of 1969 and the successful flight of the Columbia Space Shuttle in 1981, there was a decline in US interest in space activities. There were several reasons for this, including a general feeling that the primary mission of the space program had been accomplished and growing concern first over US involvement in the Vietnam war and, later, over the performance of the domestic economy. There was, however, no corresponding decline in Soviet interest in space. The political, military, and economic benefits reaped from the successes of the Soviet space program in the late 1950's and early 1960's made a favorable and lasting impression on the Soviet leadership. "The launching of the Soviet Sputniks," announced an enthusiastic Nikita Khrushchev after Sputnik I orbited the Earth in 1957, "above all demonstrates the outstanding successes achieved by the Soviet Union in the development of science and technology, and also the fact that the USSR has outstripped the leading capitalist country—the United States—in the field of scientific and technical progress."[1]

It is in part concern with continued Soviet progress in the military applications of space technology that has rekindled American interest in space activities.[2] Indeed, in a speech on March 23 of this year, President Ronald Reagan proposed an innovative program to exploit American technological advances in the coming decades to devise an effective defense against missile attacks launched by other nations. According to administration officials, the President's new military strategic doctrine, if adopted, might involve the use of such technologies as lasers, microwave devices, particle beams, and projectile beams.[3] In this context, the present essay examines the development of Soviet military space systems and assesses what light, if any, the books under review may shed on this complex and intriguing subject.

SOVIET LEADERS took an early interest in the possible military applications of rocketry in space. The first such application of space technology was the development of the ICBM. Every Soviet leader since Stalin has resolved to strengthen the nation's strategic rocket forces and gain superiority over the United States in this regard. Khrushchev, in particular, emphasized the accomplishments of the Soviet space program, in part to give credibility to the USSR's fledgling ICBM program. This gave the West the impression that the Soviet Union had enough ICBM's in its inventory to make nuclear war practicable, and fostered American concern over a "missile gap" in the late 1950's and 1960's.[4]

[1] Dodd L. Harvey and Linda C. Ciccoritti, *U.S.-Soviet Cooperation in Space*, Washington, DC, Center for Advanced International Studies, University of Miami, 1974, p. 51.

[2] Numerous books have emerged in recent years reflecting this renewed interest. In fact, at the time of this writing there were five books with space exploration or science fiction as their primary theme on *The New York Times* bestseller list.

[3] *The New York Times*, Mar. 24, 1983.

[4] Whatever their rhetoric, the Soviets placed first emphasis on medium- and intermediate-range missiles, both because Europe was a priority theater of concern and because it made technological sense to start with the development of the smaller missiles. There was indeed a missile gap, but not an ICBM gap. See the reviewed volume by William H. Schauer, p. 9.

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The Soviet Union has also energetically sought to perfect a ground-based antiballistic missile (ABM) system. In addition to limited deployment of an operational system, the Soviets have continued advanced research and development (R&D) efforts to upgrade their ABM program. For example, the Galosh ABM system deployed around Moscow continues to benefit from the space program, steadily improving its early-warning, tracking, and terminal-guidance systems. The ABM also serves an important psychological function, displaying to the Soviet people and the world that the USSR is capable of, and intent on, defending itself against a missile attack by the United States or any other "imperialist" power.

The Soviet Union effectively combines civilian and military applications of satellite technology.[5] For example, weather research performed by satellites is important to Soviet naval and air force operations; and photoreconnaissance and "SIGINT" operations (intercepting electronic signals) are essential for military intelligence, as is radar detection and tracking of ships. Satellites provide other valuable services, such as navigation assistance for the Soviet strategic submarine force and communications for early-warning systems and general military operations.

An important part of the Soviet defense force is its antisatellite (ASAT) system.[6] Since the United States does not have an operational ASAT system, the Soviet Union has a strategic asymmetry in its favor. Thus, Soviet ASAT's could deliver a potentially crippling blow against US strategic satellites, perhaps as an opening move in a central war between the superpowers, with no "escalatory" collateral civilian damage. ASAT's could also be used to attack US geosynchronous satellites capable of broadcasting directly to the Soviet population. Or the Soviets might use their ASAT capability to paralyze the reconnaissance or communications satellites of a less-formidable opponent (e.g., the People's Republic of China) or to try to dictate the outcome of a nonstrategic conflict with the West in areas remote from the United States (another Korean or Vietnam war, for example).

A further military application of space technology is in Fractional Orbital Bombardment Systems (FOBS). FOBS are literally orbiting nuclear missiles: they can be launched with partial Earth orbits (great circle routes) and then deorbited to hit targets. FOBS thus have the unique advantage of being able to strike targets from any direction, thereby complicating the enemy's task of early detection and warning. The same systems if deployed in complete (rather than partial) Earth orbits would become Orbital Bombardment Systems and violate the treaty on the exploration and use of outer space (which even FOBS may, arguably, also do).[7] When placed in permanent Earth orbits, Orbital Bombardment Systems can be commanded to reenter the Earth's atmosphere and attack targets almost without warning. They might also be detonated in space to destroy enemy satellites—functioning more or less as "space mines." The Soviets have tested such a system, but have refrained from putting FOBS into operation in light of the SALT II and other treaties limiting their deployment.[8]

Another area of concentration of Soviet R&D is in high-energy laser (HEL) and particle-beam technology. The deployment of such a "directed-energy" system could give the Soviet Union a space-based ABM capable of destroying US ICBM's launched on standard trajectories (which normally include an exo-atmospheric flight path before re-entry). It has been estimated that the Soviets will deploy a satellite laser-weapon test platform in the mid-1980's, perhaps as early as 1983.[9] Laser weapons attack their targets by generating highly concentrated light beams. When deployed in outer space, these beams can travel long distances without being dispersed or deflected. Moreover, laser beams cannot be detected by radar, which makes them particularly useful in surprise attacks against satellites. Particle-beam weapons are similar to lasers ex-

[5] The problem in determining whether a satellite is "military" or "civilian" is clouded by the difficulty of ascertaining the mission priorities of a given satellite. It has been estimated that 69 percent of Soviet satellites are used strictly for military purposes, another 15 percent for dual military-civilian purposes, and the remaining 16 percent primarily for civilian purposes. See Robert Jastrow, "The New Soviet Arms Buildup in Space," *The New York Times Magazine*, Oct. 3, 1982.

[6] Francis X. Kane, "Anti-Satellite Systems and U.S. Options," *Strategic Review* (Washington, DC), Winter 1982, pp. 56–64.

[7] Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies [1967], Washington, DC, US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1982, p. 51. Article IV of this treaty prohibits nations from placing "in orbit around the Earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction . . . or station[ing] such weapons in outer space in any other manner" (p. 52). The question of the legality of FOBS centers on the definition of what is an orbit.

[8] For example, the SALT II treaty specifically states, "Of the eighteen launchers of fractional orbital missiles at the test range where ICBMs are tested in the area of Tyura-Tam, twelve launchers shall be dismantled or destroyed and six launchers may be converted to launchers for testing missiles undergoing modernization." See the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms [SALT II], Article VII, Paragraph 2(c), Second Common Understanding, in US Department of State, *SALT II Agreement, Vienna, 18 June 1979*, Selected Documents No. 12, Washington, DC, p. 10.

[9] US Department of Defense, *Soviet Military Power*, 2nd ed., Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1983, p. 68. See also Wallace D. Henderson, "Space-Based Lasers: The Ultimate ABM System?" *Astronautics and Aeronautics* (New York, NY), May 1982, p. 44.

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cept that they fire subatomic particles instead of light waves.

Future military uses of space by the Soviet Union might move in the direction of shuttle-type craft that could perform a variety of missions such as ASAT, ABM, and communications. The Soviets have shown interest in developing such a craft and, aided by observation of the performance of the Columbia Space Shuttle, can be expected to deploy their own shuttle system in the late 1980's or early 1990's. The development of permanent manned space stations is also on the Soviets' agenda, and it has been reported that Soviet scientists are developing a space station that will house 12 cosmonauts and perform a variety of military and scientific missions.[19]

IN DISCUSSING war in space, a distinction must be drawn between dangers posed by existing technology and potential dangers posed by future technology. For example, the USSR's operational "quasi-coorbital" ASAT capability is increasingly recognized as one of the most serious threats to the United States. Interestingly, 20 years ago, the US Air Force scrapped an early direct-ascent ASAT program because its military utility was doubted; since the development of a comprehensive Soviet satellite system, however, the United States has changed its mind and is now constructing a new air-launched direct-ascent system, whose capability, it is hoped, will equal or surpass that of the Soviet system. Similarly, the possibility of the Soviet Union developing and deploying technologies now in the R&D stages cannot be discounted. For example, the deployment of an orbital ABM system—whether equipped with directed-energy or some other kill mechanism—would have serious, perhaps decisive, military consequences. Other, more remote, systems such as deep-space cruisers and permanent space stations must also be considered despite the long lead-time necessary for their development.

Conveniently, the books under review fall within the two general categories mentioned above. The first five are concerned primarily with existing technology; the last, with problems more akin—at least for the time being—to science fiction.

William Schauer's *The Politics of Space* is a slightly dated, but still very useful, look at the organization and history of the Soviet space program. The author includes a brief discussion of Soviet decision-making concerning the Soviet/American "race to the Moon," and offers good analyses of the rationale for the Soviet space program, the political and economic motivations of the Soviet leadership, and the potential effects of the program on the Soviet economy.

James Oberg confines himself to a narrative discussion of the Soviet space program and to the personalities of those involved. This makes for interesting reading for aficionados, though its usefulness as a scholarly work or as a reference book is limited owing to the lack of documentation. *Red Star in Orbit* also omits detailed discussion of why the Soviets go through such expense and effort to maintain the intensive space program it describes. Such a discussion would be especially relevant, given the considerable attention (several chapters) Oberg devotes to the disastrous failures the Soviets have experienced over the years.

The compendium edited by Bhupendra Jasani is more technical in nature and international in outlook than the other books under review. Jasani's own contribution to the study gives excellent detail on general areas of existing technologies and their applications to space. Overall, the essays focus on satellite technology, examining its role in the militarization of outer space and its effect on arms control. This concentration on satellite technology, however, leads the authors to neglect other salient topics, most notably the importance and future development of manned space missions—a significant omission, considering the recent advances in manned systems such as the US space shuttle.

Although James Canan's *War in Space* is neither very technical nor well-documented, the former Pentagon correspondent for *Newsweek* is successful in illustrating the dangers for the United States in falling behind the Soviets in space technology—not just in future technology, but in systems that are either currently deployed or capable of being deployed in the near future. Canan makes this point particularly well in his discussion of the ASAT and MX programs of the United States. His most important contribution, however, is in the analysis of the expanded role of the Soviet space program in antisubmarine warfare (ASW) efforts.

In *High Frontier*, Lt. Gen. Daniel Graham takes a somewhat different approach, focusing on the future prospects of the US space program. This study presents interesting concepts which helped lay the foundation for President Reagan's call for expanding US efforts in space technology. The study, although using exaggerated time/cost estimates, is a comprehensive examination of the military and economic potential of an expanded

[19]Craig Corvault, "Soviets Initiate Program on Modular Space Station," *Aviation Week and Space Technology* (New York, NY), Jul. 20, 1982, p. 22.

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space program. However, Graham's basic argument in favor of a space-based, boost-phase ABM is cluttered with his vision of more distant and uncertain "peaceful uses" of space technology, such as microwave transmission of solar power to Earth.

G. Harry Stine's book is an interesting blend of science fiction and serious reflection on strategic and tactical objectives in a future war in space. The author, who is quite convinced that space will be an important battleground in the next war, offers a particularly good discussion of the importance of strategic areas in space, such as the Earth's "gravity well" (basically, the "funnel" between the upper and lower extremes of the Earth's gravitational field) and LaGrangian points—the five points in the relative gravitational fields of the Earth and Moon where "theoretically a third body [could] retain its position with respect to both the Earth and the Moon because the gravity fields of all three bodies would be in balance" (p. 59).

Stine is less convincing in his discussion of future tactics and weaponry, such as psychwar (psychological warfare), chemical warfare in outer space, and space catapults (devices used to hurtle nonexplosive projectiles at space vehicles). According to the author, the nation that is able to station catapult weapons at the most strategic points "will be able to exert complete and total military control over the entire Earth-Moon system without a single thermonuclear weapon" (p. 87). Although these topics are not the primary focus of his work (and were probably included for the sake of thoroughness of coverage), they tend to detract not only from his convincing arguments on the threat of Soviet ASAT and other space systems, but also from his excellent description of existing Soviet military space programs—in particular reconnaissance and navigation satellite systems.

SPACE SYSTEMS will be very important in any future conflict. Given the heavy reliance of US strategic systems on satellite communications, reconnaissance, and guidance, ASAT systems could become *the* decisive weapon, as could high-energy lasers and particle-beam weapons. (In the distant future, "Star Wars"-type space vehicles will become important as deep-space satellites and space stations are developed and perfected.[11]) Although the treaty governing the exploration and use of outer space bans the deployment of nuclear weapons on the Moon, the Soviets may eventually attempt to develop a permanent station there (possibly manned), which could be equipped with "experimental" weapons such as particle beams or HEL's. The Soviets have never landed a man on the Moon; a Moon base could be a way of upstaging US space shuttle successes, and thus have political as well as military value.

As is obvious from the preceding discussion, Soviet leaders attach great importance to the military element of the USSR's space program.[12] It must be assumed, therefore, that in the eyes of the Kremlin leadership this segment's marginal utility is very high. Thus, aspects of the program of purely military (ABM, space lasers) and of combined civil-military (communications, navigation, electronic intelligence) focus are assured the continued support of Soviet leaders, who seem willing to pay any cost to reap the military benefits of the space program.

Nevertheless, the importance of this program as an instrument of political propaganda appears to be declining. The great Soviet propaganda successes of the late 1950's and early 1960's have not been repeated in the 1970's and 1980's. This is due in part to the US victory in the race to the Moon and the success of the Columbia Space Shuttle. Moreover, the psychological value of the Soviet space program may be offset, should Soviet citizens become aware that space technologies are being pursued at the cost of investment in the production of food and consumer durables. (Schauer has an interesting discussion of the "psychic" value of the space program.)

Since the end of World War II, there has been a consistent tendency among Soviet leaders to concentrate resources in areas affecting national security. Clearly, the Soviet Union has placed the military applications of space technology high among its national security priorities. And Soviet programs still in the research, development, testing, and evaluation stage—such as their space shuttle, space-based laser systems, and particle-beam technologies—will continue to receive increased shares of the space budget as they near the operational stage. This Soviet emphasis on the pursuit of military advantage in space, if left unanswered, could ultimately imperil the security of the West.

[11] John E. Lacouture, "Space Race," in *Proceedings of the US Naval Institute* (Annapolis, MD), February 1983.

[12] Because military applications have priority, the Soviets maintain a high level of secrecy about their space program. They have an entire series of space launches grouped under the code name Cosmos. Cosmos launches, however, are only rarely identified by specific mission, and many military launches are included in the series. By maintaining secrecy about the nature of the missions, the Soviets can claim that they are using space primarily for "peaceful purposes." This allows Soviet leaders to attack the US space program, which admits to a number of military missions. On the rare occasions when they do announce the military mission of a space launch, the Soviets declare it as a necessary response to US intentions or deployments.

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Economic Issues in the USSR

by Robert W. Campbell

US CONGRESS, JOINT ECONOMIC COMMITTEE. *Soviet Economy in the 1980's: Problems and Prospects*, 2 Vols. Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1982.

THIS TWO-VOLUME SET is the most recent issue in a series published by the Joint Economic Committee dealing seriatim (over a three-year cycle) with the economies of the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and China. Anyone seeking authoritative and current evaluations of the performance of the economies of the Communist world will find these studies an outstanding source. This collection of essays on the USSR is an especially rich one, and it comes at an opportune time, as specialists of Soviet politics try to understand how economic policy may figure on the agenda of the new Andropov administration and what problems, choices, and alternatives the new leadership faces.

Drawing on the work of an extensive panel of academic and governmental experts (composed mostly of Americans, but with some West Europeans as well), these volumes cover a broad range of Soviet economic affairs. The study contains approximately 50 articles, organized into eight sections: policy perspectives, plan and performance, military allocations and burden, energy supplies and trade, science and technology, agriculture and the grain trade, quality of life, and foreign economic relations. These articles have the double virtue of being both thorough and up-to-date. Together with its companion *Hearings* volume, which will appear somewhat later, this collection is an excellent source for a more or less systematic update of such basic aggregate indicators of Soviet economic performance as the size and growth of GNP and its major components, as well as of population and the labor force, and of foreign trade. Some articles probe deeply into special issues (such as development of particular sectors of the economy), while others discuss current policy areas (such as agricultural policy or institutional developments in the labor market). If, for example, one wants to check on the present status of the Soviet Union's hard-currency debt, or review recent policy changes concerning the private agricultural plot, this is a good place to look.

As these volumes cumulate over a period of years, they become a valuable encyclopedic reference source, providing a firm basis for comparative analyses. Certain basic topics are periodically reviewed in successive volumes, so that it is possible to use them to compile a consistent series of data on GNP, agricultural or industrial output, and other economic indicators over an extended period. In short, there is available here an unusually rich mine of data and analysis based on research carried out by some of the best governmental and academic experts on Soviet economic affairs. These are thoroughly professional studies of a high standard of scholarship that are solidly based on detailed exploitation of Soviet economic literature.

As the title indicates, this year's two-volume set not only examines the current status of the Soviet economy, but also looks ahead to the prospects for the decade of the eighties. Given the size and comprehensiveness of this collection (often referred to as the "green monster" by its users), it is impossible to discuss and critique contributions individually—or even to mention them all! One can convey, however, some idea of the work's coverage and substance by relating its contents to the central issue in Soviet economic affairs in the 1980's—the problem of adapting to economic stringency. On the whole, the volumes provide extensive evidence supporting the view that the Soviet economy is faltering and that Soviet leaders face some very difficult problems in the coming decade. Among the factors that will keep GNP annual growth at or below 2 percent—a prospect that is examined in detail in a number of the articles—are a sharp slowdown in the growth of the labor force, the difficulties inherent in investing enough to keep capital stock expanding at the old rates,

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and a productivity that is stagnant or possibly even falling. There is, for example, an extensive section on demographic trends describing how problems of labor force growth and composition will exert a significant drag on the expansion of output. This section also includes several interesting papers on the social problems that interfere with worker incentive and morale and undercut productivity growth. Especially interesting are papers by Murray Feshbach and by Christopher Davis, who present a picture of significant deterioration of health care in the Soviet Union. According to the authors, there has been a substantial increase in mortality rates for both infants and middle-aged males as well as a rise in the incidence of alcoholism. These developments are traced to rising stresses to which the population is subjected, a failure to provide adequate resources to the health-care system, and an inability to organize the process of producing and delivering health care in a way that uses effectively what resources the sector does receive.

Growth at 2 percent a year does not of course represent the economic collapse that some commentators seem to suggest is in store for the USSR, but it does indicate a further slowdown from past performance. This means that there will be smaller increments available to meet the aspirations of the leaders and of the population. The slowdown comes, moreover, at a time when Soviet economic policymakers face intensifying demands from the three major claimants for resources—investment, consumption, and military spending. The military services would like to see their allocation continue to grow at the high rates of the recent past. Unfortunately, these exceed the growth rate forecast for GNP and thus imply a rising military burden, especially since the regime has acknowledged and even encouraged the raising of consumer expectations.[1] The demand for capital investment is exacerbated by numerous trends that require greater investment to perform any given task than in the past—replacement investment to counter obsolescence, investment in infrastructure for Siberian development, higher ratios of capital to output in extractive industries as it becomes necessary to resort to resources of lower quality. There are interesting analyses in these papers on all these issues.

THE ALLOCATION of the national output among these competing end-uses involves painful choices. There is a difficult trade-off between putting resources into military power to enhance external strength and diverting investment into consumption to maintain internal political stability. Sustaining military expenditure in the short run by cutting investment undermines the economic base for longer-run growth of military capabilities. Seeking to expand GNP by sacrificing consumption to investment may so weaken people's morale and motivation as to nullify the effect of growth in capital stock. Paring investment too heavily in an effort to relieve consumption demands may create supply bottlenecks that disrupt growth and frustrate the intended effect of improving consumption levels. Improved housing is a major consumption need, and better housing could play a major role in sharpening incentives. Unfortunately, providing more and better housing requires increased capital investment, and—ironically—Soviet leaders have steadily cut the share of housing in all investment since the fifties.

The view of the eighties as a time of stringency and hard choices is not just a Western projection. As M. Elizabeth Denton's systematic review of leadership perceptions in the USSR shows, Soviet leaders are fully aware of the diminishing prospects and hard choices before them.

The policy compromise worked out in the last years of the Brezhnev regime and embodied in the 11th Five-Year Plan (1981–85) sacrificed growth of investments in order to maintain growth of military expenditures and consumption. That is a very short-run policy, appropriate to an old and conservative leadership, but it is probably not a permanently acceptable compromise. Two modeling exercises in the volume evaluate the likely effect produced by the disparity in the rates of increase in overall growth and in military spending. Using the SOVMOD econometric model, Daniel Bond and Herbert Levine show that by the end of the decade, military procurement could be taking as much as 15 percent of the output of the machinery sector compared to 7 percent in 1970, thus seriously undercutting the supply of equipment available for investment. Gregory Hildebrandt, projecting current trends, sees military spending's share of GNP rising to 17 percent by 1989. But if military spending were capped, according to the author's calculations, consumption would increase at 0.5 percent a year faster than is now projected. In a survey of the investment situation, Robert Leggett finds that even before Brezhnev's

[1] For example, in his speech to the 26th party congress in February 1981, Leonid Brezhnev pointedly emphasized to his comrades the political significance of improving consumer standards, indicating that "the people will judge our work in large measure by how these questions are solved." See *Ekonomicheskaya gazeta* (Moscow), No. 9, 1981, pp. 10–11.

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death, a vocal lobby had emerged warning of the disastrous consequences of underinvestment, and he suggests that if current low rates of investment are maintained, bottlenecks and technological stagnation are inevitable. Efforts to reconsider the trade-offs between these competing claims are likely to constitute a major item on the agenda of the new Andropov regime.

ONE OF THE policy areas to be manipulated in economic strategy is foreign trade. It is of considerable interest to other nations whether Soviet economic policymakers will seek to improve economic performance by expanding technological and agricultural imports or by turning inward, focusing on domestic solutions and emphasizing Eastern Europe in their international trade. On the evidence of the studies in these volumes, the forecast is mixed, although there does seem to be a consensus that dependence on imports of food and feed will persist because of poor agricultural performance and a continued commitment to raising levels of consumption. Regarding imports of technology, however, in the section on foreign economic relations it is suggested that there may be a retreat from importing Western equipment as a major policy thrust. For one thing, the opponents of dependence on foreign technology—who see it as unnecessary, ineffective, and dangerous—seem to be gaining influence. For another, the forecast for growth of hard-currency earnings is generally rather pessimistic. A major cause of this pessimism is the expectation of a decrease in petroleum exports by an amount that cannot be fully compensated by exports of natural gas to Western Europe. Hard-currency earnings from gas exports, net of repayments for equipment purchased for the export pipeline, are likely to be about US$8 billion a year by 1986 or 1987, compared to the US$17 billion earned in 1980 from oil and gas together. If, as the experts in these volumes predict, oil exports to countries that pay in hard currency drop significantly (and Edward Hewett suggests such exports may fall to virtually nothing), Soviet ability to import Western technology will be seriously constrained. Much will depend on whether the Soviet economy can be made to generate more exports of raw materials.

Especially important in the USSR's international economic policy is its relationship with Eastern Europe. Over the last decade, the Soviet Union has provided large subsidies to East European countries, mostly in the form of concessionary pricing, especially for fuels and raw materials. In the 1980's, as the economic prospects for these countries worsen and they face the kind of debt-repayment pressures that have wrecked the Polish economy, they will need these subsidies more than ever. In their paper for this collection, however, Michael Marrese and Jan Vanous see an inevitable trend toward reducing the USSR's trade subsidies to Eastern Europe. At the same time, though, the Soviet Union may offer some loans specifically intended to encourage these countries to restructure their economies to produce items needed by the USSR. If East European countries are to avoid disastrous declines in real income in the eighties, they will have to seriously reform their economies to achieve better structure and more productive use of resources. This will be an interesting development to watch as a part of the environment in which the USSR will be deciding what to do about reform.

THE ONE FACTOR that might improve Soviet growth prospects and ease allocational conflicts somewhat would be a turnaround in productivity trends. That would permit output to continue rising in the face of slowed input growth. One of the puzzles for analysts of the Soviet economy is to pinpoint why growth in productivity has decelerated from something like 2 percent a year in the 1960's to a negative number in the late 1970's. Some see it as the culmination of a growing incompatibility between the nature of the command economy and the increasingly complex tasks such a system must deal with. Others think it may be caused by a chance combination of such factors as unusually bad luck in weather and the effects of some structural transitions that will ease as time goes on.

Many of the papers address various aspects of this problem. Stanley Cohn's paper on capital productivity suggests a secular trend toward lower output per unit of capital that will not get better. Edward Hewett's paper on natural gas emphasizes the same theme. In their study of Soviet energy demand, Laurie Kurtzweg and Albina Tretyakova predict difficulties in adapting the structure of demand to changing availability of resources, a problem apparently rooted in the inadequacy of the mechanisms used to transmit changes in scarcities to decision-makers. This is especially likely to be problematic in the case of electric power. Two other troublesome sectors are the steel and transportation industries, which were mentioned specifically by Brezhnev in his speech to the military in October 1982.[2] The two contributions on these sectors, by the Central In-

[2] *Pravda* (Moscow), Oct. 28, 1982, p. 1.

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telligence Agency and by Holland Hunter and Deborah Kaple respectively, lend support to the idea that what is at work here is a combination of classic capacity shortages that could presumably be eased by more investment.

On the whole, however, there is little in any of the studies in this collection to encourage the idea that a revolution in productivity growth can come about without thorough reform of the economic system. Three papers, by Paul Cocks, Gertrude Schroeder, and Martin Spechler, reviewing the many administrative changes that have been instituted or considered, demonstrate the extreme caution of the Soviet leadership in its efforts at economic reform. The regime has consistently attempted to avoid changing the central institutions of its administered economy, which many outsiders see as the source of the problem. Gertrude Schroeder is an especially convincing pessimist on this point. Reviewing a large number of experiences of economic tinkering that have taken place since 1979, she concludes that none of the recent reform measures get at fundamental problems and that the system is still slogging away on a fruitless "treadmill of reforms." If anything, notes Schroeder, in the final years of the Brezhnev regime, Soviet officials inhibited reform by blocking certain initiatives backed by the late Aleksey Kosygin in the mid-1960's and by persistently intervening in economic affairs in order to impose a set of priorities on an increasingly ossified and recalcitrant bureaucratic structure. Indeed, many of the policy measures adopted recently to deal with specific problems have actually made matters worse. For example, at a time when a labor shortage is one of the most pressing problems, industrial planners have opted for a new system of measuring plan fulfillment (replacing the old gross-output system with value-added measures of output) which may well reduce the temptation to waste material inputs, but at the cost of biasing decisions toward greater labor intensity. The instrument now being introduced to prevent excessive labor use is a purely administrative measure—the establishment of enterprise-by-enterprise employment ceilings. There has been no attempt to release labor by strengthening economic incentives.

The agricultural sector, which has performed so badly in recent years, is the focus of an extremely informative section of this collection. Complementing Gale Johnson's comprehensive overview of Soviet agriculture are a number of essays dealing with more detailed aspects of the situation, such as private farming, the grain trade, the food program, and the livestock economy. A particularly useful paper is Vladimir Treml's update on agricultural subsidies, which he reports as having reached 37 billion rubles (over US$50 billion) a year by 1980. This is a subsidy on a gigantic scale, so huge in fact that the population pays only about half of the actual cost of the agricultural products it consumes. The regime's unwillingness to reform food prices, i.e., bring them closer to cost, is a major cause of the widely perceived food shortage and is instrumental in greatly reducing the welfare and incentive effects such subsidies should provide. Some authors in these volumes even suggest that better pricing policies could significantly improve the availability of food through the distribution system. The general assessment seems to be that although Brezhnev's food program offers a great deal of encouragement to agricultural producers (in the form of increased allocation of resources), it fails to promote local initiative based on economic incentives—a policy that would both alleviate excessive reliance on administrative interference from above and enhance the utilization of these resources below. In the livestock economy, in particular, numerous difficulties—wrong input mixes, poor utilization of hay and pasturage, temporal and spatial misallocations—could be overcome if the producers were freer to make decisions about how best to use the expensive inputs with which the sector is being so lavishly supplied.

CRUCIAL to the prospects for economic reform is its political aspect, namely, the problem of building a coalition to support significant change in the face of the opposition of many vested interests: party officials fearful of losing power, state bureaucrats dependent on the continuation of the present system, managers accustomed to old ways, workers afraid of losing their jobs. Although this issue is not fully explored in these papers, what is said suggests that the political obstacles to extensive economic reform are insurmountable.

Is there anything less extreme that the new leadership can do? This issue is not addressed specifically or systematically in this collection, although several authors do diagnose difficulties in a way that suggests possible policy changes that could be effected without requiring serious restructuring of the core institutions of the system. Gregory Grossman, for example, interprets widespread inflationary pressures in consumer goods markets as caused by excessive growth in the money supply and the creation of a large cash "overhang." This cash over-

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hang seriously erodes incentives and stimulates the growth not only of corruption but also of the black market economy. He sees the widely reported shortages of the Soviet economy as the result not so much of low levels of physical output as of bad pricing policies. In the same vein, a paper by Kenneth Gray on meat supply suggests that much of the consumer dissatisfaction with unavailability of meat comes not from unduly low per capita output, but from failure to employ equilibrium pricing.

This line of thinking is reflected in the analyses of many Soviet economists who emphasize the erosion of incentives when price-induced shortages make it impossible to convert the money rewards from greater effort into real income. It might be possible to generate a significant improvement in satisfaction and effort by a reform of wages and consumer goods pricing that would restore the incentive power of the ruble.

These are all complicated issues, and it is impossible to do more than introduce them here. The outcomes are obviously not subject to definite prediction by any assembly of 50 or so experts, even when they are as knowledgeable as those gathered here. How intractable the difficulties being forecast are, and what the new regime will do to resolve them, will be revealed only after several years have passed. In following that process, however, these volumes will be an invaluable vade mecum, and I suspect that these analyses will stand up well.

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Technology Transfer and Soviet Innovation

by Gordon B. Smith

EUGENE ZALESKI and HELGARD WIENERT. *Technology Transfer between East and West.* Paris, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 1980.

PHILIP HANSON. *Trade and Technology in Soviet-Western Relations.* New York, NY, Columbia University Press, 1981.

RONALD AMANN and JULIAN COOPER, Eds. *Industrial Innovation in the Soviet Union.* New Haven, CT, Yale University Press, 1982.

VLADIMIR SOBESLAVSKY and P. G. BEAZLEY. *The Transfer of Technology to Socialist Countries: The Case of the Soviet Chemical Industry.* Cambridge, MA, Oelgeschlager, Gunn and Hain, 1980.

OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT. *Technology and East-West Trade.* Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1979.

OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT. *Technology and Soviet Energy Availability.* Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1981.

THANE GUSTAFSON. *Selling the Russians the Rope? Soviet Technology Policy and US Export Controls.* Santa Monica, CA, Rand Corporation, 1981.

SINCE THE IMPOSITION of economic sanctions on the USSR for invading Afghanistan, East-West trade and technology transfer have become central issues in international relations. Political commentary on these matters over the past three years has generated much more heat than light. The seven serious studies under review here are welcome for the contrast they offer to these polemics.

It is worth noting that four are the works of European scholars: one is by Eugene Zaleski and Helgard Wienert for the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD); two are by scholars at the Centre for Russian and East European Studies at the University of Birmingham (those by Philip Hanson and by Ronald Amann and Julian Cooper); and one, by Vladimir Sobeslavsky and P. G. Beazley, for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, London. Of the three American works, two were published by the Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) and one was written by Thane Gustafson for the Rand Corporation. Together, these thoroughly researched and documented studies represent a wealth of information and years of collective effort by the leading European and American authorities on East-West trade and technology transfer.

The OECD study and the first of the two OTA volumes provide enlightening overviews of the complex issues involved, while the Amann and Cooper book, the OTA energy report, and the Sobeslavsky and Beazley volume concentrate on case studies demonstrating the problems and dynamics of the process of technology transfer. The excellent studies by Hanson and Gustafson bridge the gap, providing a theoretical and policy overview of technology transfer as well as incorporating several illuminating case studies. Most important, all of the authors relate their analyses of East-West trade to larger policy questions of export control, linkage, and East-West relations.

Despite frequent use of the term "East-West" technology transfer, the focus clearly is on technology acquisitions by the USSR. To be sure, the OTA volume and the OECD study also provide some discussion of technology imports by Eastern Europe, but more in-depth analyses are needed on this subject.

Technology transfer is an elusive concept and not easily measured. It may be defined as the transmission of technical information, procedures, or skills from one source to another. The channels by which these transfers can be made are numerous: trade, license purchases, co-production, turn-key projects, and reverse engineering. Moreover,

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since technology is "know-how" and not a physical object, it can also be transferred through noncommercial channels such as scientific exchanges, scholarly publications and conferences, trade fairs, and industrial espionage. The authors of these studies focus exclusively on commercial forms of technology transfer.

There is a tendency in some of these studies, when discussing technology transfer, to concentrate on trade, to the neglect of other forms of transfer. However, trade does not necessarily transfer the "know-how" required to replicate a product or process; it may only result in "technology substitution." There is also a tendency to focus on the transfer of products (equipment and hardware) at the expense of technical knowledge (processes and software). Exceptions to this propensity are Hanson, and Zaleski and Wienert, who acknowledge the increasing significance of license purchases of "pure knowledge." Hanson reports that license purchases by the Soviet Union increased from a handful in the mid-1960's to about 13,000 in 1976 (p. 83). The purchase of a license is not only a relatively cheap means of acquiring critical "know-how"; Zaleski and Wienert estimate that it enables the purchaser to advance 7–8 years in the given sector, compared to advances of only 3–5 years with the purchase of equipment, and only 1–2 years through co-production arrangements (p. 119).

IT IS ALMOST IMPOSSIBLE to quantify the benefit of import technologies to the USSR. How effectively are they used? Does Western technology substitute for indigenous, less efficient technology, or does it provide new capabilities? To what extent are Western technologies assimilated and diffused throughout the Soviet economy? These are just some of the unknowns that cloud our understanding of the impact of East-West technology transfer. These studies here at least suggest some significant answers.

Since the mid-1950's, the rate of Soviet commercial acquisition of Western technology has increased rapidly. In the years 1968–78, Western machinery sales to the USSR grew at an average rate of more than 27 percent a year.[1] As the volume of technology imports has risen, they have tended to be spread over a widening range of industrial branches. For instance, equipment for the chemical industry accounted for more than 35 percent of all Soviet technology imports in 1960, but only 11 percent in 1975 (Hanson, p. 107).

The volume of Soviet imports of Western technology is severely constrained by a shortage of hard currency. Soviet hard-currency earnings in 1979 totaled US$19.1 billion, more than half of which was derived from the export of oil and gas.[2] Future hard-currency reserves will depend on continued growth in Soviet natural gas exports. Reflecting the high priority attached to gas development, in 1979 approximately 22 percent of all Soviet imports consisted of energy equipment, especially pipe and pipeline compressors. The authors of the OTA energy study conclude that the most important determinant of Soviet gas production through 1990 will be the rate of pipeline construction (pp. 10, 8). However, the importation of Western pipeline equipment may be substantially restricted by the Soviet Union's estimated US$20 billion debt to the West.[3]

While the total volume of Soviet imports from the West in recent years amounts to less than 1.5 percent of the Soviet Union's gross domestic product,[4] in some sectors, Western imports have been extensive. For example, by the late 1970's, Western equipment accounted for between 66 and 100 percent of Soviet output of polyethylene, polyester fiber, and acrylic fiber (Gustafson, p. 22). Western equipment accounts for 40 percent of Soviet output of nitrogenous fertilizer and 65 percent of the output of all complex fertilizers. Soviet dependence on Western equipment for the production of complex and concentrated fertilizers leads Sobeslavsky and Beazley to conclude that the more technologically progressive the product, the greater the dependence on imported equipment (pp. 82, 80).

The beneficial effect of Western technology transfers to the USSR is limited by the poor performance of the Soviet economy in assimilating foreign technology and diffusing it broadly.[5] Major studies of the adoption of German machine tools and British chemical equipment indicate that Soviet factories required three and one-half to four

[1] Calculated from data presented in Hanson, p. 129.

[2] US Department of Commerce, International Trade Administration, *East-West Trade Update: A Commercial Fact Sheet for US Business*, Washington, DC, August 1980, p. 13; and US Central Intelligence Agency, *International Energy Statistical Review*, Washington, DC, April 28, 1981, pp. 25–26.

[3] US Department of Commerce, *Statistical Abstract of East-West Trade Finance*, Washington, DC, forthcoming.

[4] Reported by USSR Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade, Vladimir Sushkov, in *Ekonomicheskoye sotrudnichestvo stran SEV* (Moscow), No. 3, 1977, p. 58.

[5] Soviet literature on this problem is extensive. See V.I. Kushlin, *Uskoreniye vnedreniya nauchnykh dostizhenii v proizvodstvo* (Accelerating the Introduction of Scientific Advances into Production), Moscow, Ekonomika, 1976; V.A. Trapeznikov, Ed., *Upravleniye issledovaniyami, razrabotkami i vnedreniyem novoy tekhniki* (Managing the Research, Development, and Application of New Technology), Moscow, Ekonomika, 1977; and Ye. P. Torkanovskiy, *Sozdaniye i vnedreniye novoy tekhniki na predpriyatii* (Creation and Application of New Technology in the Enterprise), Moscow, Yuridicheskaya literatura, 1972.

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years longer to assimilate new equipment than did Western firms. Not only are assimilation periods longer, but chemical plants imported from the West operate on average some 10–20 percent below capacity, with worker productivity some 20 to 50 percent lower than at similar plants in the West.[6] Gustafson concludes that after 20 years of massive imports of Western chemical equipment and technology, the Soviet Union still does not have sufficient independent innovative capability to keep pace with Western firms. In fact, he suggests, the strategy of relying on imports may have retarded the growth of the indigenous chemical industry of the USSR by diverting research and development (R&D) resources to other sectors of the economy (p. 23).

The impediments to effective assimilation and diffusion of Western technology are most clearly seen in the work edited by Amann and Cooper. This collection of eight case studies is a sequel to their earlier volume, which attempted to assess the level of technology in several sectors of Soviet industry.[7] The present book seeks to explain variations in the rate of innovation among various sectors of the Soviet economy. Three of the sectors discussed—machine tools, chemicals, and industrial precision controls—have been the recipients of massive amounts of Western technology and equipment for many years, whereas Soviet defense industries (more on which presently) have benefited only indirectly from Western technologies. In addition, there are contributions exploring the development of three types of organizational innovations: group technology, automated management systems (ASU), and reforms in the Soviet R&D system.

This array of cases lends itself to some useful comparisons and contrasts. The machine-tool industry, long a high-priority sector, is a *product*-innovating branch of engineering, while the chemical industry is a *process*-innovating branch. Product innovation in the machine-tool industry suffers from limited economic incentives to innovate. In the absence of customer demand and market competition, political and administrative pressure must be applied to force enterprises to innovate. By contrast, process innovation requires the construction of new plants, and thus the innovative decision lies with the central authorities. The major impediments to process innovation in the USSR are budgetary restrictions and organizational fragmentation, rather than a lack of incentives to innovate.

Considerable attention has been focused in recent years in the Soviet Union on reforming organizational relations in planning, R&D, and production with the purpose of facilitating innovation. For example, in the production area, the concept of group technology was developed in Leningrad by Sergey Mitrofanov.[8] Group technology calls for identifying the underlying common characteristics of various manufactured items and the processes used in their manufacture, and clustering them so as to produce an optimal sequence of "families" of products (John Grayson in Amann and Cooper, pp. 101–02).

The introduction of group technology illustrates another common characteristic of Soviet innovative behavior noted by most of the authors here, namely the instrumental influence of strong political pressure on behalf of an innovation. Mitrofanov's work on group technology was singled out for praise in a 1957 resolution of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and further facilitated by his election to the Leningrad oblast party committee. Similarly, the ambitious effort to streamline Soviet central planning through the application of automated management systems has been promoted by three highly-placed scientists: Isaak Bruk, Nikolay Fedorenko, and the late Viktor Glushkov.[9] Official support for ASU was signaled in General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev's report to the 24th party congress, where he called for the establishment of branch automated management systems, eventually to be integrated into a centralized, nationwide automated system of information collection and processing.[10] Ironically, one of the major problems delaying the application of automated management systems in the USSR is the same problem they were intended to eliminate—lack of coordination among diverse administrative agencies, each of them having only partial responsibility for introducing ASU.

[6] See Philip Hanson and Malcolm R. Hill, "Soviet Assimilation of Western Technology: A Survey of U.S. Exporters' Experience," in US Congress, Joint Economic Committee, *Soviet Economy in a Time of Change*, Vol. 2, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1979, pp. 582–605; and K. C. Rothlingshofer and H. Vogel, *Soviet Absorption of Western Technology: Report on the Experience of West German Exporters*, Munich, IFO, 1979.

[7] R. Amann, J. M. Cooper, and R. W. Davies, *The Technological Level of Soviet Industry*, New Haven, CT, Yale University Press, 1977.

[8] Mitrofanov's definitive work, *Nauchnyye osnovy gruppovoy tekhnologii* (Leningrad, Lenizdat, 1959) is available in English translation, *The Scientific Principles of Group Technology*, Boston, MA, Boston Spa, 1966.

[9] Academician Fedorenko is director of the Central Economics and Mathematics Institute and Academic Secretary of the Economics Department of the USSR Academy of Sciences. Academician Glushkov, who died in early 1982, was director of the Institute of Cybernetics of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, in Kiev.

[10] *Materialy XXIV s"yezda KPSS* (Materials of the 24th CPSU Congress), Moscow, Politizdat, 1971, pp. 65, 67–68.

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IN THE DEFENSE SECTOR of the USSR, the main barriers to innovation in the Soviet economy— insufficient resources, taut plan targets, and problems of interdepartmental coordination—are substantially minimized, as David Holloway notes in his contribution to the Amann and Cooper volume. Not only do Soviet defense industries receive first priority in the procurement of personnel and materials, but supply arrangements are more dependable, thus eliminating a major source of uncertainty that impedes innovation. Taut production targets, which in the civilian sector create a reluctance to introduce new processes or products, do not hamper defense industries. Experimental factories are not assigned production quotas, and serial-production enterprises are under considerable political and administrative pressure to fulfill specific production orders, even if they entail widespread retooling and "down-time" (p. 342). Finally, Soviet defense industries have been granted considerably more organizational flexibility than other sectors of the economy. In the high-technology fields of aviation and missile production, design bureaus are attached directly to experimental plants that produce prototypes, thus bridging the research/production chasm that plagues other industries. Coordination between producer and consumer in the defense sector is more easily achieved because the USSR Ministry of Defense is the sole purchaser of military equipment. Defense quality control inspectors have the right to reject substandard goods, reinforcing the incentive to innovate and upgrade products (p. 325).

However, some continuities remain between Soviet defense industries and the rest of the economy. Technological innovation in the Soviet defense system is heavily dependent upon the copying of developments in the West. Innovations in Soviet weapons systems also tend to be evolutionary in character (e.g., scaling up), not marked by revolutionary strides forward. As Holloway notes in reference to both tanks and ICBM's, Soviet defense planners rely on such characteristics as simplicity of design, operational reliability, and large production runs to compensate for lagging technological innovation (p. 382).

UNDOUBTEDLY, the central and most troubling question for Western policymakers looking at East-West trade and technology transfer is whether the USSR's acquisition of Western technology contributes directly or indirectly to the Soviet military buildup. The need to maintain effective regulation of the export of strategic technology has never been at issue. However, what constitutes a "strategic technology" is widely debated, and the issue has led to well-publicized disagreements in the West both on the national level and among the Western allies.

Gustafson argues that the Soviets appear to be most efficient at assimilating foreign technology in those areas where their own technological base is already well-developed, notably the military (p. 75). This would justify the application of effective export controls in that sector.

However, the issue today is whether "non-strategic" Western technology will assist the Soviets over the long run in upgrading their traditionally neglected civilian industries and thus provide the infrastructure for future advances in military technology. Gustafson concludes that the benefits accruing to the Soviet Union in this regard are probably not sufficient to warrant an expanded system of export controls. The best strategy for safeguarding US strategic interests, he contends, is to maintain a strong R&D system in the US in order to protect Western technological lead-times (p. 77).

Proponents of linkage and economic embargoes will find little in these volumes to bolster their positions. Hanson argues that given the lack of cooperation among Western governments and the modest volume of Western technology exports to the USSR, leverage is very weak (p. 258). Zaleski and Wienert note that for Western Europe, gaining access to Eastern markets has always been the primary reason for establishing closer trading links with the East. Political considerations have, by and large, been secondary (p. 172). Sobeslavsky and Beazley conclude that it would be unrealistic to expect Soviet concessions on either internal or foreign policies in exchange for Western technology (p. 116). What virtually all the authors recognize is that East-West trade and technology transfer today are highly politicized issues and that the policies governing them are and will for the foreseeable future be based not on economic or technical criteria, but on the prevailing political climate of East-West relations.

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Weighing Power and Principle

by Samuel P. Huntington

ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI. *Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Adviser, 1977–1981*. New York, NY, Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1983.

IN THE EARLY pages of his book Zbigniew Brzezinski describes how President Carter, at the beginning of his administration, wanted a comprehensive statement of foreign policy goals for the next four years. Brzezinski asked me to help him prepare this document. Our product was a 43-page report identifying 10 major goals, a complex range of secondary goals and intermediate steps related to the realization of those primary goals, and a schedule for the achievement of each step and goal. The President was, Brzezinski says, "quite taken" with this effort, "praising it as an unusually useful document." It provided a "guide" for the "daily operations" of the administration.

Toward the end of his book, Brzezinski identifies 14 major accomplishments of the Carter administration in foreign policy. In some instances, as with the normalization of relations with China, the policy goals were achieved almost exactly in the order and on the schedule specified in our report. In other, more frequent cases, the achievements fell far short of the goals we had set forth. Comparing the achievements listed on pp. 528–29 with the goals outlined on pp. 53–56, one might well feel justified in giving the Carter administration a rather low grade in terms of performance.

That would, however, be an unfair way of judging the Carter record. The goals specified were, as Brzezinski says, "overly ambitious"; they were far more than any administration could hope to achieve in four years. A fairer and more relevant comparison is with the records of other administrations. The Carter achievements include major steps toward the resolution of many long-standing, festering international issues: the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty, normalization of relations with China, the Panama Canal treaty, a SALT II treaty, unratified but observed, the conclusion of the Tokyo round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, independence for Zimbabwe. In addition, they include initiatives to reassert American principle with the emphasis on human rights, and to rebuild American power through NATO conventional and theater nuclear modernization, larger defense budgets, the Rapid Deployment Force, the MX missile system, and the new strategic emphases set forth in Presidential Directives 18 and 59, and other documents. All in all, it is an impressive list of achievements, perhaps equaled in the post-World War II period only by those of the first Truman and first Nixon administrations. Yet, somehow the image has developed that the Carter administration was weak, uncertain, and ineffective in foreign policy.

Brzezinski's memoirs provide a first-rate insight into how so much was accomplished and suggest some reasons why these accomplishments did not bring the administration the credit it was due. In part the latter was the result of the high goals it set for itself. In larger part, however, it was a result of a few highly publicized fumbles—fully detailed in this book—which made the administration look far more disorganized and incompetent than it was. These include the joint US-Soviet declaration on the Middle East, the neutron bomb decision reversal, the UN vote fiasco over Israeli-occupied territories, the Soviet brigade in Cuba flap, and, most tellingly, of course, the inability to free the hostages in Iran until the end of the administration. These incidents, combined with the real differences over policy that existed within the administration, gave rise to an image of indecisiveness which it was impossible to shake. Once the media latches on to a negative image of a president, it becomes their touchstone for the coverage and interpretation of his administration. Thus Nixon was made forever evil, Ford forever stupid, and Carter forever weak, no matter how much evidence there was to the contrary in each case.

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Brzezinski does not attempt to cover all important topics in the Carter administration's foreign policy; nor does he adhere strictly to chronology. His 550-page account divides into five roughly equal sections devoted to:

- A general introduction and conclusion, describing his relationship with President Carter, Mrs. Carter, Cyrus Vance, Walter Mondale, and Harold Brown; how the administration got started; and what conclusions its experience suggests for future policy and the policymaking process.

- The Middle East, focused heavily, of course, on the Camp David accords.

- US-Soviet relations, particularly as they were affected by Soviet behavior in the SALT negotiations, in Afghanistan, and in the Third World generally.

- Iran, involving two fascinating chapters on the fall of the Shah and the handling of the hostage crisis.

- The normalization of relations with China, in which Brzezinski played the central role; plus two short, unrelated chapters on global issues, such as human rights, and on US relations with its European allies.

MUCH OF THE interest in this book has focused on Brzezinski's relations with Vance and their differences on policy. These were often greatly exaggerated in the media, but they did exist—particularly with respect to China, Iran, and the Soviet Union. In many instances, however, the differences over policy toward the Communist states appear to have been not so much between Vance and Brzezinski as between the State Department and line toward the Soviets, only to come back the next day with objections and different recommendations to which he had been exposed in his department. The State Department, as Brzezinski puts it, was more often than not "excessively deferential to the Soviets" (p. 318). The large number of cases, which Brzezinski describes, in which some State Department officials attempted to alter or to undercut administration policy, (e.g., Marshall Shulman, Vance's adviser on Soviet affairs, telling Ambassador Dobrynin that the President's hard-line Wake Forest speech was meant only for domestic consumption), while not individually important in themselves, furnish telling evidence of the ways in which bureaucrats can frustrate presidents. In the end, the Soviets themselves proved that Brzezinski's view of then was right and the State Department-Vance view of them was wrong.

While Brzezinski and Vance differed on Soviet policy, their views in many respects converged and reinforced each other on the Middle East. Brzezinski gives Vance full credit for the central role which he played, second only to President Carter, in the negotiation of the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty. He also indicates the extent to which he sympathized with Vance over the March 1980 UN vote incident, in which, over Brzezinski's opposition, Vance was compelled to humiliate himself publicly and reverse the position taken by the US ambassador to the United Nations.

While Brzezinski's arguments and Soviet behavior caused the President to change significantly his view of the Soviet Union, Carter's antipathy to the use of military force as an instrument of foreign policy remained strong to the end of his presidency. Brzezinski makes a powerful argument that Brzezinski. The book recounts how Vance, in discussions with the President and Brzezinski, would often agree to a relatively tough the failure of the United States to respond to the Soviet-Cuban military intervention in the Horn of Africa with a carrier task force encouraged the Soviets to make their subsequent moves in Cuba and Afghanistan. These, in turn, led to the derailment of the SALT agreement. "Underreaction," as he puts it, "then bred overreaction.... SALT lies buried in the sands of the Ogaden" (p. 189). Brzezinski's views thus closely parallel those of Henry Kissinger: both believe that an essential component of détente policy is preventing or countering effectively Soviet interventions in the Third World. Congress prevented Kissinger from taking the actions he thought necessary in Angola in 1975. Slightly more than two years later Carter refused to take the actions Brzezinski thought necessary in the Horn of Africa.

Throughout the fall of 1978, Carter also refused to accept Brzezinski's view that at some point the United States would have to urge the Iranian military to take timely action to stabilize their country. He also rejected Brzezinski's recommendations that the Iranian rescue mission be combined with punitive military action against Iran. Carter ends his own memoirs, *Keeping Faith*, with a quote from Thomas Jefferson on how "during the period of my administration not a drop of the blood of a single citizen was shed by the sword of war." Like Jefferson, Carter did not see that at times the shedding of some blood may be necessary to avert worse disasters. Brzezinski, on the other hand, clearly stands in the tradition articulated by George Washington that

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the United States must "be able to choose peace or war as our interest guided by justice shall counsel."

IN HIS FINAL section Brzezinski discusses the policymaking process and argues, first, that a president who wishes to play a decisive role in foreign policy needs a strong national security adviser, and, second, that this post should be elevated and retitled Director of National Security Affairs and made subject to Senate confirmation. It is clear from his memoirs, as well as those of Kissinger and others, that someone, short of the president, has to have the lead role in setting forth the broad lines of foreign policy, coordinating its formulation, and overseeing its implementation. In the days of Dean Acheson and John Foster Dulles this was done by the secretary of state, but that has become increasingly difficult. First, it is hard for one departmental secretary, even if he does have the backing of the president, to coordinate the actions of other departmental secretaries (this is particularly so between State and Defense). Second, the State Department and its secretary have important interests to represent, which tend to be lost if State assumes a central coordinating role. As Brzezinski bitingly observes, State identifies foreign policy with diplomacy and hence is almost always supportive of the status quo. There is, however, another point: the State Department has the important function of representing interests not represented in American elections. In the Carter administration, Vance performed this role perfectly: he was soft on the Soviets and tough on the Israelis. With their eyes on domestic politics, Hamilton Jordan and Jody Powell tended to favor just the opposite stands. Someone had to help the President integrate these conflicting demands, and Brzezinski played that role with great effectiveness.

A quarter-century of American history has established the need for a strong national security adviser backed by a small but very high-caliber staff. Should the position be elevated and formalized, as Brzezinski recommends? He supports his argument by pointing to the director of the Office of Management and Budget who now is subject to Senate confirmation. That, however, is not an entirely relevant parallel. Congress has final authority over the budget; both the Constitution and tradition give the president the preeminent role in foreign affairs. Making the president's closest adviser on foreign policy serve two masters would simply add confusion, delay, ambivalence, and divided authority to a policymaking process that already possesses those characteristics in full measure. As Brzezinski points out, the media and Congressional critics always made the most—and the worst—out of the slightest differences in wording between a Vance speech and a Brzezinski speech. Think of how much worse this situation would be if the national security adviser, like members of the cabinet, had to spend up to half his working hours meeting with Congressional committees. And while he was doing that, and the secretary of state was off negotiating in Moscow, Tel Aviv, or Bonn, who would be making foreign policy? No, the president needs a national security adviser who thinks in terms of the president's interests, and the national security adviser needs to be close to the president—his source of power. To formalize the post and make it subject to Senate confirmation would, in due course, only make the president turn elsewhere for foreign policy advice, possibly to some totally unaccountable confidant.

IT IS CLEAR from these memoirs that Brzezinski enjoyed the pursuit of principle, the exercise of power, and the challenge of reconciling the two. He writes with candor and directness, and does not hesitate to pass judgments, at times quite damning, on the personalities and behavior of others. Nor does he hide his own ambitions, motivations, doubts, and mistakes. The memoirs are an extraordinarily informative, open, and revealing account of how foreign policy is made at the top of the US government and what it is like to be involved in this process. They dramatically document the extent to which the conduct of foreign policy does indeed involve the management of diverse contradictions: balancing power and principle (e.g., on human rights), domestic politics and foreign policy needs (e.g., in the Middle East), diplomacy and force (e.g., in Iran), cooperation and competition (e.g., vis-à-vis the Soviet Union).

According to all accounts, the morale of White House staffers was extraordinarily high under President Kennedy because he convinced them they were working closely with him, fighting for the right policy, shaping great events, and having a whale of a time doing these things. Brzezinski had a comparable impact on his NSC staff. The concern, the zest, the sorrows, and the fun come through in this book. They make the book more than indispensable history. They also make it superb reading.

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Gulf Security and Outside Powers

by Oles Smolansky

SHAHRAM CHUBIN, Ed. *Security in the Persian Gulf, 1: Domestic Political Factors*. Montclair, NJ, Allanheld, Osmun, for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1981.

ROBERT LITWAK, Ed. *Security in the Persian Gulf, 2: Sources of Inter-State Conflict*. Montclair, NJ, Allanheld, Osmun, for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1981.

AVI PLASCOV, Ed. *Security in the Persian Gulf, 3: Modernization, Political Development and Stability*. Montclair, NJ, Allanheld, Osmun, for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1982.

SHAHRAM CHUBIN, Ed. *Security in the Persian Gulf, 4: The Role of Outside Powers*. Montclair, NJ, Allanheld, Osmun, for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1982.

HOSSEIN AMIRSADEGHI, Ed. *The Security of the Persian Gulf*. New York, NY, St. Martin's Press, 1981.

TAKEN TOGETHER, these books represent an important contribution to the growing Western literature on the Persian/Arabian Gulf. For the most part scholarly and objective, they focus on the problem of regional security, but eschew the unidimensional approach characteristic of some earlier writing on the subject. Instead, the authors analyze the implications of the area's many, diverse, and multifaceted problems for Gulf security. The stereotype of the region is that of a militarily impotent economic giant whose problems result primarily from its economic value to the rest of the world and its concomitant inability to withstand the pressures exerted by "powerful outsiders." But these authors clearly demonstrate that, while external pressures are an important source of problems, the primary dangers to Gulf security in recent years have come from within the region itself.

For the sake of convenience, these indigenous factors can be classified into two major categories: *traditional,* or those that existed long before the discovery of petroleum early in the 20th century; and *contemporary,* or those that can be traced to the exploitation of oil (more precisely, to the efforts by the Gulf's ruling families and elites to use their new-found wealth to effect rapid socioeconomic change). To the former category belong the deep national cleavages separating the Gulf's Arab, Persian/Iranian, and other inhabitants, coupled with rivalries between adherents of Islam's two major subdivisions, the Sunnis and the Shi'is. The same is true of the ancient feuds among the region's many tribes and their respective ruling families. The interplay of these forces, as well as occasional intrusions by outside powers such as the Ottoman Empire and Great Britain, accounted for much of what could be termed the politics of the Gulf and surrounding regions before the discovery of oil.

The flow of the area's petroleum to Western markets, and of hard currency in the opposite direction, has exacerbated many of these traditional rivalries—as attested to by numerous intraregional disputes over territories where oil either has been or might be discovered—and has also given rise to new problems. Simply put, the enormous wealth made available to many of the Gulf region's governments has enabled them to embark upon ambitious programs of economic and social development. Among other things, these far-flung efforts have made it necessary for the governments of many oil-producing states to attract large numbers of foreign specialists (educators, physicians, bureaucrats, technicians) and workers. In the process, foreigners (including Arabs from other countries) have come to constitute the majority of the population in some states. According to Allan G. Hill, whose chapter on the demographics of the Gulf appears in the first volume edited by Shahram Chubin, this is true of such states as Kuwait and Qatar—where the respective proportions of resident aliens came to 52.5 and 61.8 percent by 1979.

Some of the political repercussions are obvious. The fact that

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some 300,000 Palestinians reside in Kuwait, where the total population numbers approximately 1.3 million, accounts for the lively interest that the ruling family has exhibited in the geographically remote Arab-Israeli conflict. In Saudi Arabia, between one and two million Yemenis have sought and found employment—explaining, in part, Riyadh's concern with the affairs of North and South Yemen. Social and economic strains produced by such heavy dependence on foreign workers could conceivably threaten the internal stability of several states in the region.

The problem of expatriate labor has been compounded by a host of related problems. Particularly troublesome are rapid urbanization, resulting in the breakup of traditional, tribally-oriented societies and hence in far-reaching social dislocations, and the growth of political awareness and activism on the part of the indigenous population, which the rulers have attempted to neutralize by spreading the wealth. In short, the "oil boom" has thrust disruptive tendencies upon the fragile traditional societies of many Gulf states. These internal problems are examined in detail in the volume edited by Chubin, and in those edited by Robert Litwak and, especially, by the late Avi Plascov.

ON A LARGER SCALE, the region's strategic location and petroleum deposits have made it impossible for the Gulf to escape the attention of outside powers, even more so than in the past. These and other related issues are the subject of Chubin's second volume and of the contributions to Hossein Amirsadeghi's edited work.

In the early 1970's, the United States supplanted Great Britain as *the* Western power determined to protect the region's security and to keep open the flow of petroleum to North American, West European, and Far Eastern markets. With Iraq, the Gulf's most powerful Arab state, moving closer to the USSR (the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between the two states was signed in 1972), the Nixon administration developed what has since been known as the "two pillar" approach to the twin problems of regional security and stability. It was based on active US encouragement and support for the "conservative," pro-Western regimes of Iran and Saudi Arabia. Of these two states, imperial Iran—the most populous, developed, and militarily powerful country in the Gulf—attracted Washington's particular attention. President Nixon's decision to embrace the Shah resulted in active promotion of the latter's determination to continue the process of rapid economic and military development at home, and to play the part of "Gulf policeman" abroad. The Shah's relentless pursuit of "modernization" resulted in major social and economic dislocations, severely strained the country's resources, and fueled the flames of resentment among Iran's traditional and poorer classes, led by the powerful Shi'i clergy. In January 1979, the Shah was forced to leave the country.

The advent to power of the clerical regime headed by Ayatollah Khomeini shook the Gulf to its foundations. It instilled fear in the hearts of those Arab rulers whose societies contained large numbers of Shi'i Muslims, judged to be sympathetic to the appeals for a return to the "purity of Islam" emanating from revolutionary Tehran. (This applied not only to Iraq, Kuwait, and Bahrain but also to Saudi Arabia, where the Shi'is constitute the majority of the population in the oil-rich Eastern Province.) Iran's revolution also threatened the legitimacy of those Gulf regimes whose devotion to the values of Islam could be questioned by Sunni "fundamentalism." Thus, in addition to the direct loss of a major stabilizing force on the Gulf scene, the Shah's departure brought to power a man given to calling on all Muslims to follow Iran's example and overthrow their "decadent" rulers. All these developments have heightened local fears that ambitious outsiders (especially the Soviet Union) would attempt to "fish in troubled waters."

Similarly gloomy visions have been common in the West. Washington, in particular, has regarded the Shah's overthrow as a major blow to Western interests. It was widely felt that the collapse of Iran as a major US "pillar," coupled with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, was bound to create more regional turmoil. This, in turn, was believed likely to affect Western access to the area's petroleum resources, and to help the USSR spread its influence in the Gulf. Among the resulting efforts to "stabilize" the region was the proclamation of the Carter Doctrine, which threatened the use of force in the event of a Soviet attempt to "dominate" the region, and the establishment of a Rapid Deployment Force to lend credence to the new US doctrine. Both measures have since been wholeheartedly endorsed by the Reagan administration.

Much has been written in the West—and the books reviewed here are certainly no exception—about the potential or actual Soviet threat to the Gulf. The crumbling of Western-sponsored security arrangements in the Gulf, and the newly documented Soviet tendency toward "adventurism," it was claimed, would lead to Moscow's more active involvement in regional affairs. This Western (and

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particularly US) concern merits another look in the light of the events of the past three years.

IN OCCUPYING Afghanistan and expanding that country's transportation and communications network, the USSR has moved its forward bases closer to the Persian/Arabian Gulf. In the process, the Kremlin has improved its ability to project power into that region. On the debit side, however, Soviet forces have gotten bogged down in a protracted guerrilla war which, by all indications, shows no signs of abating. Equally unfortunate for Moscow, in view of its consistent efforts to present the USSR as a "selfless friend of the Muslim peoples," is the fact that it is engaged in military operations against Muslim fighters waging a "holy war" against the "godless" Soviets. At a time of major religious revival in neighboring Iran and elsewhere in the Middle East, the Kremlin is clearly unhappy about the situation in Afghanistan. Nevertheless, its commitment to upholding the pro-Soviet regime in Kabul leaves the USSR, for the time being, no choice but to stay the course.

The overthrow of the Shah, as noted, was the other major event contributing to mounting concern about Moscow's intentions in the Gulf. Direct Soviet influence in revolutionary Tehran was generally believed to be negligible, but potentially significant. Specifically, Soviet influence was held to be intimately tied to the fortunes of the pro-USSR Tudeh party. Though weakened by years of persecution, the Communists were thought to have infiltrated the ranks of the armed forces and of the trade unions, especially among the oil workers in Khuzistan. Given the internal upheavals of the early post-revolutionary period and their impact on Iran's other political organizations, the Communists were regarded as capable of mounting, in time, a serious challenge to the clerical regime. The Tudeh aside, the Soviets were thought to have benefited indirectly but significantly from the crumbling of the US position in Iran. Finally, many feared that the pronounced anti-Westernism of Tehran's new rulers, culminating in the occupation of the US embassy and the taking of hostages, would lead Khomeini to seek the cooperation and perhaps even protection of the USSR.

It is highly instructive to note that most of these contingencies have not materialized. The Tudeh hung on to a degree of "respectability" by publicly supporting the Ayatollah and his policies. In the end, however, the Communists incurred Khomeini's wrath because of their verbal backing for the Babrak Karmal regime in Kabul. The imposition of "Islamic justice"—culminating in the dissolution of the Tudeh in early May 1983—has left the party in disarray from which it is not soon likely to recover.[1]

Similarly, the Kremlin has proved incapable—though certainly not for lack of trying—of exploiting for its own purposes the genuine, powerful anti-Americanism of the ayatollahs. Discarding their initial caution, after February 1979 the Soviets welcomed the revolution as "objectively progressive," on the ground that it did much to weaken the Western position in Iran and elsewhere in the Gulf. Words have been backed by action. At the height of the hostage crisis, Moscow extended Tehran its political and moral support and opened the Soviet transportation system for the transit of Iranian trade.[2]

After the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war in September 1980, the Kremlin adopted a public posture of neutrality and noninvolvement. In reality, however, it clearly tilted toward Iran—despite the fact that Iraq had been the only Gulf state to sign a treaty of friendship with the USSR. Thus, at the beginning of the conflict, Moscow expressed its disapproval of the Iraqi invasion in thinly veiled criticism and, more important, withheld from Baghdad arms and spare parts required for the maintenance of Soviet military equipment delivered earlier in the decade.[3] The Kremlin was also rumored to have offered weapons to Tehran.[4]

If the Soviet leaders were trying to dump Iraq and draw Iran into their orbit, in the manner of the earlier switch of clients on the Horn of Africa, their effort ended in failure. Though staunchly anti-Western and engaged in a major conflict with Iraq, Tehran has refused to abandon its equally uncompromising attitude toward the USSR. Even when using the Soviet Union for their own purposes, Iran's religious leaders have left no doubt about their conviction that both Washington and Moscow belonged to the category of "Great Satans." As such, the Kremlin has

[1] See *The New York Times*, May 5, 1983.

[2] See, e.g., Brezhnev's telegram congratulating Khomeini on the establishment of the Islamic Republic, in *Pravda* (Moscow), Apr. 4, 1979. For a frank account of USSR–Iran relations since the seizure of the US embassy in Tehran, see the article by A. Akhmedzianov in *Izvestiya* (Moscow), Feb. 11, 1982.

[3] The Soviet leaders and press have consistently described the Iraq-Iran war as "senseless" and "fratricidal"; see, e.g., the article by P. Demchenko in *Pravda*, Jan. 19, 1981; and Brezhnev's speech to the 26th Congress of the CPSU, in ibid., Feb. 24, 1981. For a public claim that Moscow was withholding weapons from Iraq in the initial stages of the war, see ibid., Jan. 11, 1981 (statement by the Soviet embassy in Tehran). This reviewer's conversations with various informants suggest that, at the time, only previously contracted deliveries to Iraq continued—and then only from East European suppliers.

[4] Karen Dawisha, "Moscow and the Gulf War," *The World Today* (London), January 1981, p. 12.

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been unacceptable as a full-fledged ally of the revolutionary regime. For this reason, Moscow appears to have given up on Iran as of 1983, and is now once again engaged in a "fence-mending" operation in Iraq. One of its primary manifestations has been the stepped-up delivery of Soviet weapons to the beleaguered Ba'athi regime in Baghdad.[5]

THE MOST IMPORTANT conclusion to be derived from the foregoing analysis is that the understandable temptation—in both Washington and Moscow—to view events in the Gulf through the prism of superpower rivalry has obscured the truth that the most serious threats to Gulf security stem from regional and local dynamics, not from outside powers. Past and present upheavals in the Gulf have been primarily an outgrowth of competing socioeconomic and political forces indigenous to that region. These traditional conflicts, as noted, have been complicated by the efforts of Gulf governments to use their new-found wealth in order to transform their societies in the image of the late-20th-century capitalist West. The resulting social, economic, and political tensions have been contained by some governments better than by others, but all have been affected in major or (in the case of Iran) even fundamental ways. Future turmoil in the region can likewise be expected to derive largely from local causes. The books under review all provide ample evidence in support of these hypotheses.

Nevertheless, some of the contributors do less well than others with what seems, to this reviewer, the most plausible object lesson of their own analyses. Specifically, the widespread application in the books reviewed here of a "zero-sum" model to US-Soviet rivalry in the Gulf does not appear warranted by the facts. The Kremlin has failed to translate into tangible gains the serious damage to the US position caused by the revolution in Iran. Future regional upheavals that weaken one superpower will be no more likely to strengthen the hand of the other.

To be sure, the superpowers and the states of Western Europe can play an important role in the affairs of the Gulf. This role does not, however, rest on their ability to *shape* events—as demonstrated by US and Soviet experiences in Iran, and by Soviet inability to influence the course of events in Iraq. Instead, what outsiders have is merely the power to aggravate or to moderate existing problems. Ideally, given the nature of the stakes, interested external parties should exercise maximum restraint while contributing constructively to the region's political and socioeconomic development. Realistically, however, such restraint is not an attribute of the activist foreign policy pursued by either superpower—as illustrated in the detailed studies in Chubin and in the contributors to Amirsadeghi's edited collection. Continued Western reliance on oil from the Gulf guarantees active participation in the region's affairs. Moscow, which may one day need to import petroleum, has also been casting a covetous eye on the area to its south. Actual or potential economic considerations are automatically compounded by superpower strategic rivalry. For these reasons, and because many of the Gulf's pressing problems have evolved an independent dynamic of their own, it may be safely assumed that the entire area will remain subject to external pressures while also experiencing serious internal dislocations. What is truly remarkable, under these circumstances, is that most Gulf governments have thus far been capable of adapting to and surviving the turmoil of the last quarter of this century.

[5] *The New York Times*, May 6, 1983. See also Karen Dawisha, "The USSR in the Middle East: Superpower in Eclipse?" *Foreign Affairs* (New York, NY), Winter 1982/83, p. 444; this source indicates that large-scale Soviet arms deliveries to Iraq resumed in August 1982.

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